1. Kumārila stating in the ātmavāda chapter within his ŚV that we can directly grasp the self through our awareness of ourselves as an I (via ahampratyaya)
2. Kumārila stating, against Dignāga, that cognitions are not transparent to themselves (see ŚV pratyakṣa 79, 134 and then ŚV śūnyavāda) and that they are rather known a posteriori through arthāpatti based on the fact that something, e.g., a pot, has now the characteristic of being manifest (jñātatā or prākaṭya, see ŚV pratyakṣa 56) and that this characteristic wold be unexplainable otherwise
3. Kumārila stating in the pratyakṣa chapter within the ŚV that perception is sense-perception

Which sort of cognition is ahampratyaya? The “I” cannot be known through cognitions’ awareness of themselves (as in Prabhākara), because of No. 2. Nor can the “I” be known through perception, because of No. 3. Again, given that there must be a solution (the point is too striking to have been missed by Kumārila himself) and that No. 2 looks quite sure, let me try to explore No. 3. Could it be that Kumārila accepts perception as sense-perception AND ahampratyaya? (In this connection, please note that also Jhā writes that “the notion of “I” […] is directly perceptible by the Senses”, fn on ŚV ātmavāda v. 107).

The relevant verses in the chapter on perception are mainly addressed against upholders of yogic perception. Kumārila insists there that perception is about present contents, and the “I” would qualify. He also says that perception arises from a contact between the object and the sense-faculty (sati indriyasaṅgame […] tasya (=pratyakṣasya) evaṃdharmakatvataḥ, vv 17–18), thus excluding svasaṃvedana or other forms of non-sensory direct perception from pratyakṣa. Still, ahampratyaya could qualify as belonging to perception. The sense-faculty at stake in the case of the “I” could be manas, the inner sense faculty. It is in this sense somehow disappointing that Kumārila does not mention the case of ahampratyaya while discussing ātman-manas contact in ŚV pratyakṣa, v. 66. Moreover, ŚV pratyakṣa v. 83 discusses the apprehension of pleasure and pain via manas, but does not mention the case of the manas also cognising the “I”. Even more relevant, v.83 follows a discussion of how a cognition cannot grasp itself and how pleasure etc. can be an exception because there is no svasaṃvedana there, but rather the apprehension of something inhering in the self, via the manas (see Pārthasārathi thereon: manaḥsañjñakenendriyeṇa saṃyuktaḥ ātmā svasamavetān sukhādīn […] pratipadyate). If we were to apply the same scheme to ahampratyaya, we would need to say that the self, connected to the manas, grasps the self itself, which seems to contradict the point made in v. 82, against reflectivity. Also disappointing in this regard are ŚV pratyakṣa, vv. 134–139, that discuss the role of manas in svasaṃvitti (refuted by Kumārila) and pleasure etc. (accepted) and never mention the case of “I-cognitions”. Then, again, ŚV pratyakṣa v. 160 states that manas can work on its own, without an external object, but only cites pleasure and pain as an example (yathā hi manasaḥ sārdhaṃ rūpādau cakṣurādinā | pravṛttiḥ sukhaduḥkhādau kevalasyaiva dṛśyate ||). Same with ŚV śabdanityatādhikaraṇa 337 on manas grasping pleasure etc. when not connected with the external senses.
This is all not conclusive, but it is disheartening that Kumārila never mentions the case of ahampratyaya in the chapter on perception, if ahampratyaya is in fact a case of perception.

At this point I might have been too negative about the possibility of ahampratyaya being a case of perception. Let me therefore look at the evidence in favour of it. The main one is that ahampratyaya is mentioned as an evidence for the existence of the self and as being different than inference in ŚV ātmavāda v. 107. Next, ahampratyaya is discussed in conjunction with recognition (pratyabhijñā) in the same chapter (v. 109, v. 137), and we know that recognition is a combination of memory and perception.

Could it be that ahampratyaya is just a case of recognition? In favour of this view run a few passages in Pārthasārathi’s commentary, where he says pratyabhijñārūpeṇa ahampratyayena (ad ŚV ātmavāda v. 109) and ekasantānasambandhino ‘hampratyayā ekajñātṛviṣayā iti pratyabhijñeti (ad ŚV ātmavāda v. 139), as well as the fact that the self is proven to exist because of phenomena like desire, which need some extension through time (perception of X, memory that X in the past produced pleasure, desire of X, see vv. 104–105). However, recognition requires a preceding (perceptual) awareness (and Kumārila has already established that inference does not establish the ātman). How could one re-cognise something if one had not cognised it in the first place? Recognition is essential in the argumentative structure of ŚV ātmavāda, because this has as its main opponent the Buddhist epistemologists’ point of view on the self being momentary. Yet, it would be strange to claim that ahampratyaya is only a recognition, since this would deny the phenomenological appeal that we recognise ourselves qua-I immediately (not inferentially, as Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas would like it to be, see vv. 92–101).

