Tag Archives: Kumārila Bhaṭṭa

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Kumārila and the limits of perception

According to Kumārila, much can be sense-perceived. It goes without saying that sensible qualities can be sense-perceived, but Kumārila thinks that we can also sense-perceive the substance behind the sense-qualities (that is, the substrate of the sense-qualities). He also thinks that we can sense-perceive the universal inhering in the particular. Thus, when we look at a brownish cow, we are sense-perceiving its colour, the substance-cow and the universal-cow.

However, this rather generous account of perception comes with some serious and specific boundaries. Perception, to begin with, is only about the present. It cannot grasp the past nor the future. There is no yogic super-sensuous perception that would be able to grasp such features of reality.
Kumārila also denies that cognitions are self-aware (this self-awareness, or svasaṃvedana is considered to be a form of perception by Buddhist epistemologists) and rather claims that we become aware that a cognition has taken place only retrospectively, through arthāpatti. Thus, besides denying self-awareness he also denies the Naiyāyika anuvyavasāya or `apprehension of a previous cognition’, through which one becomes aware of a previous mental event. Why is anuvyavasāya not acceptable for Kumārila? Presumably because it is about something no longer present (this might be the main reason for his general denial of mānasapratyakṣa if it is about prior thoughts).
The only seeming exception is ahampratyaya `cognition of ourselves qua-I’, which grasps something other than an `external’ object. Kumārila still thinks that the I is not a construct, but something objectively real, but he claims that in that specific case we have direct access to it. How exactly is still under investigation (see my previous posts on the matter), but my current understanding is that ahampratyaya grasps the I-as-knower while it is knowing something. It cannot grasp a previous I, otherwise it would violate the boundaries of sense-perception discussed above.
Thus, as much as Kumārila is generous with regard to regular sense-perception, he is strict in denying any sort of perception beyond it.

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Does Kumārila accept I-cognition as a kind of perception? (updated 2)

Kumārila is an extremely systematic thinker. Thus, if there is a seeming contradiction in Kumārila’s thought, it is likely the case that the contradiction is only a seeming one and that it can be solved.
In the case at stake, we have:

  1. Kumārila stating in the ātmavāda chapter within his ŚV that we can directly grasp the self through our awareness of ourselves as an I (via ahampratyaya)
  2. Kumārila stating, against Dignāga, that cognitions are not transparent to themselves (see ŚV pratyakṣa 79, 134 and then ŚV śūnyavāda) and that they are rather known a posteriori through arthāpatti based on the fact that something, e.g., a pot, has now the characteristic of being manifest (jñātatā or prākaṭya, see ŚV pratyakṣa 56) and that this characteristic wold be unexplainable otherwise
  3. Kumārila stating in the pratyakṣa chapter within the ŚV that perception is sense-perception

Which sort of cognition is ahampratyaya? The “I” cannot be known through cognitions’ awareness of themselves (as in Prabhākara), because of No. 2. Nor can the “I” be known through perception, because of No. 3. Again, given that there must be a solution (the point is too striking to have been missed by Kumārila himself) and that No. 2 looks quite sure, let me try to explore No. 3. Could it be that Kumārila accepts perception as sense-perception AND ahampratyaya? (In this connection, please note that also Jhā writes that “the notion of “I” […] is directly perceptible by the Senses”, fn on ŚV ātmavāda v. 107).

The relevant verses in the chapter on perception are mainly addressed against upholders of yogic perception. Kumārila insists there that perception is about present contents, and the “I” would qualify. He also says that perception arises from a contact between the object and the sense-faculty (sati indriyasaṅgame […] tasya (=pratyakṣasya) evaṃdharmakatvataḥ, vv 17–18), thus excluding svasaṃvedana or other forms of non-sensory direct perception from pratyakṣa. Still, ahampratyaya could qualify as belonging to perception. The sense-faculty at stake in the case of the “I” could be manas, the inner sense faculty. It is in this sense somehow disappointing that Kumārila does not mention the case of ahampratyaya while discussing ātman-manas contact in ŚV pratyakṣa, v. 66. Moreover, ŚV pratyakṣa v. 83 discusses the apprehension of pleasure and pain via manas, but does not mention the case of the manas also cognising the “I”. Even more relevant, v.83 follows a discussion of how a cognition cannot grasp itself and how pleasure etc. can be an exception because there is no svasaṃvedana there, but rather the apprehension of something inhering in the self, via the manas (see Pārthasārathi thereon: manaḥsañjñakenendriyeṇa saṃyuktaḥ ātmā svasamavetān sukhādīn […] pratipadyate). If we were to apply the same scheme to ahampratyaya, we would need to say that the self, connected to the manas, grasps the self itself, which seems to contradict the point made in v. 82, against reflectivity. Also disappointing in this regard are ŚV pratyakṣa, vv. 134–139, that discuss the role of manas in svasaṃvitti (refuted by Kumārila) and pleasure etc. (accepted) and never mention the case of “I-cognitions”. Then, again, ŚV pratyakṣa v. 160 states that manas can work on its own, without an external object, but only cites pleasure and pain as an example (yathā hi manasaḥ sārdhaṃ rūpādau cakṣurādinā | pravṛttiḥ sukhaduḥkhādau kevalasyaiva dṛśyate ||). Same with ŚV śabdanityatādhikaraṇa 337 on manas grasping pleasure etc. when not connected with the external senses.
This is all not conclusive, but it is disheartening that Kumārila never mentions the case of ahampratyaya in the chapter on perception, if ahampratyaya is in fact a case of perception.

