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Read more primary texts to unsettle your philosophical views

I tend to think that the history of philosophy is not (just) of historical significance, but that it is an integral part of philosophy.

I think that it would be delusional to think that philosophy of the last, say, twenty years, is, by coincidence the best philosophy ever produced by humans and that therefore exposing oneself to just those twenty years means blindfolding oneself and risking to mistake one’s prejudices for genuine philosophical “intuitions”. Therefore, I think that it is key to read texts written in different time-periods and coming from different philosophical traditions. With “texts” I mean primary texts (at least in translation), not just summaries of them in English.

To make an easy example: A contemporary scholar of, say, cosmopsychism who has never read Abhinavagupta or Utpaladeva may have heard about their philosophical positions and incorporate a paragraph on one or the other in their last article. But given that this engagement is based only on hearsay and not on a direct engagement with Utpaladeva or Abhinavagupta’s thought, the potential of Utpaladeva or Abhinavagupta’s thought to trigger a real rethinking of cosmopsychism is lost and they are used only to confirm the contemporary scholar’s own views. 

For instance, “material cause” and “efficient cause” are Aristotelian categories and superimposing them on Vedānta in an uncritical way risks leading to fundamental misunderstandings. The antidote? Reading Sāṅkhya, Nyāya and Vedānta theories of causation, so as to. understand similarities, but also differences with the Aristotelian paradigm.

There might come a time when secondary literature on, e.g., causation in Sanskrit philosophy or on specific authors will be enough. But we are not there yet. Only a few texts have been edited among the millions of manuscripts that await an edition, a small percentage of these have been translated, and even less have been properly studied. At this stage, any conclusion reached by secondary literature is preliminary at best.

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Further notes on Mīmāṃsā permissions UPDATED 11.3.2024

The following are a few random notes on permissions which have not (yet) found a place in an article.

1. A colleague wondered whether the command my co-authors and I have been discussing in several articles on Mīmāṃsā and called the “better-not permission” can be meaningfully described as permission at all. In fact, the term `permission’ in Euro-American philosophy or in Deontic Logic is strongly polysemic, covering, among others, acts that are not normed as well as acts that were previously prohibited and are permitted, and even rights.

Philosophers of the Mīmāṃsā school, by contrast, adopt the standard Sanskrit terms for permission, anujñā and anumati), but focus on only one aspect among better-not, encouraged or normatively indifferent, and use different terms for the others, thus offering a way out of the polysemy of `permissions’ (for instance, adhikāra comes close to rights, as I will discuss in a separate text).
Using the term `permission’ thus highlights a single shared aspect and suggests a way out of the polysemy of `permissions’.

2. Within the Mītākṣara commentary on Yājñavalkya, Vijñāneśvara discusses better-not permissions for Brāhmaṇas in distress. For instance, the general prohibition to steal is overrun by the permission to steal if one has not eaten for three days, provided one is stealing only from a non-brāhmaṇa (thus presupposing that the prohibition to stealing from a brāhmaṇa holds unconditionally).

The Mitākṣarā commentary further explains that stealing from a non-brāhmaṇa is permitted, provided one has not eaten for three days and one only takes enough for one meal and not additional supplies

Now, if one goes on like that for a long time, one might eventually die of starvation (because one is stealing only enough for one meal and only once every three days). Verse 44 suggests the solution (the king should take care of one), but this is not a solution one can count on in every case. Hence, Mitākṣarā verse 43 does not rule out a situation in which, in order to avoid violating the prohibition at stake (that of stealing in general), though weakened by the permission to steal from a non-brāhmaṇa if one has not eaten for 3 days,) and F(stealing from a brāhmaṇa/in general)) one ends up actually dying.

This further strengthens the point that there is no obligation to avoid starvation as the result of the general prohibition to perform any violence.

3. I use the term `command’ to cover all sorts of deontic statements. Thus, a command can convey an obligation, a prohibition or a permission. This terminology is different than the one adopted in Guhe, pp. 422–423, where `permission’ covers elective obligations. This distinction is due to the fact that E. Guhe relies on the definitions found in a late Nyāya primer, the Nyāyakośa, whereas I focus on Mīmāṃsā. It is historically interesting that later Nyāya authors considered elective rituals as permissions (they aren’t Mīmāṃsā better-not permissions, but they share with Euro-American permissions the fact that there is no risk connected with their lack of performance).

4. Permissions are not easily recognised by their linguistic form, because linguistic forms can be misleading in Sanskrit, as it can be in English (for instance, within a series of instructions, one can encounter statements in the indicative that are, however, to be analysed as commands, e.g. “One takes two cups of flour”, or “One threshes grains”). Therefore, Mīmāṃsā authors identify commands through a semantic and contextual analysis.

5. The Mīmāṃsā position is neatly distinguished from the one of, e.g., Hansson (2013), who thinks that introducing permissions even in the absence of general prohibitions is useful to define rights.
In fact, Mīmāṃsā authors deal with the category of rights differently, and I am currently working on its possible functional equivalent, namely adhikāra.

6. In general, the Mīmāṃsā analysis of commands focuses on commands occurring within a closed corpus of norms, such as the Veda, since only a closed corpus of norms provides the ideal setting for applying nyāyas.