At this point I wonder whether for Kumārila ahampratyaya is an ad hoc pramāṇa, a cognition that never ceases every time one cognises something (see ŚV ātmavāda 133), but different than the arthāpatti through which one knows a posteriori that a cognition has taken place. Now, against that runs Kumārila’s mention of six pramāṇas (e.g., ŚV codanā 111cd), which seem to either point to ahampratyaya as a subspecies within one of the main sources of knowledge or to ahampratyaya as not necessarily knowledge-conducive. Could be just a cognition (jñāna), one that is not necessarily true, but that remains valid as long as it is not falsified? However, a pramāṇa is in Kumārila exactly defined as something that remains valid as long as it is not falsified. That is, in Nyāya it is easy to distinguish pramāṇas from thinking processes that are not *necessarily* knowledge-conducive although they might lead to true cognitions, such as tarka. But this distinction does not seem to be available to Kumārila’s falsificationism. He does use the term pramāṇa also for sources other than the six (pratyakṣa, anumāna, śabda, upamāna, arthāpatti, abhāva), for instance in the case of pratyabhijñā and of the hermeneutic pramāṇas, but both can be reduced to a subspecies of one of the six pramāṇas. This all would lead one back to ahampratyaya being a form of manas-pratyakṣa, with the ātman featuring both as the subject and object thereof.

ŚV ātmavāda 142 seems to offer a slightly different point of view, with the ātman being described as self-luminous (through the simile of a light, jyotiḥ). Thus, even though Kumārila refutes (see point No. 2 above) self-luminosity in the case of cognitions, he seems to accept it for the self. The next verses explains that this does not apply to other people’s selves, that need to be known through inference (v. 145) and perhaps also through analogy and linguistic communication combined (v. 144). Unfortunately, Uṃveka’s commentary is not available for this chapter and Pārthsārathi does not add much to this short section.

By the way, one might wonder whether ahampratyaya could ever count as knowledge, given that it is unfalsifiable. However,
a. Kumārila has defeated the alternatives already (mainly bhūtacaitanyavāda, or physicalism and the non-physicalist illusionism of Buddhist epistemologists)
b. Kumārila showed at least in one case that he is comfortable with an unfalsifiable knowledge, namely the Veda.

I have a non-polemical question: What did you read within what you call “non-Western thought”? If the list is extremely short compared to what you know of Euro-American philosophy (say, less than 100 titles), or if it focuses on a special field (say, Confucian ethics) then it’s easy to have a less diverse impression. The problem is that scholars or students who speak of “non-Western thought” as being “less diverse” have at most taken a single class on anything other than Euro-American philosophy.
Do you think you would have an idea of Euro-American philosophy as very diverse and interesting if you had studied, say, Sanskrit philosophy for decades, and had taken a single class on French existentialism and German phenomenology?

More in general, many Philosophy departments think that diversifying means adding a single class on anything that is not Euro-American mainstream philosophy (it can be Maori political thought, ubuntu ethics, Confucianism, Sanskrit epistemology…).
The result is often implicitly suggesting that there is a single world of “non-Western” thought and that everyone can teach it, because it does not go very deep.
For instance, I am routinely asked to answer questions about, e.g., the Zhaungzi, as if my expertise should extent to the whole of “non-Western thought”, because it is implicitly assumed to be very limited.

I ask students on the first class on Sanskrit philosophy how many texts do they think were composed in Sanskrit philosophy if compared to Greek philosophy and they are ridiculously wrong, guessing anything between 30 and 300 texts.

The whole passage starts because Śabara is discussing the role of the deity in sacrifice. He explains that the deity does not promote the sacrifice (na devatā prayojikā and na devatāprayuktāḥ pravartiṣyāmahe). An opponent mentions the fact that the deity is mentioned as the target (sampradāna) of the action (given that it is in the dative case). Śabara quickly dismisses the point as related to the fact that the sacrifice is the real instrument to realise the result and moves on. Kumārila elaborates on it and comes to the conclusion that the deity has a primary role because of its grammatical function, which makes it needed for the performance of the sacrifice.