At this point I might have been too negative about the possibility of ahampratyaya being a case of perception. Let me therefore look at the evidence in favour of it. The main one is that ahampratyaya is mentioned as an evidence for the existence of the self and as being different than inference in ŚV ātmavāda v. 107. Next, ahampratyaya is discussed in conjunction with recognition (pratyabhijñā) in the same chapter (v. 109, v. 137), and we know that recognition is a combination of memory and perception.

Could it be that ahampratyaya is just a case of recognition? In favour of this view run a few passages in Pārthasārathi’s commentary, where he says pratyabhijñārūpeṇa ahampratyayena (ad ŚV ātmavāda v. 109) and ekasantānasambandhino ‘hampratyayā ekajñātṛviṣayā iti pratyabhijñeti (ad ŚV ātmavāda v. 139), as well as the fact that the self is proven to exist because of phenomena like desire, which need some extension through time (perception of X, memory that X in the past produced pleasure, desire of X, see vv. 104–105). However, recognition requires a preceding (perceptual) awareness (and Kumārila has already established that inference does not establish the ātman). How could one re-cognise something if one had not cognised it in the first place? Recognition is essential in the argumentative structure of ŚV ātmavāda, because this has as its main opponent the Buddhist epistemologists’ point of view on the self being momentary. Yet, it would be strange to claim that ahampratyaya is only a recognition, since this would deny the phenomenological appeal that we recognise ourselves qua-I immediately (not inferentially, as Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas would like it to be, see vv. 92–101).

At this point I wonder whether for Kumārila ahampratyaya is an ad hoc pramāṇa, a cognition that never ceases every time one cognises something (see ŚV ātmavāda 133), but different than the arthāpatti through which one knows a posteriori that a cognition has taken place. Now, against that runs Kumārila’s mention of six pramāṇas (e.g., ŚV codanā 111cd), which seem to either point to ahampratyaya as a subspecies within one of the main sources of knowledge or to ahampratyaya as not necessarily knowledge-conducive. Could be just a cognition (jñāna), one that is not necessarily true, but that remains valid as long as it is not falsified? However, a pramāṇa is in Kumārila exactly defined as something that remains valid as long as it is not falsified. That is, in Nyāya it is easy to distinguish pramāṇas from thinking processes that are not *necessarily* knowledge-conducive although they might lead to true cognitions, such as tarka. But this distinction does not seem to be available to Kumārila’s falsificationism. He does use the term pramāṇa also for sources other than the six (pratyakṣa, anumāna, śabda, upamāna, arthāpatti, abhāva), for instance in the case of pratyabhijñā and of the hermeneutic pramāṇas, but both can be reduced to a subspecies of one of the six pramāṇas. This all would lead one back to ahampratyaya being a form of manas-pratyakṣa, with the ātman featuring both as the subject and object thereof.

ŚV ātmavāda 142 seems to offer a slightly different point of view, with the ātman being described as self-luminous (through the simile of a light, jyotiḥ). Thus, even though Kumārila refutes (see point No. 2 above) self-luminosity in the case of cognitions, he seems to accept it for the self. The next verses explains that this does not apply to other people’s selves, that need to be known through inference (v. 145) and perhaps also through analogy and linguistic communication combined (v. 144). Unfortunately, Uṃveka’s commentary is not available for this chapter and Pārthsārathi does not add much to this short section.

