Habilitation in Italy (results)

You can read here the results regarding the Italian “Habilitation” process. Unlike in other parts of the world, the Habilitation has been introduced in Italy only in 2012 and it is twofold:

you can find here the results of those who submitted their work in order to be judged worthy of becoming Associate Professor (e.g., Maria Piera Candotti, Claudio Cicuzza, Marco Franceschini, Cristina Pecchia, Tiziana Pontillo and many others, including myself)

and here the results of those who submitted their works in order to be judged worthy of becoming Full Professor (e.g., Fabrizia Baldissera, Anna Filigenzi, Giacomella Orofino, Alberto Pelissero, Francesco Sferra, Federico Squarcini and many others).

You might also know that the whole process has led to controversial opinions. Comments?

Before “Classical Indian Philosophy”: the influence of the Sāṅkhya logic UPDATED

We discussed already on this blog about how our conception of “classical Indian philosophy” is contingent and historically determined. For instance, if you were to ask me what “classical Indian philosophy” for me means, I would at first answer with “debate between Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā and Buddhist Pramāṇavāda”. However, as soon as one throws a closer look at the texts, one sees how this balance was precarious and how the debate had different protagonists at different times.

The Indian Philosophy Blog launched!

Remember the time when I was complaining about the absence of a platform for discussions among scholars philosophically interested in India? Now we (meaning: myself, Amod Lele and a group of interesting friends and colleagues, based throughout Europe and in the US) launched one! Ideally, this should work as a forum where ideas can be discussed and shared. We also hope that it will increase the chances for Indian philosophy to become part of the intellectual discours of philosophy throughout the (academic) world.

Hope you will join the discussion!

A theist caught in the paradoxes of free will

Can a theist believe in God’s omniscience&omnipotence and in free will? I have argued in other posts that one can think in a compatibilist way (because God wants to be freely loved) and that this entails that no punishment/ban from God’s presence can be eternal. Here I would like to test it in the case of Vedānta Deśika/Veṅkaṭanātha, a Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedāntin who also wrote Mīmāṃsā works.

From a Mīmāṃsā standpoint, free will is a fundamental presupposal, since Vedic prescriptions are in a dialectical relation with one’s desire (rāga): one always decides on the basis of the one or the other. That rāga itself might lie beyond one’s free will is an idea never discussed by Mīmāṃsā authors, possibly because they are interested in the phenomenology of free will and not in its ontology.

Can the Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta point of view agree with this perspective? On the one hand, one might think that the omnipotency of God as conceived by Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta authors leads back to the initial problem. On the other, according to Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta human beings are nothing but specifications (viśeṣas) of the only existing reality, God Himself. In some forms of Vaiṣṇavism (e.g., in Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavism), God can freely choose to self-delude Himself as part of His play (līlā). Thus, the child-Kṛṣṇa can willfully forget His omnipotence in order to enjoy His mother’s protection.

Can one conceive the freedom enjoyed by human beings also as a case of self-delimitation?

Further thoughts on free will in Indian Philosophy can be read here.

 

 

What did Kumārila have in view when he spoke of a “linguistic force” and of an “objective force”?

What did Kumārila mean when he spoke of śabda– and arthabhāvanā? While the first compound can be interpreted as a tatpuruṣa (the force of language) or as a karmadhāraya (the force consisting of language), the latter remains less clear… You can read about three interpretative proposals here.