“[Obj:] But the deity is mentioned as the target (sampradāna) [and hence needs to be the one that prompts one to sacrifice, like the teacher to whom one gives a gift prompts one to give it].

[R:] The sacrifice, which is enjoined with regard to a result. requires a performance. And this performance is not possible without a deity and a sacrificial substance (to be offered). And the substance and the deity which are required (by the performance) are required only on the side of the complement, not as the thing to be realised [by the sacrifice] (which is the real motivator). Among the two, the substance becomes a complement through the third-case ending. The deity through a suffix or through the fourth-case ending.”

Here Pārthasārathi’s Tantraratna adds an intermediate objection explaining that this makes the deity seemingly into the principal element. The response is that this is not a problem.

“And if this deity-complement did not reach the condition of being primary with regard to the sacrifice (as required by the dative ending expressing the target), the sacrifice would not be performed at all. And without the performance of the sacrifice, there would not be the complement either. And if the sacrifice did not reach the condition of being its (complement’s) secondary element (guṇa), it would not come into being.

Therefore the sacrifice needs to reach the condition of being secondary as something/through an activity which is unavoidably concomitant (to the grammatical form used). And also the deity-complement [needs to reach] the condition of being primary as something unavoidably concomitant (to the grammatical form used).”

The addition of “unavoidably concomitant” (nāntarīiyaka) may seem puzzling, since neither Kumārila nor Pārthasārathi explain it. Clooney 1997 makes the bold move to interpret it as na antarīyaka (not… intermediary). I can see his motivation, but antarīyaka is not a Sanskrit word I am aware of. (NB: The L manuscript and the Tantraratna read tasmād yāgena nāntarīyakeṇa vyāpāreṇa guṇabhāvaḥ pratipattavyaḥ (instead of tasmād yāgena nāntarīyako guṇabhāvaḥ pratipattavyaḥ)).

At this point, Pārthasārathi’s Tantraratna adds that this does not mean that the sacrifice has become because of that for the sake of the deity. The following explains why.

“Nor is it the case that the unavoidable functioning is the cause for being primary or secondary, since it is not what is enjoined (and only the injunction determines real primary status). For, [one thinks:] “Since I have been enjoined towards the result, I realise the result through the sacrifice, not otherwise” (and this shows how the injunction puts the result as the primary thing and the sacrifice as its instrument).”

The Tantraratna has an interesting variant here, namely yāgo hi phale coditaḥ. This fits the beginning of the passage, which also read yāgaḥ phale codito…. The translation, in this case, would be as follows: “The sacrifice, being enjoined with regard to the result, does not realise the result otherwise [but through the deity as target]”.

“In this way, the unavoidable functioning needs to be the secondary element with respect to the deity.”

PSM adds: “in order to realise the sacrifice’s being an instrument towards the result”. It also specifies: “the secondary status is not enjoined”.

“Hence, in all cases there are two parts (a principal one, and a secondary one). Among them, we need to understand which one is what is wished to be expressed and which one is not. Among these two possibilities, in worldly experience what is wished to be expressed is determined by the force of things. In the Veda, by contrast, by language. And through language the sacrifice is the primary element, because it realises the result, given that it is proximate [to the result], The deity, by contrast, is understood to be the secondary element. Nor is it the case that the subordination (śeṣatva) is characterised as being an auxiliary (upakāra). Rather, it is established that it is characterised by the Vedic injunction.”

PSM explains that the “Nor…” sentence is the cause of the previous one.

“[UP:] What is the purpose of this investigation?

[R:] If the sacrifice had the purpose of gladdening the deity, then the deity were the one to be worshipped and the sacrifice would be a worship. And the worship is a thing known in worldly experience. Within a worship, what would be the confidence [one could have] in the claim that Sūrya is worshipped in the same way as Agni? The very opposite might be the case (namely that Sūrya dislikes what Agni likes). (Hence, the ectype for Sūrya should not be performed as the archetype sacrifice for Agni!)”

Thus, Kumārila concludes, the fact that the material trumps the deity when it comes to determining the procedure to be followed shows that the sacrifice is not a worship aimed at the deity and that the deity’s seeming predominant role is due to grammar only. I don’t see any important difference between Kumārila’s and Śabara’s conclusions here.