By the way, one might wonder whether ahampratyaya could ever count as knowledge, given that it is unfalsifiable. However,
a. Kumārila has defeated the alternatives already (mainly bhūtacaitanyavāda, or physicalism and the non-physicalist illusionism of Buddhist epistemologists)
b. Kumārila showed at least in one case that he is comfortable with an unfalsifiable knowledge, namely the Veda.

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Third Kumārila conference (18–22 May 2026)

Kumārila is one of the rare thinkers who are truly irreplaceable. Sanskrit philosophy would not have been the same without his contributions to epistemology (e.g., his epistemology of absence, of linguistic communication, his theory of intrinsic justification…), philosophy of action, deontics, hermeneutics and ontology. Still, his work is partly untranslated and largely understudied. A group of scholars started meeting in 2024 with the shared purpose of studying Kumārila and making him accessible to scholars of philosophy. As a result of the first two Kumārila conferences, a reader on Kumārila will be published by OUP at the end of 2026. During this third conference scholars will translate, analyse and discuss new passages by Kumārila in 2- or 3-hours sessions. Younger scholars (including students) will also be invited to the conference and will deliver shorter talks.

Preliminary program

Monday May 18th (Kumārila’s Ślokavārttika 1)
Chair: John Nemec
8.30 onwards: Breakfast
9–10 Tempa Sherpa, Kumārila on vyāpti. From the definition of inference in the Śābarabhāṣya to Kumārila’s Anumānapariccheda (ŚV, anumāna) (tbc)
10–10:15 Tea break
10:15-11:15am Alessandro Ganassi, Kumārila on universals
11:15–11:30 Tea break
11:30–12:30 Zihao Wu, tbd
12:30–2 Lunch break
Chair: Daniele Cuneo
2–3pm Devansh Bharadvaj, Kumārila on the perception of the self (ŚV, ātmavāda)
3–3.15: Tea break
3.15–5.45: Hugo David, tbd

Tuesday May 19th (Kumārila’s Ślokavārttika 2; Kumārila’s Tantravārttika 1)
Chair: Manasicha Akepiyapornchai
8:30 onwards: Breakfast
9–10: Sarju Patel, svataḥprāmāṇya in Kumārila and Bhāsarvajña
10–10:15 Tea break
10:15–12:45: Taisei Shida, Ślokavārttika Śabdādhikaraṇa vv. 1–19b & 163c–201b
12:45–2:15 Lunch break
Chair: Ajay Rao
2:15-4:45pm Andrew Ollett, tbd

Wednesday May 20th (Kumārila’s Tantravārttika 2)
Chair: Vincent Lee
8.30 onwards: Breakfast
9–10: Nirali Patel, Kumārila has his yogic cake and eats it: Kumārila on ātmatuṣṭi (TV 1.3.adh.7)
10–10:15 Tea break
10:15–12:45: Alessandro Graheli, Kumārila on Grammar in the vyākaraṇādhikaraṇa (TV 1.3.adh. 9)
12:45–2:15 Lunch break
Chair: tbd
2:15–4.45: Jonathan Peterson, brāhmaṇapratyakṣa (TV)

Thu May 21st (Kumārila’s Tantravārttika 3)
Chair: Munena Moiz
8.30 onwards: Breakfast
9–10 Kiyotaka Yoshimizu, Nitya or Kāmya from the Mīmāṃsā Viewpoint (TV ad 2.4, adh. 1)
10-10.15: Tea break
10.15–12:45: Monika Nowakowska, upāṃśuyājādhikaraṇa (TV ad MS 2.2.9-12)
12:45-2:15pm Lunch break
Chair: Jesse Pruitt
2:15-4:45pm Larry McCrea, vacanavyakti from Grahaikatvādhikaraṇa (TV ad 3.1.7, pp. 705-709 in the Anandashrama 1st ed.)

Fri May 22nd (Kumārila’s Tantravārttika 4, Kumārila’s Ṭupṭīkā)
Chair: Shashank Rao
8:30 onwards: Breakfast
9–11:30: Kei Kataoka, arthaikatva (TV 2.1.46)
11:30–11:45: Tea Break
11:45–12:45: Meera Sridhar, Substitution of ritual substances: Annotated Translation and Analysis of Kumārila’s Ṭupṭīkā 6.3
12:45-2:15: Lunch break
Chair: tbd
2:15-4:45pm: Akane Saito, tbd

Jolly (in case someone has to cancel): EF (ṬṬ ad 6.1.1–3)

Venue: University of Toronto, Mississauga campus

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Kumārila graduate students workshop at UofT

I started last year to organise small workshops at the end of each graduate class, for graduate students to present their work. This year’s topic is Kumārila (you probably guessed it). 

