Does a prescription with two results become meaningless? UPDATED

In his Seśvaramīmāṃsā, Veṅkaṭanātha (aka Vedānta Deśika) discusses why it is the case that we need to study Mīmāṃsā.

The most likely candidate as a prescription causing one to undertake such study is svādhyāyo’dhyetavyaḥ ‘one should learn the portion of the Veda learn in one’s family’. Veṅkaṭanātha will conclude that this prescription culminates in the learning by heart of the phonemes, leaving aside the grasping of the meaning.
Before that point, however, he analyses the view of those who say that the prescription remains valid until one has studied Mīmāṃsā. These think that each prescription needs an indipendently desirable result (phala). The learning alone cannot be construed as such a result (p. 20 of the 1971 edition), because it is not independently desirable. If one were to construe both the learning of one’s portion of the Veda and the understanding of its meaning as the result (bhāvya), the prescription would end up being meaningless.

Therefore, one should
1. either postulate heaven as the result, according to the Viśvajit rule (according to which one can postulate heaven as result whenever no result is mentioned)
2. or postulate that all results could be achieved, since learning the Veda pleases the deities and the ancestors, who would then grant one all results.

I will come back to why these hypotheses are refuted, but meanwhile, why is it the case that the prescription would become meaningless? Because neither the learning of the sheer Vedic phonems, nor the understanding of the meaning are intrinsically desirable, and each prescription needs a desirable goal.

The Sanskrit passage reads as follows:

svādhyāyārthabodhayos tu bhāvyatve vidhyānarthakyaprasaṅgāt

Comments and discussions are welcome. Be sure you are making a point and contributing to the discussion.

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8 thoughts on “Does a prescription with two results become meaningless? UPDATED

  1. Dear Elisa,
    the question could probably be answered only if we had a clear definition of anarthakya. Do you have one in the text your are studying or in a textual tradition to which it belongs? without that we are just left to our common-sense understanding and guessing.
    If you don’t have any definition, the thing that came to my mind from reading Yogasutrabhasyavivarana, many years ago (maybe the passage was even from Yogasutrabhasya itself, I do not have now these texts with me now), in a discussion on the existence of Iśvara, on YS I, 30 or I,29, if I remember well, there was a statement discussed why there cannot be two Gods, not one, and the answer was, that if there were two most powerful, there could arise a doubt (or even arise a dispute between them) which one is in fact the mightier one, and if one said and the other said , then the one which would prevail (make his will come true) would appear to be really the mightiest one (the most powerful one, omnipotent, so as to say).
    Maybe here we have a similar presupposition: if there were two goals there might finally arise a doubt which goal is the real one? There might be a hidden contradiction between them, although not cleraly visible in the beginning, yet in the final stage it might appear, and then we would have to answer which one is mightier, which one should prevail if there is any, which should prove to be the real one. With two there is always a question of the principle of differentiation, supposedly there cannot be two [things, events, etc. of the same genus], and at the same time totally identical in each and every aspect. There must be some difference between them – and this difference causes that one of them in the final real will prove to be more important.
    Using another Nyaya example (I do not remember the exact source now), a man cannot have identical affection to two women at the same time. Or the Biblical one: One cannot serve two masters.
    So if one is supposing there are two goals, he (she) in fact does not understand there can be only one goal, and with the claim for two goals one has not yet found the real (the only) goal. And probably artha in anarthakya here means just that, a goal, or in fact a lack of it.
    All the best
    Maciej St. Zięba

  2. It was just some vague association, not a real answer. But I may add, that maybe (Maybe! You should know, because I don’t know those texts) according to Mimamsa and/or Venkatanatha people need to have a very precise, unequivocal objective in order to undertake an action – and having two goals would leave some of them hesitating, whether this action would rather lead to this result (goal) or to the other – so they could not not undertake the action if they do not like one of these objectives??? (This is of course contrary to the practical experience of the mankind, and human action, but here we are not dealing with a common daily activities, but with some supernatural activity which requires an unambiguous explantation, single justification. If you have two justifications you might as well have three and more, and the special status of these actions would become diluted. So finally no justification (objective) could be held valid.

    To remind just the anectodal mayor of a small town somewhere in Switzerland, who during the visit of the emperor Napoleon Bonaparte has not ordered a cannon salvo, and asked “Why?”, answered “There are 10 reasons. The first one is we have no cannons”, to which Napoleon cut his speach and replied “One reason is enough”.

    Just thinking aloud.

    All the best
    Maciej St. Zięba

  3. That reading doesn’t appear correct. Read it as स्वाद्ध्यायार्त्थबोधस्य तु भाव्यत्वे विद्ध्यानर्त्थक्यप्रसङ्गात् । Are you sure that you have a good edition?

      • I checked original. I suggest you to post required portion in Sanskrit, since that will help people get the context immediately.
        Anyhow, there are two views accepted by Bhatta-s, first svAdhyAya(veda) is bhAvya and other that arthaGYAna is bhAvya. Read bhATTadIpikA 1.1.1 for the same.

        Now, it is easy to understand that he is talking about both those views and refuting them, because veda and it’s meaning both are not innately desirable.

        Refutation of this refutation is that both veda and it’s meaning culminate in desireable svarga, etc.

  4. I can see that in the first of my two comments something went wrong, where the italics begin (for no reason), the text should read: « if one said “yes” to something, and the other said “no” ».

    And I understand that ललितालालित’s comment telling that neither Veda nor it’s meaning are innately desirable, means practically the same as my words “here we are not dealing with a common daily activities [like food or sleep, which seem, so as to say, innately desirable], but with some supernatural activity which requires an unambiguous explantation, single justification”.