This article uses Mīmāṃsā tools for a non-exegetical purpose, i.e., in order to build a system of representations of imperatives. The purpose of the system is even further away, since it regards Artificial Intelligence. In fact, the authors start with the (evident, but often overlooked) observation that we communicate with computers mostly through imperatives and not assertive statements (do this, then if x, then do z…).
Category Archives: Sanskrit Philosophy
American Academy of Religion
The deadline for submissions for this year’s annual meeting of the American Academy of Religion in San Diego is Monday, March 3, 2014, 5:00 pm EST. The Program Administration Proposal, Evaluation, Review, and Submission (PAPERS) System, the AAR’s online proposal submission system, is open for your proposal! The AAR Meeting will be held November 22-25, 2014.
The Yogācāra Buddhism Group invites proposals on the following:
Call for Papers:
In light of the success and excitement that our text-discussion format has received in recent years, the following candidates for the upcoming AAR were proposed:
• The “Tattvārtha” chapter of the Bodhisattvabhūmi
• A chapter of the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra, e.g., Paramārthasamudgata
• A short text or significant passage from any text related to Yogācāra
Panel and Paper topics:
• Tantric Appropriations of Yogācāra (for a possible cosponsored session with the Tantric Studies Group)
• The body in Yogācāra (can include medicine)
• Intersubjectivity
• Yogācāra and cognitive science
• Yogācāra and phenomenology
• Modern Yogācāra revivals
Additional topics welcome.
Ready to submit your proposal? Go to the MyProposal page to get started.
Doing research on free will in Indian Philosophy
As a scholar trained in Western Academia, one has at least three choices while dealing with Sanskrit Philosophy:
- One can treat it as if it were Western philosophy and discuss, e.g., of monotonic or non-monotonic logic in Nyāya,
- One can deal with it in its own terms, e.g., by describing the inner-Mīmāṃsā controversy about whether one has to study the Veda because of the prescription to study it or because of the prescription to teach it (since, in order for someone to teach, someone else must be learning from him),
- One can attempt a compromise, looking for how a certain topic is configured in Sanskrit philosophy.
In the case of the topic of free will, it is hard to avoid the third approach. In fact, whereas the topic of free will is one of the major Leitmotivs running throughout the whole history of Western Philosophy, on a pair with ontological issues, it is not formulated as such in Sanskrit philosophy (see Freschi in the volume edited by Dasti and Bryant). Nonetheless, one can look for implicit treatments of it in theological contexts and in in philosophy of action ones.
Veṅkaṭanātha (also known with the honorific title Vedānta Deśika, traditional dates 1269–1370) is one of the most prolific and multi-faceted personalities of Indian philosophy. He attempted to create a philosophic system which should have broadened Rāmānuja’s Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta and make it into a more comprehensive philosophical system. Due to its ambition of comprehensiveness, it is legitimate to expect from Veṅkaṭanātha’s system that it deals also with questions relating to the nature of action and of our contribution to it, and, thus, ultimately with the issue of free will.
What do we have at Veṅkaṭanātha’s background?
On the one hand, Veṅkaṭanātha’s relation towards (Pūrva) Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta (and other Indian philosophical systems), on the other his relation with the Vaiṣṇava religious literature he considers authoritative (Pāñcarātra, hymns of the Āḻvārs). Given the fact that most researches on Indian philosophy focus on Sanskrit texts, one runs the risk to neglect the latter component, which is predominant in Veṅkaṭanātha’s non-Sanskrit production.
The Mīmāṃsā background
The Mīmāṃsā school did not explicitly deal with the topic of free will. Nonetheless, its theory of action presupposes that there are real agents and that these can be held responsible for their actions. In this sense, its concept of duty and of responsibility takes free will as self-assumed.
The Vaiṣṇava background
The Vaiṣṇava texts follow a different path, since many of them emphasise the worthlessness of the poet (the Āḻvār) or of his poetical figura (often a woman) and his/her desperate need of God’s mercy, which is the only thing which could save him/her. Interestingly enough, even in these texts, free will is not denied, but rather superseded by God’s intervention. The protagonist is desperate because of her/his sins and states that s/he cannot achieve anything on his/her own. The possibility to achieve salvation through other ways (most notably, through the bhaktimārga, which is based on one’s love for God) is not ruled out. One could theoretically be able to love God and to be saved through that. De facto, however, the protagonists of the Āḻvārs’ hymns feel unable even to do that. Even their love is not perfect, only their surrender is.
Thus, free will seems to remain a pre-condition. But God’s grace can supersede it and save even unworthy ones. Or do Tamil-conversant readers have a better appreciation of what is at stake?
(cross-posted also on the Indian Philosophy blog)
It is fun to reconstruct the (Central Asian) puzzle—An interview with Chiara Barbati —Part 1
I met Chiara Barbati long ago in Italy, because we studied at the same University (“Sapienza” University of Rome), but it is only once we had both moved to Vienna that we became friends. She is now a researcher at the Institute of Iranian Studies at the Austrian Academy of Sciences and works on Sogdian, which is probably well-known to many of us because of the many Buddhist texts being translated from Sanskrit (or, in a less amount, from Chinese) into Sogdian. All the others will be perhaps surprised to know that Sogdian exists (almost) only as a corpus of translations, from Syriac (in the case of Christian texts), from Sanskrit (Buddhist texts) or from Middle Persian (Manichean texts).