It will take place on Dec 3 morning and Dec 4 morning, 9-12 Toronto time.

The idea is a low-stake workshop where students get feedback so that they can improve their final papers (or embed ideas in future articles).

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Kumārila on deities

Did Kumārila believe in the language-independent existence of deities? In their efficacy within sacrifices? I believe he did not. Sacrifices work independently of deities who at most might be Epicurean-like entities, with no function in human lives. For this purpose, I am going to examine a passage in Kumārila’s Ṭupṭīkā ad 9.1, adhikaraṇa 4, p. 1652ff (Śubbāśāstrī 1929 edition).

The whole passage starts because Śabara is discussing the role of the deity in sacrifice. He explains that the deity does not promote the sacrifice (na devatā prayojikā and na devatāprayuktāḥ pravartiṣyāmahe). An opponent mentions the fact that the deity is mentioned as the target (sampradāna) of the action (given that it is in the dative case). Śabara quickly dismisses the point as related to the fact that the sacrifice is the real instrument to realise the result and moves on. Kumārila elaborates on it and comes to the conclusion that the deity has a primary role because of its grammatical function, which makes it needed for the performance of the sacrifice.

“[Obj:] But the deity is mentioned as the target (sampradāna) [and hence needs to be the one that prompts one to sacrifice, like the teacher to whom one gives a gift prompts one to give it].

[R:] The sacrifice, which is enjoined with regard to a result. requires a performance. And this performance is not possible without a deity and a sacrificial substance (to be offered). And the substance and the deity which are required (by the performance) are required only on the side of the complement, not as the thing to be realised [by the sacrifice] (which is the real motivator). Among the two, the substance becomes a complement through the third-case ending. The deity through a suffix or through the fourth-case ending.”

Here Pārthasārathi’s Tantraratna adds an intermediate objection explaining that this makes the deity seemingly into the principal element. The response is that this is not a problem.

“And if this deity-complement did not reach the condition of being primary with regard to the sacrifice (as required by the dative ending expressing the target), the sacrifice would not be performed at all. And without the performance of the sacrifice, there would not be the complement either. And if the sacrifice did not reach the condition of being its (complement’s) secondary element (guṇa), it would not come into being.

Therefore the sacrifice needs to reach the condition of being secondary as something/through an activity which is unavoidably concomitant (to the grammatical form used). And also the deity-complement [needs to reach] the condition of being primary as something unavoidably concomitant (to the grammatical form used).”

The addition of “unavoidably concomitant” (nāntarīiyaka) may seem puzzling, since neither Kumārila nor Pārthasārathi explain it. Clooney 1997 makes the bold move to interpret it as na antarīyaka (not… intermediary). I can see his motivation, but antarīyaka is not a Sanskrit word I am aware of. (NB: The L manuscript and the Tantraratna read tasmād yāgena nāntarīyakeṇa vyāpāreṇa guṇabhāvaḥ pratipattavyaḥ (instead of tasmād yāgena nāntarīyako guṇabhāvaḥ pratipattavyaḥ)).

At this point, Pārthasārathi’s Tantraratna adds that this does not mean that the sacrifice has become because of that for the sake of the deity. The following explains why.

“Nor is it the case that the unavoidable functioning is the cause for being primary or secondary, since it is not what is enjoined (and only the injunction determines real primary status). For, [one thinks:] “Since I have been enjoined towards the result, I realise the result through the sacrifice, not otherwise” (and this shows how the injunction puts the result as the primary thing and the sacrifice as its instrument).”

The Tantraratna has an interesting variant here, namely yāgo hi phale coditaḥ. This fits the beginning of the passage, which also read yāgaḥ phale codito…. The translation, in this case, would be as follows: “The sacrifice, being enjoined with regard to the result, does not realise the result otherwise [but through the deity as target]”.

“In this way, the unavoidable functioning needs to be the secondary element with respect to the deity.”

PSM adds: “in order to realise the sacrifice’s being an instrument towards the result”. It also specifies: “the secondary status is not enjoined”.

“Hence, in all cases there are two parts (a principal one, and a secondary one). Among them, we need to understand which one is what is wished to be expressed and which one is not. Among these two possibilities, in worldly experience what is wished to be expressed is determined by the force of things. In the Veda, by contrast, by language. And through language the sacrifice is the primary element, because it realises the result, given that it is proximate [to the result], The deity, by contrast, is understood to be the secondary element. Nor is it the case that the subordination (śeṣatva) is characterised as being an auxiliary (upakāra). Rather, it is established that it is characterised by the Vedic injunction.”