Sanskrit philosophy is taught in at least two different places in Europe: (South) Asian (or Oriental or Indological) Studies and —less often— Philosophy departments. The dominant trend of US universities, where Sanskrit philosophy is taught predominantly in Religious Studies departments is only evident in the UK. Departments of Asian Studies, of Oriental Studies or of Indology, often have a philological focus (so that knowing Sanskrit or other relevant languages is strongly recommended, although not always compulsory), whereas studying Sanskrit Philosophy in a Philosophy department may imply having to avoid Sanskrit.

Further elements for non-European students and scholars:
1) university fees are by and large very low in Europe (between nothing and 1,500 E per year for full-time students) and in many countries funding is available, so that one gets paid for being a PhD student —very often being a PhD student is much easier than being a post-Doc!
2) the main point of a PhD course in Europe is the final output, i.e., your dissertation. You might have to attend classes (or not), but the main focus should remain the fact of becoming an independent researcher, and this is proved by your ability to write a book on your own.
3) in countries such as Germany, Austria, Poland, France…, you can only choose as your supervisor someone who has a Habilitation. Think about who has it before applying to an institution in the hope to be working with Prof. X or Dr. Y.
4) do not choose a certain department on the basis of your expectations to have a career in Sanskrit Philosophy. Write a PhD in Sanskrit Philosophy (only) because you are interested in it. There are little or no SLACs in Europe and in this sense you cannot really plan a career as a university teacher of Sanskrit Philosophy in Europe (you might have a few more chances as a researcher within larger projects, but this involves being willing and able to do research with others, or alone and to apply for fundings).

Now, a disclaimer: the European landscape of research related to Sanskrit philosophy is variegated. I have surely forgotten many institutions (for instance, as far as I know, there is no one working on Sanskrit philosophy in Spain, Portugal, Greece, Malta…is this really the case?) and have not been exhaustive in the case of others. I rely on readers for emendations and supplements.

The elements which will be listed, beside the universities, are: AOS, whether funding is possible and whether it is possible to write one’s PhD thesis in English. In all cases, no information does not mean that it is impossible, it only means that I have no information about it.

I have omitted Russia from the list because I would not advise international students to move to Russia at this moment. For different reasons, I have omitted Ukraine.

AUSTRIA
University of Vienna (Institute of South Asian, Tibetology and Buddhist Studies): The Institute has a matchless paramparā of scholars in the history of Sanskrit philosophy. However, at the moment (I will update this post if a successor of Karin Preisendanz will be designated and if they work on Philosophy, but at the moment this looks very unlikely) there is NO supervisor for Sanskrit Philosophy at the University. You may want to contact the 1–2 people at the IKGA (Institute for the Cultural and Intellectual History of Asia, Austrian Academy of Sciences) who have a habilitation (see point (3) above) and might want to supervise you (especially in Buddhist epistemology), but the classes you will have to attend at the university will not be taught by them. Only the university can bestow doctoral degrees.

University of Vienna (Institute of Philosophy) They have recently advertised a position in “Eastern philosophy”. It remains to be seen whether they will hire someone who is competent and willing to supervise theses in Sanskrit philosophy.

Limited funding possibilities: through the FWF, the Academy of Sciences or the University itself (in all cases you need the approval of a supervisor and they might need to apply for a project within which you will be able to finance your position)

BELGIUM (possibility to write a PhD thesis in English)
Ghent (dept. of languages and cultures of South and East Asia) (Jainism, Buddhism, Indian Philosophy); funding possibilities: FWO (regional) and BOF (university) (Eva De Clerq, Lucas den Boer, Agnieszka Rostalska)

Louvain, Université catholique de Louvain (Catholic University of Louvain in Louvain-la-Neuve):
—(Faculty of Letters, Oriental Institute, with Christophe Vielle)
—(Faculty of Theology, Religious sciences). Please notice that the successor of Prof. Cornu, who will probably be a specialist of Buddhism, will only be designated in 2027. Meanwhile, theses are possible with Prof. Vielle and other profs.
Funding possibilities: FRS-FNRS (regional) and FSR (university)

CROATIA
Zagreb (Humanities) (Upaniṣads, Vedānta) (Ivan Andrijanić)

CZECH REPUBLIC
Charles University of Prague (Institute of Asian Studies); (Institute of Philosophy & Religious Studies) (but note that in 2024–2025 Prof. Lubomir Ondracka will not be available and hence no one will supervise theses for students starting at that point)

