1. manas connecting sense faculty to ātman while sensing an external object (see ŚV pratyakṣa 160ab)

2. manas working itself as a sense faculty for pain and pleasure (see ŚV pratyakṣa 83; ŚV pratyakṣa 136ab; ŚV pratyakṣa 160 cd)

3. manas as a faculty of cognition and memory (see examples below)

Notwithstanding all these roles, manas does not, for Kumārila, work as the faculty perceptually accessing a previous cognition, as in the Nyāya and Buddhist epistemologists’ view of mānasapratyakṣa and anuvyavasāya respectively. Kumārila is quite explicit about it, see ŚV pratyakṣa 134.

Ad 1: To begin with, sense-perception according to Kumārila, works through four elements, namely the sense-faculty, its object (typically an external object), the consciousness-principle (ātman) and the manas. The consciousness-principle is needed because without it the whole process would remain unconscious. The role of manas, by contrast, is invoked in Nyāya in order to direct attention to one or the other sense-faculty and thus to explain why one may not register something although it is in contact with the relevant sense-faculty, because the manas is connecting another sense faculty to the ātman. This functioning is the reason that led scholars like Jonardon Ganeri to think of manas as covering the same role as attention in contemporary Analytic philosophy. However, whereas Nyāya authors insist strongly on the possibility of manas to only connect the ātman to one sense-faculty (so much that seemingly simultaneous perceptions are just occurring too close to each other for people to become aware of the time gap among them), the position might be less clear for Kumārila and other Mīmāṃsā authors, for reasons to be discussed immediately below and in this post: [ahampratyaya].
In partial contrast to that, Kumārila explains manas’ role in perception as primarily needed to explain the possibility of memory. In other words, if sense-perception only involved the external sense faculty and the object, there would be no way leading the sense cognition into memory (see ŚV pratyakṣa 166).
Pārthasārathi’s commentary here is explicit in saying that all memories are manas-based (sarvasmaraṇānāṃ mānasatvāt) and that therefore the possibility of remembering sensory cognitions leads one to infer that manas must have played a role in them too (ataḥ śabdādigrahaṇe ’pi manovyāpāto ’numīyate). The commentary by Pārthasārathi here also mentions the topic of attention (kiñ ca viṣayāntaravyākṣiptamanaskasya cakṣurādisaṃyukteṣv api rūpādiṣu jñānānudayād asti tatrāpi manovyāpāra iti niścīyate), but not so Kumārila himself, or at least not explicitly.
However, Kumārila appears to presuppose this view at a later point in ŚV pratyakṣa, namely in 237cd–238a, when he says that people who did not put their manas to something do not grasp things even if these are connected to their sense faculties (vimanaskā yadā ke cit sambaddham api cendriyaiḥ | na budhyante). Still, there seems to be a strong difference between Kumārila’s and the Nyāya view, insofar as —as fas as I know— Kumārila (and his commentators) don’t declare that manas can only connect one sense faculty at a time with the ātman. Rather, they use the absence of manas-connection to explain why one might not be aware of a certain object, although their sense faculties were connected to it. For instance, the absence of manas-connection explains why a person engrossed in a conversation might not be aware of the room temperature.

Manas is also said to be an indriya ‘sense faculty’ for pain and pleasure, see, for instance, ŚV pratyakṣa 83ab (manasas tv indriyatvena pratyakṣā dhīḥ sukhādiṣu); ŚV 136ab (manasas tv indriyatvena sukhaduḥkhādibuddhiṣu); ŚV ātmavāda 128 (idaṃ mamedṛśaṃ cakṣurmano me śrāntam ity api | indriyeṣv api bhedena vyavahāraś ca dṛśyate ||). Now, what happens in the case of perception using manas as the sense faculty, or manas-pratyakṣa¹ itself? Manas connects itself directly with the ātman and with its object (e.g., inner pain), without any further sense-faculty, as explained in ŚV pratyakṣa 83 cd (manasā samprayukto hi tāny (=sukhādīni) ātmā pratipadyate ||).²

