You might have noticed it already (since I am well-known for being a late adapter), but there are now several scholars of South Asian philosophy on twitter, such as Jonathan Duquette, Marco Ferrante, Marzenna Jakubczak, Malcolm Keating, Birgit Kellner, Amod Lele, Ethan Mills, Cat Prueitt, Evan Thompson… Please feel free to mention the many I am missing in the comments.
I am, as already said, a late adapter, but twitter made me get in touch with interesting people coming from outside my direct field and I enjoyed several insightful conversations. One such conversation is directly relevant for many readers and I would be glad to read your opinion about it.
Short premiss: Someone (teaching in another institute) writes me explaining that their university would like to open a position on “Indian philosophy”, but that some colleagues are against it, claiming that “it is all religion”. Now, it might at times be disheartening to hear such opinions coming from colleague philosophers, but how would you react after a few deep breaths?
Here below comes my first reaction:
There will always be people who think they know what there is even in places they never visited, and I guess it must be hard for you to be patient and try to explain your reasons without getting angry. Usually, books like Matilal’s and Ganeri’s ones are really helpful here. Perhaps, you might also point them to the podcast by Ganeri and Peter Adamson on the history of Indian Philosophy? […] Many philosophers (especially historians of philosophy) know and trust P. Adamson and might be convinced by his opinion.
Also, perhaps you might try to understand where these people come from. Are they historians of philosophy? Analytic philosophers? Phenomenologists? Using Matilal and Mohanty for the latter two groups respectively might really help… Ch. Ram-Prasad’s books are also great to reach people working in the so-called “continental philosophy”.
Last resort: Give them a book which looks “religious”, like Parimal Patil’s Against a Hindu God and ask them what they think of the Buddhist syllogisms and their refutations of the Brahmanical ones.
P.S. I know that your colleagues meant “religion” in a derogatory way, but South Asian philosophy that engages with religion is intellectually extremely stimulating, too (and would they really want to cancel Thomas Aquinas or Augustinus from their philosophical syllabi?)
How do you react in such cases? I have strong hopes in young colleagues (like many of the ones I mentioned above) and in the positive effect their contribution will have, especially once added to the tasks which have already been accomplished by their forerunners. Till that moment comes, however, we will have to think of convincing and polite answers. What will your answer be?
Thanks for posting this. I think your response hits home all the right points. Perhaps some primary texts to give to the resistant analytic could be Raghunātha’s Nañvāda (especially Matilal’s translation in his The Navya-Nyāya Doctrine of Negation), and Gaṅgeśa’s Tattvacintāmaṇi.
By way of purely rhetorical strategies (again, when faced with an analytic philosopher): One is to point out that Timothy Williamson is now convinced that Euro-American philosophy has plenty to learn from Indian philosophy. Williamson’s review of Arindam Chakrabarti’s Realisms Interlinked talks about “the rapidly developing interaction between Indian and Western traditions in metaphysics and epistemology” and the “rich resources” of both Indian and Euro-American philosophy. Another is to point out that Quine provided lots of comments on Daniel Ingalls’ Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyāya Logic, and was quite impressed with Vyākaraṇa. Throughout Word and Object, Quine makes clear in some footnotes that he took Bhartṛhari to have anticipated his own views about semantic holism.
I would first suggest asking what they mean by “religion.” Once you understand that, you can explore whether they or others they respect work on philosophers who do “religion” or whether Indian philosophy is, indeed “religion” in that sense. And you can then explore what kinds of contemporary presuppositions and starting points might be analogous to what they think of as “religious.”
Additionally, I would like to suggest that the word “dharma” be explained. The best explanation that Western academia (even non-Sanskrit related Indian academia) has for “dharma” is “religion”, which is only an aspect of the Vedic tradition. The various definitions of dharma can be narrowed down into three aspects: lifestyle, philosophy, and worship (“chodanā lakṣhaṇo artho dharmaḥ”, “dhārayati iti dharmaḥ”, “yāgādireva dharmaḥ” and any others I missed). So, in reality, the Indian definition of what others consider encompasses not only worship but also addresses the needs of everyday life as well as intellectual/spiritual/mental growth.
Good point. We tend to mistake dharma as meaning only “religion” and then decide that all South Asian authors care for is “religion”…
Thanks for the post. Of course, we know that such opinion arises from sheer ignorance. A short article or paper describing briefly a selection of some of the most interesting and diverse debates in Indian philosophy (for example: on rasa; on determinate and indeterminate perception; on the nature of linguistic meaning; on the various kinds of inference; on difference -between dvaitins and advaitins; on the proofs of the existence of God -between naiyayikas and bauddhas; etc) should convince any sincere sceptic. Is there any such article that we could share with our ignorant colleagues?
Thanks and best regards.
Many thanks to you all for your competent answers. I do not know any single article answering all such doubts, but would be happy to read it.
Indian philosophy does not need to prove itself since it has stood the test and wear of time. Having said this, Western-trained philosophers have had little exposure to the fertile field thus it is incumbent to design courses in Western-centric depts. which show that metaphysics does not equal religion (read monotheism ) in the global context. Once it becomes evident that the Upaniṣadic sages were engaging in meta-philosophy, that Bhartṛhari anticipated some of the analytic problems occupying the linguistic circles in Europe, that the Vedic mantras are more than paeans of nature worship, then the road to acceptance will have been reached.
Thank you, Renu. What do you mean by saying that the Upaniṣadic sages engaged in metaphilosophy?