शब्दविषये रसेल(Russell)मत: संस्कृतायां वाचि निरूपितः
पूर्वस्मिन् मासे, मृणालकौलमहोदयः संपूर्णानन्दविश्वविद्यालयस्य ३९-तमां संस्कृतां पत्रिकां मह्यं दत्तवान् (अतीव धान्यवादः, मृणाल!) ।
पात्रिकायां भारतीयपण््डितानां संस्कृतसंवादः रसेल(Russell)महोदयस्य शब्दस्वरूपविषयमते संक्षिप्तः । संवाद: शब्दस्य सत्यत्वमिथ्यत्वयोः, संज्ञार्थे, वाक्ये, संबनधे च वर्त्तते स्म ।
शब्दस्य सत्यत्वमिथ्यत्वविषये, अर्थो यदि बहिरवतिष्ठते, तदा वस्त्वेव— इति निरूपितम् (रसेलमहोदयः कदाचित् “नाईव् रीअालिस्ट” (naive realist) इति मह्यं प्रतिभाते, साध्यार्थोपेक्षात्) ।
व्याख्यानं विशुद्धं, रुचिकारं च, न केवलं रसेलमतं निदर्शितमपि तु संस्कृतविवादेष्वनुयोजितं च –इति कारणात् । उदाहरणमिव, चैत्रो वह्णिना क्षेत्रं सिञ्चतीति, अर्थोऽवस्तु, अपितु शब्दरूपः (proposition) अवज्ञेयः । शब्दरूपार्थयोः भेदेन मिथ्यावाक्यावगतिर् सुलभा । तद्विना तु, वह्निणा सिञ्चतीतिवाक्ये योग्यताभवात् वाक्यं किमवगच्छामः ? अनवगते च, केन प्रकारेण मिथ्येति वदेमः ? एवमेव, कथं नैयायोकाः मीमांसकाश्च शब्दनित्यत्वविषये चर्चां कर्तुं शक्नुवन्ति ? यदि शब्दोऽनित्य इतिवाक्यस्यार्थो वस्त्वेव, तर्हि कथं शब्दो नित्य इतिवाक्यमवगम्यते ? रसेलमतः एका एव गतिः इति विद्वांसः मन्यन्ते ।
तत्पश्चात् रसेलमतेन वाचस्पतिमिश्रस्य, शाब्दिकानाम् (इत्युक्ते वैयाकरणानामित्यहं मन्ये) अद्वैतवेदान्तिनां च मतानां भेदो स्फुटीकृतः । रसेलमते बहिरसतः अर्थाः बुद्धावपि नावतिष्टन्ते –इति भेदः । ते तु केवलं बुद्धिविषयाः ।
तत्रभवान् किं किं मन्यते ? रसेलमतं विना किं नैयायिकानां मीमांसकानां मिथः संवादः शक्यो वा न वा ? शक्ये च, कुत्र कुत्र रसेलमतमुपयोजनीयम् ?
Economic structures and philosophic superstructures: On Scott 2013 and Eltschinger 2013
How was Capitalism born? And, more in general, 1. does the economic structure determine its superstructure (including philosophy or religion), as in Marx; 2. does a certain philosophy, religion, etc. determine a certain economic result, as in Weber; or 3. do important actors select a certain philosophy, religion, etc., because it is more adequate for their needs? Or are there still other solutions (as in Hirschman’s 1977 The Passions and the Interests)?
What was happening in Indian publishing houses at the beginning of the 20th c.?
(apologies again for the lack of diacritics, I am still at home)
After several years, I could finally hold grasp of the editio princeps of Veṅkaṭanātha’s Seśvaramīmāṃsā. I found it in the University library in Kiel (too good that German Indology has managed to acquire so many important books!), in a volume collecting other works (see below), presumably because they were all parts of the same series.
What is involved in a religious identity? On the Introduction of Leach 2012
What are the Pāñcarātras? Is there anything like a uniform Pāñcarātra Canon and/or Theology? Or are these texts only part of a constellation which has been made consistent by its later interpreters?
On Vyāsa and the authorship of the Saṅkarṣakāṇḍa UPDATED
(apologies in advance for the partial lack of diacritics, I am home, ill, with no access to a unicode keyboard)
The Saṅkarṣakāṇḍa (henceforth SK, about which see here) is an enigmatic text thought to complete the Mīmāṃsā Śāstra, after the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā Sūtra (henceforth PMS) and before the Uttara Mīmāṃsā Sūtra (or Vedānta Sūtra, henceforth UMS).
As for its origin, several witnesses speak of the SK as having been authored by Jaimini
At the link you can read my thoughts on the topic, from the point of view of mainly Western philosophy, but with some incursions into Indian theories (e.g., of the jīvanmukti or the Bodhisattva).