किं प्रामाण्यं स्वतः, परतो वा उत्पद्यते, ज्ञायते च ?
सांख्यानां प्रामाण्याप्रामाण्यौ उभौ स्वतः । नैयायिकानां वैशेषिकानां च प्रामाण्याप्रामाण्यौ उभौ परतः । बौद्धप्रमाणवादिनां प्रामाण्यं परतः, अप्रमाण्यं तु स्वतः । मीमांसकानां तु प्रामाण्यं स्वतः, अप्रमाण्यं च परतः । इति चत्वारः पक्षाः ।
What experiences the practitioner when he is in an architectural setting of high symbolic value?
I guess it should be one, according to Nyāya and the other schools who put the burden on the speaker, but I tried to discuss the topic from the point of view of Western epistemology. Let me know if you think it works.
Today I read in Philipp Maas’s contribution to Periodization and Historiography of Indian Philosophy (edited by Eli Franco) an intriguing critique of Colebrook and of all the Indologists who, seemingly following him, thought that there was nothing philosophical in Yoga apart from its Sāṅkhya component and that what was typical of Yoga alone was not philosophical.
In my weekly article on “Western” philosophy, I discuss about the requisites for testimony. Reductionists (i.e., scholars who think that Linguistic Communication can be reduced to other instruments of knowledge, the usual candidates being memory and inference) tend to have higher requirements for Testimony, but so do also some Non-Reductionists. Do we agree in ending up with that little “sound” testimonial knowledge?
I received from Peter Bisschop the following ad —if I were not happily in Vienna I would certainly apply!
A religion without mystics is a philosophy.”
I cannot enroll the Pope among my supporters, but this quote offers a further interesting insight on a point I raised here.
Does God have a body? And in which sense? Have a look at the whole problem, from the point of view of Western philosophy, but with an answer inspired by Vedānta Deśika in this post of mine.
Should we investigate about the epistemology of testimony in order to improve other people’s testimonial habits? If so, we should avoid too strict criteria, or people will withdraw precious testimonies for fear of not being justified in testifying about them. If, by contrast, the epistemology of testimony merely describes common testimonial norms, then, why does it have so high expectations? You can read my thoughts from the point of view of (Western) epistemology here.