What was Dignaga’s theory of apoha? On PS 5.41–42 SECOND UPDATE

The main point of departure for any inquiry into Dignāga’s theory of apoha is his Pramāṇasamuccaya, chapter 5. Unluckily enough, this text is only available as a reconstruction from the two (divergent) Tibetan translations and from Jinendrabuddhi’s commentary.

How exactly does one seize the meaning of a word? K. Yoshimizu 2011 (and Kataoka forthc.) on Dignāga and Kumārila UPDATED

We all know that for Dignāga the meaning of a word is apoha ‘exclusion’. But how does one seize it and avoid the infinite regress of excluding non-cows because one has understood what “cow” means? Kataoka at the last IABS maintained (if I understood him correctly) that Dignāga did not directly face the problem of how could one seize the absence of non-cows. He also explained that the thesis he attributes to Hattori and Yoshimizu, which makes the apoha depend on the seizing of something positive (e.g., one seizes the exclusion of non-cows because one seizes the exclusion of dewlap, etc.) contradicts the negative nature of apoha, since it indirectly posits positive entities, such as dewlaps. But this leaves the question of how apoha can take place in the worldly experience open.

(Third day at the IABS:) Franco on the datation of Dharmakīrti and some further thoughts on Dharmakīrti, Dignāga, Kumārila

The datation of Dharmakīrti is a topic I am not competent enough to speak about, but I will nonetheless try to summarise other people’s arguments.
The departing point is the traditionally accepted date of Dharmakīrti, namely 600–660, settled by Erich Frauwallner mainly on the basis of the reports of Chinese pilgrims,

K. Yoshimizu on valid inferences in Kumārila (and on the chronology of Kumārila and Dharmakīrti)

All nice things come to an end, and so did the IABS conference. Now, many among you will be heading to Heidelberg for the Dharmakīrti Conference. Although I will not be able to attend, I received from K. Yoshimizu his paper for it, with the assent to discuss it here.

IABS 2014 — Summary of my posts

For my first impressions concerning the first day at the IABS, with Kei Kataoka’s paper on apoha, see here.

For the first part of the second day, with the panel I organised on textual reuse within Buddhist literature, see here.

For the second part of the second day, with some thoughts on Buddhist epistemology, see here.

For the third part of the second day, with M. Sakai’s paper on dṛṣṭānta, see here.

For the third and forth days, with the panel on Indo-Sinic Buddhism, see here (Introduction, Katsura, Lusthaus) and here (Franco on the date of Dharmakīrti).

For the fifth day, with the panel on Buddhism and Philosophy of Mind, see here.

For the posts my readers and colleagues appreciated more, check here (and add your own likes and dislikes).

Fifth day at the IABS: “Buddhism and Philosophy of Mind” panel, Siderits and Coseru

Today, I went to the panel on Buddhism and Philosophy of Mind, which was announced as involving Christian Coseru, Mark Siderits and Jonardon Ganeri. In fact, Ganeri could not make it (“obviously he did not feel fit for the match” commented Coseru at the beginning, among general laughter), but this had the beneficial consequence that there was a whole slot free for discussion.

Third and forth day at the IABS: “Pramana Across Asia”: Introduction to the panel, Katsura, Lusthaus

The “Pramana across Asia” panel has been opened by Eli Franco, its convener, with the following hope: “In some years, through stimuli such as this panel, we will speak of Indo-Sinic Buddhism, just like we speak of Indo-Tibetan Buddhism”.

Second day at the IABS 2014 in Vienna: The panel on textual reuse UPDATED

Yesterday was the day of our panel (meaning the panel on intertextuality within Buddhist literature organised by Cathy Cantwell, Jowita Kramer and me), which means that I spent most of the day there. The final discussion has been especially challenging and interesting, since