PSM explains that the “Nor…” sentence is the cause of the previous one.

“[UP:] What is the purpose of this investigation?

[R:] If the sacrifice had the purpose of gladdening the deity, then the deity were the one to be worshipped and the sacrifice would be a worship. And the worship is a thing known in worldly experience. Within a worship, what would be the confidence [one could have] in the claim that Sūrya is worshipped in the same way as Agni? The very opposite might be the case (namely that Sūrya dislikes what Agni likes). (Hence, the ectype for Sūrya should not be performed as the archetype sacrifice for Agni!)”

Thus, Kumārila concludes, the fact that the material trumps the deity when it comes to determining the procedure to be followed shows that the sacrifice is not a worship aimed at the deity and that the deity’s seeming predominant role is due to grammar only. I don’t see any important difference between Kumārila’s and Śabara’s conclusions here.

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Cognition of the self

How does one know about the self, according to the three main schools discussed in my last post?

Buddhist Epistemological School (Dharmakīrti): the self does not exist. The only thing that exists is a stream (santāna) of causally linked momentary cognitions. Cognitions are self-aware of themselves qua cognitions (svasaṃvedana). This is not contradictory, because each cognition has a perceiver and a perceived aspect (grāhaka and grāhya-ākāra respectively).
Nyāya: the self is known only through inference (Vātsyāyana, Jayanta); it is known also through perception (Uddyotakara, Udayana)*
Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā (Kumārila): we have direct access to our self through ahampratyaya `cognition of the I’. No need to infer it, since perception trumps inference and Mīmāṃsā authors require novelty as a criterion for knowledge, so that repeating what is already known through ahampratyaya would not count as knowledge.

The first Nyāya position might lead to problems if connected with the acceptance of yogic perception. Yogins can indeed perceive the self, according to all Naiyāyikas. Why not all other beings, given that perception requires a conjunction of self+manas+sense faculties, that the self is pervasive (vibhu) and that spatial limits are not needed for perception, as shown by the case of absence? Jayanta explains that the self is partless and that a partless thing cannot simultaneously be perceiver and perceived (cf. Kumārila’s argument against the Buddhist idea of cognitions’ having a perceiver and a perceived aspect and Kumārila’s claiming that this does not apply to the self, which is complex and not partless).

The Mīmāṃsā position requires the joint work of intrinsic validity and falsification: some I-cognitions are not about the ātman, since they are indeed falsified (e.g., “I am thin”, which only refers to the body).
Other I-cognitions are not, e.g., cognising ourselves qua knowers and recognising ourselves as the same knower who knew something in the past.

*I am grateful to Alex Watson for discussing the topic with me per email, on top of his decades of work on the topic!

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Intro to Sanskrit philosophy

Background: This year I taught again a class on Sanskrit philosophy (for the first time since 2021). I only had 12 meetings, of three hours each, hence I had do made drastic choices. The following is the result of these choices (alternative choices could have been possible, e.g., focusing on the Upaniṣads and their commentaries). Comments, as usual welcome!

There is a time within Sanskrit philosophy, approximately around 500 to 1000 CE, without which all later discussions do not make sense (whereas one can understand later discussions without referring to, e.g., the Brāhmaṇas, the Pāli canon etc.).
I am thinking of this core of Sanskrit philosophy as the period of time in which philosophers interacted with each other in a dialectical way, learning from each other and being compelled by each other’s points. In other words, as the time in which philosophy was constrained by the need to give reasons for each claim. In this sense, I am not focusing on the Pāli Canon or on the Upaniṣads.

At the core of this period lies the interaction between three schools, namely Mīmāṃsā, Nyāya and Buddhist epistemological school. No matter the topic, the interaction among these three is always at the center and always needs to be taken into account. According to the various topics, further schools might need to be taken into account. For instance, discussions about atomism will need to take into account the Vaiśeṣika school, discussions about language need to take into account the Vyākaraṇa school.

At the center of this core moment are discussions about epistemology and philosophy of language. It is interesting to note that ontology does not necessarily logically precede epistemology and that the opposite can be the case, especially in the case of Mīmāṃsā. This is particularly evident in the case of discussions about prāmāṇya `validity’.

Sanskrit philosophy developed through debates among thinkers commenting and responding to each other. In this way, they showed that ‘novelty’ is overestimated as a criterion to assess philosophical value and its consistent presence among the criteria reviewers of grants and projects are asked to assess is more the result of a fashion than of inner-philosophical reasons.

