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On Uttamur T. Vīrarāghavācārya

Have you ever seen a copy of the Upayukta Mīmāṃsā?

I already discussed here my admiration and fascination for Uttamur T. Viraraghavacarya and his work. Vīrarāghavācarya is known in his Tamil works as Uttamur (or Uthamur) T. Vīrarāghavācarya (with various graphic variants) and in his Sanskrit works mainly as Abhinava Deśika Vīrarāghavācarya.

He wrote countless books, mostly commentaries on Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta books in Tamil, Maṇipravāḷa and Sanskrit. However, he also wrote directly on texts he deemed important for religious, e.g., stotras and Upaniṣads, theological, e.g., Udayana’s Nyāyakusumañjali, and philosophical reasons, e.g., Kaṇāda’s Vaiśeṣika Sūtra and Pāṇini’s Aṣṭādhyāyī. His commentaries display his originality and deepness as a thinker, an instance of which has been discussed here.

The Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta community also reveres the figure of U.T. Vīrarāghavācārya, so that one can find on the web several interesting webpages dedicated to him and many of his works have been uploaded on archive.org (mostly under the name “Uttamur T. Viraraghavacharya”, see here). However, I could not find in any library or catalogue a copy of a text he refers to in his commentary on Vedānta Deśika’s Seśvaramīmāṃsā, namely his Upayukta Mīmāṃsā. According to the way he presents it (in his commentary on the beginning of the SM), this should constitute an attempt of making Pūrva Mīmāṃsā consistent with Vedānta, thus a very interesting topic. It is also referred to, for instance, in this and this page dedicated to U.T. Vīrarāghavācārya, still not a copy seems to be available for purchase (or download).

Do readers have suggestions about where to look for a copy of it?
(I already wrote to the Uttamur Swami Trust)

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Proximity, semantic fitness and syntactic expectancy as criteria for the sentence meaning

Words (for the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā authors) get connected into a complex sentence meaning through proximity (sannidhi), semantic fitness (yogyatā) and syntactic expectancy (ākāṅkṣā).
These three criteria correspond to the requirement of being uttered one after the other with no intervening time (unlike in the case of the words “a cow” and “runs” pronounced on two different days), being semantically fit to connect (unlike the words “watering” and “with fire”) and being linkable through syntactic expectancy (as in the case of a verb and its arguments).
It is in this connection noteworthy that the example of expectancy always refer to syntax rather than semantics and typically have a verb expecting a complement or vice versa.

The Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā authors also adopt the same criteria in order to rule the understanding of the sentence meaning out of the connected words and avoid the objections (mentioned above) about the fact that out of a random heap of words one would not know how to start to get to the sentence meaning.

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Maṇḍana on the Śyena

We already discussed (here, on November the 30th 2017) Jayanta’s position on the Śyena sacrifice. In this post we will observe that Jayanta was in fact inspired by Maṇḍana and, perhaps, by Maṇḍana’s commentator Vācaspati (it is still unsure whether Vācaspati was inspired by Jayanta or the other way around).

According to Maṇḍana, there are two kinds of Vedic prescriptions, the ones regarding the person (puruṣārtha) and the ones regarding the sacrifice (kratvartha).

In the case of puruṣārtha actions, the Vedic prescriptions do not motivate people to undertake them, since one would undertake them anyway because thery lead to happiness (prīti).
Rather, the Vedic prescriptions motivate people to undertake these actions with a certain set of auxiliaries. Similarly, in the case of the Śyena, the prescription about it does not promote it, since it is in itself puruṣārtha. The Śyena remains an anartha. (Vidhiviveka, p. 279, Goswami edition)

(ef and Sudipta Munsi)

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Sanskrit Reading Room at Soas (London)

I received the following announcement from Karen O’Brien-Kop and I am glad to advertise it, also because several readings will be conducted by long-term colleagues and friends of mine. You can read Karen’s very interesting posts about the reading sessions on her blog.

The Sanskrit Reading Room at SOAS is a graduate initiative that holds fortnightly readings of Sanskrit texts with leading scholars. This year we are looking at a number of texts from the Indian philosophical traditions. The reading seminars are open to all, although knowledge of Sanskrit is recommended. Participants can book their place in advance and will receive the reading in order to familiarize themselves with the text. Selected sessions will be live-streamed via our Facebook page and all sessions will be recorded for an audio archive on our blog.

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Āyurvedic mantras

In the Caraka Saṃhitā, cikitsāsthāna, 23, vv. 90–94, the one who prepares the antidote to poison called Mahāgandhahastin should utter the following mantra:

While grinding [the ingredients] one should pronounce this siddha mantra:
“My mother is called jayā, my father jaya (victory). I, the son of jaya and jayā, am victorious (or: “I am Vijaya”) and win.
Praise to Viṣṇu Narasiṃha, Viśvakarman, Sanātana, Kṛṣṇa, Bhava and Vibhava. I bestow (or: “I restrain”) the splendour of Vṛśākapi and the direct splendour of Brahmā and Indra
Just like ‘I don’t know the defeat of Vāsudeva, nor the marriage of my mother, nor the draining of the ocean’, so, through this truthful statement may this antidote be successful.
O, best among the medications, mixed with Hilimili, may you protect [me], hail!”