In this connection, how do we grasp ourselves qua an I (I will need to come back to this topic, but see meanwhile this post: [ahampratyaya])?
Kumārila says that we grasp our self as an I through ahampratyaya and that this is a case of sense-perception. Since it is unimaginable that the self is an object of any of the external sense faculties, it appears that it has to be the object of manas-pratyakṣa. Unfortunately, Kumārila never mentions ahampratyaya in the chapter on perception of his ŚV, where the only objects of manas-pratyakṣan are sukhādi ‘pleasure and [pain]’. The self is, in contrast, identified as an object of manas-pratyakṣa later in the ŚV, in the chapter on phonemes (ŚV śabdanityatā 337–338ab: ahaṃpratyayavijñeyair ātmabhir vyabhicāritā | liṅgaśabdādyabhāvena manassaṃyogahetukam || pratyakṣaṃ caitadekāntāt sukhādāv iva kalpyate).
However, given that manas as a sense faculty should grasp a sensory object, like sukha or duḥkha, it is unclear how the aham could qualify as one. Moreover, Kumārila at times speaks of ahampratyaya as grasping the I while it is knowing. How can one understand this? Either as the claim that ahampratyaya grasps the I while it is knowing a further object X, e.g., looking at an apple, or loosely, as the claim that ahampratyaya grasps the I, which is a knower. The first position would need manas to be able to perform a double function, namely on the one hand it would work as a shift, connecting the ātman to the sense faculty, and on the other it would work also as a sense-faculty, connecting the ātman to itself and to its object, the aham.

At this point it may be important to note that there is a difference between the specific case of manas-pratyakṣa and other functions of manas. As hinted at above, Pārthasārathi is explicit in pointing out that for Kumārila the faculty of memory is manas. Moreover, manas is in charge of synthesising cognition. For instance, ŚV sphoṭa 111–115³ evokes the possibility of using manas to have a cumulative cognition of several phonemes so that one can cognise a word (this mānasa cognition seems to work like what Uṃveka ad ŚV 111 and Jayanta call saṅkalanājñāna, see Graheli 2015, tab. 7.3). Here, manas is the instrument for a cognition that is not perceptual, since it includes elements of memory, as explained in ŚV sphoṭa 117. ŚV abhāva 27 speaks of the cognition of absence as being manas-based (mānasa), exactly insofar as it presupposes perception of X and memory of Y, but it is not identical with either (gṛhītvā vastusadbhāvaṃ smṛtvā ca pratiyoginam | mānasaṃ nāstitājñānaṃ jāyate ’kṣānapekṣaṇāt ||). ŚV pratijñā 4 speaks of manas as the faculty of thinking and wishes for it not to focus on flaws only (na cātrātīva kartavyaṃ doṣadṛṣṭiparaṃ manaḥ | doṣo hy avidyamāno ’pi taccittānāṃ prakāśate ||).⁴

1. sense-perception (indriyapratyakṣa)
2. yogic perception
3. self-awareness of cognitions (svasaṃvedana)
4. mānasapratyakṣa (used to access immediately preceding cognitive events)

For Nyāya epistemologists, it includes:

1. sense-perception (indriyapratyakṣa)
2. yogic perception
3. mānasapratyakṣa (used to access immediately preceding cognitive events) (including anuvyavasāya)

svasaṃvedana is refused, because cognitions are not transparent. Instead, they are perceptible through anuvyavasāya, which is a form of mānasapratyakṣa.

For Mīmāṃsā epistemologists, it includes:

1. sense-perception (indriyapratyakṣa)

Please notice that sense-perception includes, for all Sanskrit philosophers I am aware of, six senses, one of which is manas, which is meant to grasp internal events, typically sukha or duḥkha.

Now, where does Kumārila’s ahampratyaya ‘cognition of the I’ fall into? It cannot be a case of mānasapratyakṣa, because this one is not accepted as a separate way to accept cognitive events (for thorough refutations of it from a Mīmāṃsā point of view, one can check Śālikanātha’s Pramāṇapārāyaṇa, pratyakṣapariccheda or Vācaspati’s Nyāyakaṇikā, on VV chapter 8). It could be a case of indriyapratyakṣa, with the manas working as the sense faculty, but this is odd, given that manas as a sense faculty should grasp a sensory object, like sukha or duḥkha and it is unclear how the aham could qualify as one.