This does not mean that individual authors did not deliver substantial contribution to philosophy. Philosophy develops through its history and its history is made by individual thinkers. Nonetheless, these individual thinkers contribute under the garb of a school, downplaying their disagreements with their predecessors and often enveloping them within a commentary on a predecessor’s text, which is meant not just to explain it, but also to enfold all its potential meaning. Some scholars did move from one school to the other (e.g., possibly Vasubandhu or Maṇḍana), others just introduced in one school the elements of the other school they more strongly agreed with (e.g., Jayanta).

Key authors to be kept in mind:
• Dignāga (Buddhist epistemological school), introduced the threefold check, later accepted by all thinkers
• Kumārila (Mīmāṃsā), introduced the concept of intrinsic validity, explained that cognitions are not self-aware, challenged the Dignāga framework, systematised the discussions about absence and the other sources of knowledge (found already in his predecessor, Śabara).
• Dharmakīrti (Buddhist epistemological school), younger contemporary of Kumārila, adjusted the apoha theory and several other epistemological points in the light of Kumārila’s cricitism.
• Jayanta (Nyāya), modified the Nyāya epistemology in the light of Kumārila’s criticism, explained that cognitions are intrinsically doubtful, unless proven right, but that this does not lead to a paralysis, because one can act based on doubt.

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Second Kumārila conference (2025)—updated program

The first Kumārila conference took place at the University of Toronto in 2024. You can read more about why we need to read and write more about this key Sanskrit philosopher here: https://elisafreschi.com/2025/02/28/kumarila-conference-2025/

The second Kumārila conference will take place again at University of Toronto, this time at the St George campus. You can read more about the event’s announcement here: https://philosophy.utoronto.ca/event/kumarila-conference-2/

This conference has the form of a workshop and its purpose is to make progress towards the publication of a “Kumārila Reader”. This will include translations of (large-enough) passages by Kumārila and introductions highlighting their context and philosophical relevance. Most participants have already presented their translations last year and this year they will be able to fine-tune them. Participants will have 1—2 hours time to discuss their draft translations.

If you have a 2-hours slot, we encourage you to quickly remind the other participants about the topic, then discuss selected passages within it. You may want to first present and then have a 30 minutes discussion, but you may also want to integrate the discussion within your presentation.
If you have a 1-hour slot, we encourage you to present your topic and/or discuss selected passages in 30–45 minutes, then have some time dedicated to Q and A.

Please read the updated program below:

Monday May 5th
Chair: Nilanjan Das
8.30 onwards: Breakfast
9–11 John Nemec ŚV, Saṃbandhākṣepaparihāra 42cd-114ab
11–11:15 Tea break
11:15-12:15pm Alex Watson, ŚV ātmavāda
12.15–1.15 Long Yin Sin ŚV Pratyakṣapariccheda 171-185
1:15–2:15 Lunch break
2:15–3:15pm Alessandro Ganassi, ŚV on ākṛti
3.15–3.30: Tea break
Chair: Ajay Rao
3.30–5.30 Hugo David, ŚV vākyādhikaraṇa

Tue May 6th
Chair: Srilata Raman
8.30 onwards: Breakfast
9–11 Tarinee Awasthi, mantrādhikaraṇa (TV 1.2.4)
11–11:15 Tea break
Chair: Elisa Freschi
11:15-1:15pm Jonathan Peterson, virodhādhikaraṇa and śiṣṭākopādhikaraṇa (TV 1.3.3)
1:15–2:15 Lunch break
Chair: Nirali Patel
2:15-4:15pm Andrew Ollett, anuṣaṅgādhikaraṇa (TV 2.1.16)
4.15–4.30: Tea break
4.30–5.30: Sarju Patel, Tantravārttika 1.3.7

Wed May 7th
Chair: Vincent Lee
8.30 onwards: Breakfast
9–10 Kei Kataoka, bhāvārthādhikaraṇa (TV 2.1.1)
10–10:15 Tea break
10.15–12.15: Alessandro Graheli, vyākaraṇādhikaraṇa (TV 1.3.adh. 9)
12:15–1 Lunch break
Chair: Taisei Shida
1–3pm Malcolm Keating, tatsiddhipeṭikā (TV 1.4.23)
3–5: (Philosophy Department’s party, everyone is invited to join)