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Dissent among a Viśiṣṭādvaitin and a Mīmāṃsaka: What do Vedic words mean?

Within his Mīmāṃsā commentary, the Seśvaramīmāṃsā, Veṅkaṭanātha explicitly dissents from Śabara (also) in his commentary on Pūrva Mīmāṃsā Sūtra (henceforth PMS) 1.1.31 on Vedic words seemingly expressing proper names, e.g., Prāvāhaṇi and Babara (which are used by opponents as an evidence of the impermanent nature of the Vedas).

Śabara suggested that such seeming names in fact only express something else and offered alternative etymological explanations. Veṅkaṭanātha replies that out of context it is clear that specific people must be referred to, but that these people’s roles are recurrently covered at each new era.

The relevant passage by Śabara on PMS 1.1.31 reads:

[The name] ”Prāvāhaṇi” derives from `flowing forth’ (pravah-). [The name] ”Babara” imitates a sound. Therefore, these two [linguistic expressions] express only a permanent referent (artha). Therefore it is said \textbf{The other [ephemeral things mentioned in the Vedas], by contrast, are merely similar in the way they sound.

pravāhayati, sa prāvāhaṇiḥ. babara iti śabdānukṛtiḥ. tena yo nityārthas tam evaitau śabdau vadiṣyataḥ. ata uktam – paraṃ tu śrutisāmānyamātram iti

Veṅkaṭanātha’s rejection of this view reads as follows:

Only Half-Materialists (ardhacārvāka) like this construction (yojanā) [of the sūtra]. Otherwise, how could [such meanings] be connected (anvaya) with [linguistic expressions such as] ”he desired”? (How could ”Babara” be connected with ”he desired” if it is only an onomatopoeia?)

[Obj./in favour of Śabara:] Also in regard to that (”he desired”) one postulates a different meaning.

[R.:] Why should not [a different menaning] be postulated in this way in every case?

All four manuscripts of the Seśvaramīmāṃsā reproduce Śabara’s passage in a slightly different way, including a reference to vāyu as a referent of Prāvāhaṇi:

[The name] ”Prāvāhaṇi” derives from `flowing forth’ (pravah-). [The name] ”Babara” imitates a sound. Therefore, these two linguistic expressions express only a permanent referent (artha), [i.e.], the wind (which flows forth).

pravāhayati iti prāvāhaṇiḥ. babara iti śabdānukṛtiḥ. tena yo nityo ‘rthas tam imau śabdau vadiṣyataḥ vāyum. ata uktam – paraṃ tu śrutisāmānyamātram iti

The mention of vāyu is not present in the published version of the Śābarabhāṣya. Nonetheless, the reference to the wind is well-attested in the Mīmāṃsā subcommentaries on this adhikaraṇa, thus Veṅkaṭanātha could easily be aware of it.

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Did ṛṣis author the Veda? UPDATED

A Mīmāṃsā and Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta view about it

In his Seśvaramīmāṃsā (ad 1.1.29), Veṅkaṭanātha discusses the problem of the authorship of the Veda while being a Mīmāṃsaka, but also trying to condede something to theism.

For instance, he is less straightforward than Mīmāṃsā authors in ruling out the role of the ṛṣis. Mīmāṃsā authors spoke of the ṛṣis mentioned in connection with some Vedic parts as having just recited (and not authored) those parts in an excellent way. Veṅkaṭanātha does not deny his opponent’s claim that ṛṣis could see parts of the Veda they did not learn with a teacher. Nonetheless, they only see what they are eligible to see, through powers given to them by Prajāpati. They also don’t see anything new:

For this very reason, also the fact that the ṛṣis have done the sūtras, the [Vedic] parts (kāṇḍa) (Brāhmaṇa and Upaniṣads) and the mantras (i.e., the Vedic saṃhitās), conforms to previous acts (i.e., they have uttered them as they were in the previous kalpa), [and] the immediate perception (sākṣatkaraṇa) of a part of the Veda which has not been studied [by them] by ṛṣis who had specific powers given [to them] by Prajāpati conforms with their various eligibilities. For this reason, in this way there is no author of the Veda. Therefore, in all times the Vedas are only recited by a sequence (paramparā) of people depending on someone else (paratantra).

ata eva ṛṣīṇām sūtrakāṇḍamantrakṛttvam api prācīnakarmānuguṇaṃ prajāpatipradattaśaktiviśeṣāṇāṃ tattadadhikārānuguṇam anadhītavedabhāgasākṣātkaraṇam eva. tad evaṃ na vedakarteti sarvadā paratantrapuruṣaparamparādhītā eva vedāḥ.

In other words, ṛṣis are an exception to the normal transmission of the Veda, they are not at its origin. And they don’t see anything more than what people learn through their teachers.