FRANCE (possibility to write a PhD in English)
Paris, EPHE (4th section and especially 5th section, “Sciences Religieuses”) (Brahmanical systems, Buddhist philosophy (including Tibetan), Śaiva philosophy, philosophy of language (Sanskrit and, in case, Tibetan), Vyākaraṇa; funding available through a competitive scholarship contest (Vincent Eltschinger, Jan Houben)

Sorbonne Nouvelle (Department of Indian Studies) (Buddhist and Brahmanical philosophy, special focus on Śaiva philosophy); funding available through a competitive scholarship contest (Isabelle Ratié, Daniele Cuneo [now on leave])

NB: some directors of studies affiliated to the EFEO (Ecole française d’Extrême-Orient, mostly based in Paris and Pondicherry) (like Hugo David) or to the CNRS (Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris) may also accept PhD students, although those institutions do not directly deliver diplomas.

GERMANY (possibility to write a PhD in English, very low fees, special emphasis on Sanskrit texts, so that critical editions (also) of philosophical texts are possible also at other locations) (in all cases below, the universities have an “institute of Indology” or something similar)
Hamburg (Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Tantrism, Kaśmīrī Śaiva Philosophy, Mahāyāna, Tibetan Buddhism) (Harunaga Isaacson)

Heidelberg (Ritual studies, Śrīvaiṣṇavism) (Ute Hüsken)

Leipzig (Buddhist Philosophy (Jowita Kramer); Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Nyāya, Āyurveda, Upaniṣads, Epics (Philipp Maas, who however does not have a permanent position, hence check again if he is still affiliated before applying if you are checking this list after 2024))

Marburg (Śaiva and Kashmirī philosophy, Mokṣopāya, Buddhist Philosophy) (Jürgen Hanneder, Dimitrov Dragomir, Roland Steiner)

Munich (Buddhism, Indo-Tibetan Buddhist philosophy) (Vincent Tournier)

HUNGARY
Budapest, Eötvös Loránd University (dept. of Indo-European Studies): Program in “Buddhist Philology”, led by Péter-Dániel Szántó (all classes in English and theses expected in English); school of philosophy with Ferenc Ruzsa (who has been working on Sāṅkhya, but also on Vasubandhu and much more). Funding possibilities: Stipendium Hungaricum.

ITALY (possibility to write a PhD thesis in English)
Cagliari University (faculty of Humanities) (Sanskrit philosophy, Vyākaraṇa, Dharmaśāstra, Mīmāṃsā, contemporary Sanskrit) (Tiziana Pontillo, Maria Piera Candotti, Lidia Sudyka and Elisa Freschi (affiliated), full funding for 3 years possible (applications usually open in the summer)

Naples University (Oriental Studies) (Sanskrit philosophy, especially Śaivism, Buddhism and Tantrism in general, Sanskrit philology) (Francesco Sferra, Serena Saccone), full funding for 3 years possible (applications usually open in the summer)

Rome, Sapienza University (Oriental Studies) (Mokṣopāya) (Bruno Lo Turco), full funding for 3 years possible (2–3 funded position per year, some of them are reserved for international students) (applications usually open in the summer)

Turin University (Asian and African Studies) (Indian religions and philosophy, especially Advaita Vedānta and Buddhism), (Gianni Pellegrini, A. Pellissero) full funding for 3 years possible (1 new funded position every second year) (one can write a PhD thesis in any language of the EU) (applications usually open in the summer)

Venice University (Asian Studies) (Indian religions and philosophy, especially Vedānta, Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Dharmaśāstra, Sociology of Indian religions), (Federico Squarcini, Antonio Rigopoulos) full funding for 3 years possible (1 new funded position every year, but there are often not enough candidates). This PhD program is connected with the Heidelberg university. It might be worth noting that they also have an MA in Yoga studies. (applications usually open in the summer)

NETHERLANDS (possibility to write a PhD thesis in English, all classes are in English)
Amsterdam (Vrije Univerisiteit, Philosophy) (Comparative philosophy, contemporary Indian philosophy, Indian philosophy in vernacular languages) (Monika Kirloskar-Steinbach)
Amsterdam (Vrije Univerisiteit, Religion and Theology) (Avni Chag)

Leiden (Institute for Area Studies) (Buddhist Philosophy), no fees and full funding for 4 or 5 years possible (Jonathan Silk)