Program-Specific Foreign Language Associate Professor Position at the Department of Indological Studies, Graduate School of Letters / Faculty of Letters, Kyoto University

The Department of Indological Studies, Graduate School of Letters & Faculty of Letters, at Kyoto University invites applications for a post-doctoral teaching fellow position.
The main duty of this position is teaching Sanskrit Grammar. All the classes should be held in English and the Japanese ability is not required. The longest term of employment is five years, which cannot be renewed, and one who can work more than three years is desirable.
An academic year here consists of two terms: the first term from the beginning of April to the beginning of August and the second term from the beginning of October and the beginning of February. Teaching at this position is preferably to start from the second term of 2016.

Qualifications

• Excellent level of Sanskrit ability.
• Fluency in English: not only to teach classes but also to instruct academic writing in English, specifically dissertations and research papers, in Indology and related fields.
• PhD degree is required in principle.
• Preference will be given to the candidate who has the knowledge of Indo-European linguistics and/or some languages relevant to our field (Tamil, Pali, Prakrit, Hindi etc.) and the candidate who can teach German or French reading class in the field of Indology and Buddhology.
• Japanese ability is not required.

Employment Conditions

• Working hours are 38 hours 45 minutes per week under a flexible-hours system.
• Main duty is to teach six classes per week (one class takes one and half hour). Two of the six classes are allotted to the Sanskrit Grammar and at least one class to English for academic writing in Indology and related field (including doctoral theses). In addition to the six, one more class in basic education course may sometimes be required.
• There is no duty in the administration of the Faculty and University. On the other hand, active involvement in the department’s education programme and management will be expected.
• A monthly salary of ¥750,000 shall be paid on a specified day each month. Taxes, insurance and other applicable deductions shall be deducted from this amount. The travel cost between the home country and Japan should be paid on one’s own.
• Holidays with pay are 20 days per year. In addition, there are several National holidays, New Year holidays (about a week) and Bon holidays (three days in the middle of August).
• Eligible for MEXT* mutual aid association membership, employment insurance, and workers’ compensation insurance.
  *Japan’s Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology
• All allowances (commuting allowance, housing allowance, and dependency allowance) will not be paid.

Applicants should submit the following documents to the contact address mentioned below by February 5, 2016 either by email or by airmail. References should be sent separately from the referents.

• A cover letter stating your motivation for this position
• A CV
• A set of copies of representative publications
• Two references (referents’ signature is not required when their references are sent to the contact person by email)

Contact Address:
Prof. Yuko Yokochi
Email: yyokochi@bun.kyoto-u.ac.jp Department of Indological Studies,
Graduate School of Letters, Kyoto University Yoshida Honmachi, Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606-8501 JAPAN
If there is any question, do not hesitate to get contact with us, please.

You can also get contact with Prof. Diwakar Acharya for the information about the working condition of our department (diwakar.acharya@bun.kyoto-u.ac.jp).

Yuko Yokochi
Head of the selection committee

Indian philosophy is taught in at least two different places in Europe: (South) Asian (or Oriental or Indological) Studies and —less often— Philosophy departments. The dominant trend of US universities, where Indian philosophy is taught predominantly in Religious Studies departments is only evident in the UK. Departments of Asian Studies, of Oriental Studies or of Indology, often have a philological focus (so that knowing Sanskrit or other relevant languages is strongly recommended, although not compulsory), whereas studying Indian Philosophy in a Philosophy department may imply having to avoid Sanskrit.

Further elements for non-European students and scholars:
1) university fees are by and large very low in Europe (between nothing and 1,500 E per year for full-time students) and in many countries funding is available.
2) the main point of a PhD course in Europe is the final output, i.e., your dissertation. You might have to attend classes (or not), but the main focus should remain the fact of becoming an independent researcher, and this is proved by your ability to write a book on your own.
3) do not choose a certain department on the basis of your expectations to have a career in Indian Philosophy. Write a PhD in Indian Philosophy (only) because you are interested in it. There are little or no SLACs in Europe and in this sense you cannot really plan a career as a university teacher of Indian Philosophy in Europe (you might have a few more chances as a researcher, but this involves being willing and able to do research with others, or alone and to apply for fundings).