Thu May 8th
Chair: Munena Moiz
8.30 onwards: Breakfast
9–10 Kiyotaka Yoshimizu, deities (ṬṬ 9.1.6–10 and 10.4.23)
10-10:15: Tea break
10:15–12:15: Monika Nowakowska, similarity (TV ad 1.4.adh. 4, sū 5)+ŚV upamāna
12:15-1:15pm Lunch break
Chair: Jesse Pruitt
1:15-3:15pm Larry McCrea, vājapeyādhikaraṇa (TV 1.4.adh.5)
3.15–3.30: Tea break
3.30–5.30: Akane Saito, viniyogādhikaraṇa (TV 3.1.2)

Fri May 9
Chair: Shashank Rao
8.30 onwards: Breakfast
9–10: Kei Kataoka (part 2)
10–11: Alex Watson (part 2)
11–12: Final thoughts and next steps towards publication
12:15: lunch together (RSVP)

Venue: JHB 100 (Mon-Wed); JHB 318 (Thu); JHB 418 (Fri)

All breakfasts and lunches will take place at the same location as the conference, apart from the final lunch (at the Clay Restaurant)

Let me know if you want to join!

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Kumārila conference 2025

To be held in Toronto, St George campus, May 5 to 8.

Kumārila ranks among the key Sanskrit thinkers, and his massive influence has forever changed the course of Sanskrit philosophy, from Buddhist epistemology to Nyāya ontology. This conference, held at the Department of Philosophy on the St. George campus, is the second time international experts on Kumārila’s philosophy can come together to discuss his masterpieces. These experts will workshop their translations of some of Kumārila’s works in two-hour reading sessions. Sessions will see us both reading and commenting on selected passages on a given topic (e.g., adhikāra in Ṭupṭīkā 6.1) and hearing a talk on the topic itself (e.g., mapping the intersection of adhikāra and sāmarthya). A discussion session will follow. Additionally, scholars and advanced students will have the opportunity to present their Kumārila-related research in shorter, 60-minute sessions.
The conference is coordinated by Elisa Freschi and Nilanjan Das and will see the participation of other experts in Sanskrit philosophy and philology.
Confirmed participants: Tarinee Awasthi, Hugo David, Alessandro Ganassi, Alessandro Graheli, Kei Kataoka, Malcolm Keating, Lawrence McCrea, John Nemec, Monika Nowakowska, Andrew Ollett, Sarju Patel, Parimal Patil, Jonathan Peterson, Akane Saito, Taisei Shida, Long Yin Sin, Elliot Stern, Alex Watson, and Kiyotaka Yoshimizu.
This will be an in-person only event, since we believe in the power of collective intelligence and collaboration, which are challenging to replicate when some participants speak on Zoom while others are in the room.
The organizers gratefully acknowledge support for the conference from the Departments of Philosophy at UTSG and UTM, as well as the Office of the Vice-Principal, Research, and the Decanal Fund at UTM.

Preliminary program!

Mon May 5th
9–11 Alex Watson, ŚV ātmavāda
11–11:15 Tea break
11:15-12:15pm Long Yin Sin ŚV Pratyakṣapariccheda 171-185
12.15–1.15 Alessandro Ganassi ŚV on ākṛti
1:15–2:15 Lunch break
2:15–4:15pm John Nemec ŚV, Saṃbandhākṣepaparihāra 42cd-114ab
4.15–4.30: Tea break
4.30–6.30 Hugo David, ŚV vākyādhikaraṇa

Tue May 6th
9–11 Tarinee Awasthi, mantrādhikaraṇa (TV 1.2.4)
11–11:15 Tea break
11:15-1:15pm Jonathan Peterson, virodhādhikaraṇa and śiṣṭākopādhikaraṇa (TV 1.3.3)
1:15–2:15 Lunch break
2:15-4:15pm Andrew Ollett, anuṣaṅgādhikaraṇa (TV 2.1.16)
4.15–4.30: Tea break
4.30–5.30: Sarju Patel, Tantravārttika 1.3.7

Wed May 7th
9–11 Alessandro Graheli, vyākaraṇādhikaraṇa (TV 1.3.adh. 9)
11–11:15 Tea break
11:15-12:15pm Elliot Stern, (ṬṬ 6.3.2)
12:15–12:45 Lunch break
12:45-2:45pm Malcolm Keating, tatsiddhipeṭikā (TV 1.4.23) + 1.3.10, on ākṛti as the primary meaning, (and maybe 3.2.1, the short section that also discusses mukhya/lakṣaṇā, etc.)
2.45–5: Break (Philosophy Department’s party)
5–7: Monika Nowakowska, similarity (TV ad 1.4.adh. 4, sū 5)+ŚV upamāna

Thu May 8th
9–11 Kei Kataoka, śeṣapratijñādhikaraṇa (TV 3.1.1); bhāvanādhikaraṇa (TV ad 2.1.1–4)
11–11:15 Tea break
11:15-12:15pm Kiyotaka Yoshimizu, deities (ṬṬ 9.1.6–10 and 10.4.23)
12:15–1:15 Lunch break
1:15-3:15pm Larry McCrea, vājapeyādhikaraṇa (TV 1.4.adh.5)
3.15–3.30: Tea break
3.30–5.30: Akane Saito, viniyogādhikaraṇa (TV 3.1.2)

Location: JHB 100 (5–7 May); JHB 401 (8 May).