Leiden (Philosophy Department), Chinese, Indian and comparative philosophy. Possibility of funding through the NWO (deadline around February, further information here: https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/en/education/study-programmes/master/philosophy-120ec/philosophy-in-world-traditions) (Douglas L. Berger, Stephen Harris)

POLAND
Krakow (Jagiellonian University, faculty of Management and Social Communication (Indian Philosophy, especially Buddhism, Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Advaita Vedānta, Comparative Philosophy, contemporary Indian philosophy) (Marzenna Jakubczak)

Krakow (Jagiellonian University, dept. of Oriental Studies) (Indian Philosophy, especially early Advaita Vedānta and Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta, Vaiṣṇavism) (Lidia Sudyka, Halina Marlewicz, Cezary Galewicz)

Poznan (Languages and Literature) (Indian Philosophy, especially ethics) (Sven Sellmer)

Warsaw (dept. of South Asian Studies) (Indian Philosophy, especially Jainism, Mīmāṃsā) (Monika Nowakowska)

SWEDEN
Currently no option possible, but keep in touch with Anna-Pya Sjödin, who is teaching at Umeå and might be willing to accept students of Sanskrit philosophy again there.

SWITZERLAND (possibility to write a PhD thesis in English)
Zürich (Hinduism, contemporary Hinduism, Ethics) (Angelika Malinar, who however will be retiring in 2025, so check who is going to replace her!) (possibility to apply for a six-month grant to write your PhD proposal before starting your PhD)

UK (higher fees, up to 9,000 pounds per year for British students and much more (perhaps 25k pounds) for foreign students —which now means also EU citizens) (some possibilities of fundings through the University, the Colleges and private institutions). In most cases, no Sanskrit is required nor taught (exceptions: Cambridge, Oxford, Lancaster)
Cambridge (Asian and Middle Eastern Studies) (Sanskrit Philology, Vyākaraṇa, Śaivādvaita) (Vincenzo Vergiani, Jonathan Duquette)

Cambridge (Divinity) (Vedānta, contemporary Indian Philosophy) (Ankur Barua)

Cardiff (Religious and Theological Studies) (Buddhist studies and philosophy) (James Hegarthy)

Durham (Philosophy) (Environmental Ethics in Buddhism, Graeco-Roman and Indian Philosophy) (Simon James, Nathan Gilbert)

Edinburgh (Paul Schweizer)

Lancaster (Religious Studies; Philosophy) (Indian Philosophy, especially Vedānta, Early Buddhist Philosophy, Upaniṣads) (Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad, Brian Black)

Leeds (Theology and Religious Studies) (Sāṅkhya, Pātañjala Yoga) (Mikel Burley)

Liverpool (Philosophy) (Vedānta, contemporary Indian philosophy) (C.J. Bartley)

London, King’s College (Philosophy) (logic, epistemology, metaphysics and philosophy of language in India, Greek and modern Western philosophy) NO SANSKRIT (Will Rasmussen)
London, King’s College (Theology) (Yoga) (Karen O’Brien-Kop)

Manchester University (Arts, Languages, and Cultures) (Indian philosophy, especially Vedānta) (Gary Donnelly)

Oxford (Oriental Studies) (Indian philosophy, especially Vyākaraṇa and Mīmāṃsā, Sanskrit philology, Yoga, Buddhist Philosophy) (Diwakar Acharya, Bogdan Diaconescu, Jim Mallinson, Ulrike Rösler)

Oxford (Theology and Religion) (Hindu philosophy, metaphysics) (Jessica Frazier, Jan Westerhoff)

Oxford (Philosophy) (Buddhist philosophy) (Monima Chadha)

Oxford (one might also want to get in touch with the Oxford Center of Buddhist Studies and the Oxford Center of Hindu studies for external tuition)

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: I am really obliged to the following people for their help: Robert Leach, Philipp Maas, Monika Nowakoskwa, Nirali Patel.

When one works on the intellectual history of the Sanskrit cosmopolis*, by contrast, one still needs to map the entire territory, whose extension still escapes us. Very few elements of the landscape have been fixated, and might still need to be re-assessed.