Now, a disclaimer: the European landscape of research related to Indian philosophy os variegated. I have surely forgotten many institutions (for instance, as far as I know, there is no one working on Indian philosophy in Spain, Portugal, Greece, Malta…is this really the case?) and have not been exhaustive in the case of others (for instance, I have been unable to gather exhaustive informations concerning Croatia and Hungary). I rely on readers for emendations and supplements.

The elements which will be listed, beside the universities, are: AOS, whether funding is possible and whether it is possible to write one’s PhD thesis in English. In all cases, no information does not mean that it is impossible, it only means that I have no information about it.

• AUSTRIA (possibility to write a PhD thesis in English)

University of Vienna (Institute of South Asian, Tibetology and Buddhist Studies) Sanskrit philosophy, Āyurveda, Sanskrit philology, Buddhist philosophy, especially Pramāṇavāda and Mādhyamaka, Tibetan philosophy)

• BELGIUM (possibility to write a PhD thesis in English)

Brussel, Vrije Universiteit (Antwerp FVG, Faculty for Comparative Study of Religions) (Hinduism, Buddhism, Sikhism, Jainism, Indian Philosophy, especially Vedānta schools, Kaśmīr Śaivism) 2 funding posibilities: FWO (regional) and BOF (university)

Ghent (dept. of languages and cultures of South and East Asia) (Jainism, Buddhism, Indian Philosophy)

• CROATIA

Zagreb (Humanities) (Upaniṣads, Vedānta)

• CZECH REPUBLIC (possibility to write a PhD thesis in English) UPDATED

Charles University of Prague (Institute of Philosophy & Religious Studies) (Buddhism, especially Mahāyāna and Madhyamaka, Nyāya, Kashmiri Śaivism)

• FRANCE (French needed)

Paris, EPHE (5th section, “Sciences Religieuses”) (Sanskrit philosophy, especially Abhinavagupta and Vedānta), limited possibility for fundings

Paris-I Panthéon Sorbonne (Comparative Indian Philosophy) NO Sanskrit

Lille III (Tantrism)

• GERMANY (special emphasis on Sanskrit texts, so that critical editions (also) of philosophical texts are possible also at other locations) (in all cases below, the universities have an “institute of Indology” or something similar)

Göttingen (Indian religions, including Veda, Pāli, Epics…)

Hamburg (Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Tantrism, Kaśmīrī Śaiva Philosophy, Mahāyāna, Tibetan Buddhism)

Halle (Sanskrit Philosophy, especially Mokṣopāya and Kaśmīrī philosophy)

Heidelberg (Pramāṇavāda)

Leipzig (Sanskrit Philosophy, especially Pramāṇavāda)

Mainz (Buddhist Philology in Central Asia)

Marburg (Śaiva and Kashmirī philosophy, Mokṣopāya, Buddhist Philosophy)

Münich (Buddhism, Tibetan religions)

• HUNGARY

Budapest, Eötvös Loránd University (dept. of Indo-European Studies) (Sanskrit philology)

• ITALY (possibility to write a PhD thesis in English)

Cagliari University (faculty of Humanities) (Sanskrit philosophy, Vyākaraṇa), full funding for 3 years possible

Milan University (aesthetics), full funding for 3 years possible

Naples University (Oriental Studies) (Sanskrit philosophy, especially Śaivism, Buddhism and Tantrism in general, Sanskrit philology), full funding for 3 years possible

Rome, Sapienza University (Oriental Studies) (Sanskrit Philosophy, especially Śaivism, Pramāṇavāda, Tantrism and Vyākaraṇa, Sanskrit philology), full funding for 3 years possible

Turin University (Oriental Studies) (Indian religions and philosophy, especially Advaita Vedānta and Buddhism), full funding for 3 years possible (1 new funded position every year)