Now a question to you, dear readers: I am not sure about my interpretation of the compound sūtrakāṇḍamantrakṛttvam. This is found in the same context also in Veṅkaṭanātha’s Nyāyapariśuddhi, but I could not find it in any other text. I am not sure about its meaning, since the Vedic kāṇḍas (karmakāṇḍa and jñānakāṇḍa) do include mantras. Nor did Veṅkaṭanātha mention here mantras of altogether different origin… Moreover, sūtras are generally accepted to have an author, so that they don’t really belong to the same group. What could be meant here?

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Being a Mīmāṃsaka and believing in God might be hard

To my knowledge, Veṅkaṭanātha’s Seśvaramīmāṃsā has been commented upon only once in Sanskrit, namely in the 20th c. by Abhinavadeśika Vīrarāghavācārya.
At times, the Sūkṣmārthaṭīkā‘s author seems to disagree with Veṅkaṭanātha insofar as he stresses that a certain position by the Mīmāṃsā school is “not accepted by us” (i.e., by the Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedāntins). Many such cases pertain to the core teachings about language and the Veda being fix according to Mīmāṃsā and depending on God according to Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta. In the commentary on SM ad PMS 1.1.29, the Sūkṣmārthaṭīkā is quite explicit:

By contrast, we do not accept the inference said by Mīmāṃsakas, namely ”Each recitation of the Veda has been preceded by one’s teacher’s teaching one the recitation of the Veda, because it is a Vedic recitation, like the present ones”. We do not accept it, because there is an exception, since the probans is absent in the recitation performed by Brahmā of the [Vedic text] based on the Lord (who was Brahmā’s inner controller, so that Brahmā did not need to learn the Veda from a teacher) as well as in the present recitation of the Veda, when it is performed by an ascetic who has made it present (and therefore can see it without the need of a teacher).
And we also do not accept the syllogism because it contradicts the sacred texts speaking of creation and dissolution [of the entire world].

vedādhyayanaṃ sarvaṃ gurvadhyapanapūrvakam adhyayanatvād ity anumānaṃ tu mīmāṃsakoktaṃ necchāmaḥ. īśvaramūlacaturmukhakartṛkādhyayane sākṣātkāritapasvikārite ādyādhyayane ca sādhyābhāvāt vyabhicārāt (ad SM ad 1.1.29, 1971 edition p. 128).

It is easy to see how a Mīmāṃsaka could not have agreed less with Vīrarāghavācārya’s arguments. Mīmāṃsā authors in general believe in a beginningless time and think that the idea of creations and dissolutions is only an unwarranted assumption. Even more dangerous is the idea that an ascetic might see directly the Veda, since this could open the door to yogipratyakṣa and to autonomous religious experiences.

In all the above ways, the Sūkṣmārthaṭīkā‘s author also indirectly points out the gigantic effort Veṅkaṭanātha undertook, almost seven centuries before, when he tried to propose a synthesis of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta.

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nitya and eternality

During the three days of this workshop on philosophy of language in South Asia I have been repeatedly asked why I would want to “remove” the aspect of eternality from the concept of nitya. In fact, I think the situation is rather the opposite.

“Eternality” is a later overinterpretation of a term which, in my opinion, originally did not mean that, and continued not to have eternality as its primary meaning throughout its history.

nitya (as shown by Minoru Hara, JAOS 79.2) is etymologically adjective meaning ‘inherent’. This meaning is completely in harmony with its use in the same semantic field as siddha, autpattika, apauruṣeya and svābhāvika in Vyākaraṇa and Mīmāṃsā, as well as dhruva.*

So, how comes that one starts speaking about temporality in connection with nitya? In my hypothesis, there are three steps:

  1. In connection with the Mīmāṃsā vs Nyāya controversy, Mīmāṃsā authors insist on the apauruṣeya aspect of language, whereas Nyāya authors insist on language as pauruṣeya. Since language is pauruṣeya, it is not nitya in the sense of being kṛtaka ‘made up’, ‘artificial’. Thus, once again, nitya is not opposed to ‘temporal’ but to ‘artificial’, once again pointing to an opposition which does not have “eternality” as its primary focus.
  2. The Mīmāṃsā vs Nyāya controversy evolved also into a Mīmāṃsā vs Buddhist Epistemology controversy. For Buddhist epistemologists, whatever is kṛtaka is also kṣaṇika. Here temporality comes into the picture. Still, the point is not about “eternality” vs, “temporality”, but rather about “fixed/permanent/ummovable” vs “ephemeral”, as shown by the examples mentioned (mountains and rivers are said to be respectively kūṭastha– and pravāhanitya).
  3. Euro-American interpreters are used to the topic of temporality and to the concept of eternality, which plays a big role in the Graeco-Roman and in the Judaeo-Christian worldviews. Thus, they are inclined to interpret concepts in this sense, just like it happens with concepts like “Scripture”, “God”, “letter” and the like, which have been introduced uncritically in the Indian debate.

*Yes, you might find nitya also in connection to anādi ‘beginningless’, which might be interpreted temporally (I rather think it just means “for which no beginning can be proved”). But this is just one among the many terms used in juxtaposition with nitya (see above for several others).

P.S. I recently wrote an article on nitya. You can read the pre-print version here.