What are the mountains, main cities as well as rivers, bridges, routes that we would need to fix on the map? Key authors, key theories, key schools, as well as languages and manners of communication and how they worked (public debates? where? how?).
I mentioned authors before schools because for decades intellectual historians looking at the Sanskrit cosmopolis emphasized, and often overemphasized the role of schools at the expense of the fundamental role of individual thinkers, thus risking to oversee their individual contributions and to flatten historical developments, as if nothing had changed in astronomy or philosophy for centuries. This hermeneutic mistake is due to the fact that while the norm in Europe and North America after Descartes and the Enlightenment has been increasingly to highlight novelty, originality is constantly understated in the Sanskrit cosmopolis. It is not socially acceptable to claim to be novel and original in the Sanskrit world, just like it is not acceptable to be just “continuing a project” in a grant application in Europe or North America.
Still, schools are often the departure point for any investigation, since they give one a first basic understanding of the landscape. How does this exactly work?
For instance, we know that the Vedānta systems were a major player in the intellectual arena, with all other religious and philosophical schools having to face them, in some form of the other. However, it is not at all clear which schools within Vedānta were broadly influential, where within South Asia, and in which languages. Michael Allen, among others, worked extensively on Advaita Vedānta in Hindī sources, but were they read also by Sanskrit authors and did the latter react to them? Were Hindī texts on Vedānta read only in the Gangetic valley or throughout the Indian subcontinent? The same questions should be investigated with regard to the other schools of Vedānta (Viśiṣṭādvaita, Dvaita, Śaivādvaita…), the other vernacular languages they interacted with (respectively: Tamil and Maṇipravāḷam, Kannaḍa…), and the regions of the Indian subcontinent they originated in. And this is just about Vedānta schools.
Similarly, we still have to understand which other schools entered into a debate with philosophy and among each other and which interdisciplinary debates took place. Scholars of European intellectual history know how Kepler was influenced by Platonism and how Galileo influenced the development of philosophy. What happened in the Sanskrit cosmopolis?
Dagmar Wujastyk recently focused on the intersection of medicine (āyurveda) alchemy (rasaśāstra) and yoga. Which other disciplines were in a constant dialogue? Who read mathematical and astronomical texts, for instance? It is clear, because many texts themselves often repeat it, that Mīmāṃsā, Nyāya and Vyākaraṇa (hermeneutics, logic and grammar) were considered a sort of basic trivium, to be known by every learned person. But the very exclusion of Vedānta from the trivium (it cannot be considered to be included in “Mīmāṃsā” unless in the Viśiṣṭādvaita self-interpretation) shows that the trivium is only the starting point of one’s instruction and is not at all exhaustive. And we have not even started to look at many disciplines, from music to rhetorics.

One might wonder whether it is not enough to look at reports by today’s or yesterday’s Sanskrit intellectuals themselves in order to know what is worth reading and why. However, as discussed above, such reports would not boast about innovations and main breakthroughs. Sanskrit philosophy (and the same probably applies to Sanskrit mathematics etc.) is primarily commentarial. That is, authors presuppose a basic shared background knowledge and innovate while engaging with it rather than imagining to be pioneers in a new world of ideas. In a commentarial philosophy, innovations are concealed and breakthroughs are present, but not emphasised. Hence, one needs a lot of background knowledge to recognise them.

I would like to map the territory to realise who was studying what, where and how. How can this be done? The main obstacle is the amount of unpublished material, literally millions of manuscripts that still remain to be read, edited, translated and studied (I am relying on David Pingree’s estimate). Editing and translating them all requires a multi-generational effort of hundreds of people. However, a quick survey of them, ideally through an enhanced ORC technology, would enable scholars to figure out which languages were used, which theories and topics were debated, which authors were mentioned, and who was replying to whom.

This approach will remind some readers of the distant reading proposed by Franco Moretti. I am personally a trained philologist and a spokesperson for close reading. However, moving back and forth between the two methods seems to be the most productive methodology if the purpose is mapping an unknown territory. Close reading alone will keep one busy for decades and will not enable one to start the hermeneutic circle through which one’s knowledge of the situation of communication helps one better understanding even the content of the text one is closely focusing on. As hinted at above, this is particularly crucial in the case of a commentarial philosophy, where one needs to be able to master a lot of the author’s background in order to evaluate his contribution.

*As discussed several times elsewhere, I use “Sanskrit philosophy” or “Sanskrit intellectual history” as a short term for “philosophy in a cosmopolis in which Sanskrit was the dominant language of culture and everyone had to come to terms with it”, as with the use of “philosophy in the Islamic world”, that includes also thinkers part of the Islamic world but who were not themselves Muslims.

(The above are just quick notes. Any feedback is welcome!)