Venice University (Asian and African Studies) (Indian religions and philosophy, especially Vedānta, Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Dharmaśāstra, Sociology of Indian religions), full funding for 3 years possible

• NETHERLANDS

Leiden (Institute for Area Studies) (Buddhist Philosophy)

• POLAND

Krakow (Pedagogical University, dept. of Philosophy) (Indian Philosophy, especially Buddhism, Sāṅkhya, Yoga, contemporary Indian philosophy)

Krakow (Jagiellonian University, dept. of Oriental Studies) (Indian Philosophy, especially early Advaita Vedānta and Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta, Vaiṣṇavism)

Poznan (Languages and Literature) (Indian Philosophy, especially ethics)

Warsaw (dept. of South Asian Studies) (Indian Philosophy, especially Jainism, Mīmāṃsā)

• RUSSIA (possibility to write a PhD thesis in English at St. Petersburg)

Moscow (institute of Philosophy) (Indian philosophy, especially Vaiśeṣika)

Moscow (Moscow State University) (Vyākaraṇa, Sanskrit Philology)

Moscow (Russian State University for Humanities) (Jainism, Indian Philology)

St. Petersburg (St. Petersburg State University) (Bhartṛhari, Vyākaraṇa, Buddhism, some Indian philology)

St Petersburg (Institute of Oriental Manuscripts (Buddhist philosophy, Kaśmīri Śaivism, Bhartṛhari, Tibetan Buddhism)

• SWEDEN

Stockholm (Oriental languages) (Indian Philosophy, especially Nyāya and Buddhism)

• SWITZERLAND (possibility to write a PhD thesis in English)

Lausanne (Section on languages and cultures slavic and of South Asia) (Buddhist studies, contemporary Indian philosophy)

Zürich (Hinduism, contemporary Hinduism, Ethics, Ethics of Medicine)

• UK (much higher fees, up to 4,000 pounds per year) (some possibilities of fundings through the University, the Colleges and private institutions)

Bristol (centre for Buddhist studies) (Theravāda Buddhism, Chinese Buddhism, Zen Buddhism)

Cambridge (Asian and Middle Eastern Studies) (Sanskrit Philology, Vyākaraṇa, Mīmāṃsā, Buddhist Studies)

Cambridge (Divinity) (Vedānta)

Cardiff (Religious and Theological Studies) (Buddhist studies and philosophy)

Dundee (Philosophy) NO SANSKRIT

Durham (Philosophy) (Metaphysics and Philosophy of Language, especially in Madhyamaka Buddhism)

Edinburgh (South Asian Studies) (Indian Philosophy, especially Jainism)

Kent (Religious Studies) (Buddhism, Vedānta)

Lancaster (Religious Studies; Philosophy) (Indian Philosophy, especially Vedānta)

Leeds (Theology and Religious Studies) (Sāṅkhya, Pātañjala Yoga)

Liverpool (Philosophy) (Vedānta, contemporary Indian philosophy)

London, King’s College (Philosophy) (logic, epistemology, metaphysics and philosophy of language in India, Greek and modern Western philosophy) NO SANSKRIT

London, SOAS (Religion; South Asia) (Buddhist studies, Tibetan Buddhism, Yoga, Jainism)

Manchester University (Arts, Languages, and Cultures) (Indian philosophy, especially Vedānta)

Oxford (Oriental Studies) (Indian philosophy, especially Vyākaraṇa and Mīmāṃsā, Sanskrit philology, Sanskrit scientific literature)

Oxford (Theology and Religion)

Oxford (one might also want to get in touch with the Oxford Center of Buddhist Studies and the Oxford Center of Hindu studies for external tuition)

Sussex (Philosophy) (Indian Philosophy, especially Nyāya, Vedānta)

York (Philosophy) (Indian ethics and Indian Buddhist philosophy), NO SANSKRIT

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: I am really obliged to the following people for their help: Daniele Cuneo, Evgeniya Desnitskaya, Camillo Formigatti, Jonardon Ganeri, Marzenna Jakubczak, Lubomir Ondracka, Isabelle Ratié, Agnieszka Rostalska, Alex Watson

(cross-posted also on the Indian Philosophy blog)