Updated program here: https://elisafreschi.com/2025/04/18/second-kumarila-conference-2025/

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Debates on adhikāra (again)

Within the Śābarabhāṣya commentary on the Mīmāṃsāsūtra (the foundational text of the Mīmāṃsā school), chapter 1 of book 6 is dedicated to adhikāra. The chapter deals with several cases in a manner which might surprise some readers, because the text does not distinguish a priori between “good” and “bad” cases and rather applies Mīmāṃsā-based reasoning throughout. For instance, an opponent suggests understanding adhikāra as only or primarily grounded on desire and is therefore willing to accept as a consequence that women, śūdras (members of the lower class) and animals have the same adhikāra as male Brahmans to perform Vedic sacrifices. Even more surprising, perhaps, is that the reply by the upholder of the final opinion is not that animals are impure, women are inferior and śūdras are inherently flawed. Rather, they discuss about the other requirements of adhikāra and show why they exclude some of the above categories from the performance of Vedic sacrifices.

To begin with, animals lack the adhikāra to perform sacrifices not because they lack desire (they do have plans), but because 1. they lack the ability to perform them, insofar as they don’t have hands. Moreover, 2. they lack desires regarding the next life, because these desires depend on our being cultivated into desiring something beyond the present life. Thus, wolves etc. can decide to fast, but only because they want health, and not for purposes relative to a next life, because they don’t know about it.

There is then an interesting discussion about poor people and people having some physical disability. It’s easy to see that the latter lack ability and are therefore excluded from having the adhikāra to perform Vedic sacrifices. However, how can one distinguish the case of disabled people who cannot, for instance, look at the clarified butter (because they are blind) and poor people who cannot look at the clarified butter because they lack the substances to buy it? Śabara speaks therefore of a distinction between śakti and sāmarthya. Both terms can be translated as “ability”, but Śabara seems to make them into technical terms in order to distinguish the two cases. Accordingly, poor people temporarily lack the sāmarthya to perform a sacrifice, but this temporary lack of sāmarthya is remediable, because they could acquire the relevant substances later on in their life, whereas they never lost the śakti to perform sacrifice. I will conventionally call the temporary thing being lost (or sāmarthya) ‘capacity’, whereas the thing that poor people don’t loose (i.e., their śakti) ‘ability’. Śabara distinguishes them insofar as the former is bahirbhūta ‘external’, whereas the latter is ātmavṛtti ‘belonging to one’s soul, intrinsic’.

Unfortunately, Kumārila does not keep this opposition and just generically speaks of sāmarthya.

It is also interesting that the debate about disabled people continued through the centuries. Kumārila (a commentator of Śabara and possibly the main author of the Mīmāṃsā school) explains that disabled people lack the sāmarthya (and hence the adhikāra) to perform Vedic sacrifices, but that this does not mean that they cannot reach the same goal, namely happiness in a future life (a.k.a. ‘heaven’). He clarifies that they have a different path open to them, namely that of remaining a chaste student of the Veda and reciting it. This is considered by him to be an easier option and Kumārila needs therefore to explain that it is only open to the ones who lack the ability to perform the more difficult alternative, whereas those who are able to work, get married and perform Vedic sacrifices should certainly do so. Incidentally, the same device will be used by an even later author, Veṅkaṭanātha, to justify the adoption of an easier soteriological path, namely prapatti, instead of bhakti. This path is only open, he points out, to those who are unable to follow the path of bhakti, hence there is no contradiction between the command about a difficult path and an easier one.

Later Mīmāṃsā texts, possibly after Khaṇḍadeva, go back to the duties of disabled people and offer a slightly different solution. They say that disabled people cannot perform elective rituals, because they lack the relevant ability, but they still retain the adhikāra (insofar as they have learnt the Vedas by heart etc.) to perform fixed rituals. In fact, these rituals can be performed ‘as much as one can’, hence a blind person will just skip the command to look at clarified butter etc.