(cross-posted on the Indian Philosophy Blog)

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Recommendation letters: Dos and Donts

So, you are a student and you want to ask a professor for a recommendation letter? Consider doing the following (not in hierarchical order):

  1. Explain who you are (e.g., “My name is Elisa Freschi, I was in your PHL 100 and PHL 401 classes”)
  2. Explain what you want their recommendation for (e.g., “I am writing to ask whether you might want to write a recommendation letter for me for my application to an MA in Gender Studies at Western University”)
  3. Be specific: Do you need a recommendation letter or just to put down their name as a reference?
  4. Give all the details about yourself: Attach your transcripts, letter of intent (for the school(s) you are applying to), writing sample, cv…
  5. Give all the details about the position you are applying for (a graduate program? A summer course? A conference?…)
  6. ASK before giving the name of a certain professor as reference (it is annoying to know that you have no choice)
  7. Explain when the deadline is and REMIND the professor one week in advance (I have never received an automatic reminder, but I know that it looks bad on an application if a professor did not submit their application)
  8. Don’t aim too high: It’s better to have an engaged letter by a TA or postdoc than to have a lukewarm letter by a well-known professor who does not really know you and will only say vague things about you.
  9. Connected with the above: Be sure that the professor will be happy to write a strong letter for you (not just a letter). Some letters are not really of help.
  10. Connected with the above: You have let your professor down as a TA or RA multiple times? They might not be in the best position to help you. Please try to do your best with at least one prof as TA or RA if you want their recommendation letters.
  11. Explain what exactly you are asking. In some cases, what is required is just a 1-paragraph letter, in others a longer letter is required. Be specific!
  12. Optional: Explain why you are asking exactly this professor (e.g., “I am asking you because you are the one who engaged the most with my writing assignments and could therefore speak about them/because your class is the one during which I have been improving the most and I hope you can attest to that/because of the many 1-1 discussions we had, which makes me confident that you have a clearer opinion about my philosophical ideas than most other professors/…”).
  13. INFORM your letter-writers of what happened. It’s nice to hear back from you!

Am I forgetting something?

(Updated, thanks to @neuroyogacara.bsky.social)

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Kumārila conference

The first Kumārila Conference will be held at the Department of Philosophy at the University of Toronto, Mississauga, from May 27th to June 1st, 2024. Venue: Maanjiwe nendamowinan building, Room 3230, UTM.

The conference will bring together experts who will lead two-hour reading sessions on key passages of Kumārila’s texts and provide participants with the necessary tools to understand the hidden gems of Kumārila’s philosophy. More in detail, these sessions will include the reading and commenting on selected passages on a given topic (e.g., adhikāra in Ṭupṭīkā 6.1) and a talk on the topic itself (e.g., mapping the intersection of adhikāra and sāmarthya) and then a discussion session. Besides, there will be opportunities for scholars and advanced students to present their research related to Kumārila in shorter sessions (60′ and 30′).

The conference will be coordinated by Elisa Freschi and Nilanjan Das and will see the participation of other experts in Sanskrit philosophy and philology. Confirmed participants (so far) include Dan Arnold, Tarinee Awasthi, Purushottama Bilimoria, Hugo David, Alessandro Graheli, Ham Hyoung Seok, Kei Kataoka, Malcolm Keating, Lawrence McCrea, Sudipta Munsi, John Nemec, Monika Nowakowska, Andrew Ollett, Parimal Patil, Akane Saito, Wintor Scott, Taisei Shida, Elliot Stern, Angela Vettikkal, Alex Watson and Kiyotaka Yoshimizu.

This will be an in-person only event, since we believe in the power of collective intelligence and collaboration and these are hardly replicable when some participants speak per Zoom and others are in the room. Please consider that we are happy to assist you with invitation letters etc. if you need them for visa purposes, just let us know!

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Thinking about rights in Sanskrit philosophy

I started thinking about rights while working on permissions, because some deontic logicians think that permissions need to be also independent of prohibitions, in order to ground rights. Now, as I argued elsewhere, Mīmāṃsā permissions are always exceptions to previous negative obligations or prohibitions, so what happens to rights?


There is not a directly correspondent concept (how could there be one, given how historically loaded ‘right’ is?), but an interesting parallel is adhikāra. How does this work?


Let me look, to begin with, at the discussion in the apaśūdrādhikaraṇa by Rāmānuja. There, he explains that śūdras (humans belonging to the lowest class) do not have the adhikāra to perform worship (upāsana), because they are unable (asamartha), even though they desire the result of the action. Why are they unable? Because the do not have the adhikāra to perform a part of it, namely vedādhyayana.


So, as a preliminary understanding:

adhikāra to do x (e.g., upāsana) presupposes:

  1. desire to obtain the result of action x
  2. ability to perform action x, which, in turn, presupposes the ability to perform each of its parts
  3. [not yet determined, but see below]

The interesting part is that according to “as much as possible” principle, one does not need to perform each part of x in order to perform x, if x is a compulsory action (e.g., if you have the duty to each single day, you might leave out polishing each slide every single time). However, you still need to be “able” (samartha) to perform each part, even the ones you might have left out.

asāmarthya ‘inability’ can be due to physical or economical inability, but could also be the result of the lack of a predecing adhikāra. Thus, adhikāra has a double relation to sāmarthya: a) Lack of sāmarthya precludes the possibility adhikāra (adhikāra presupposes can); b) Lack of adhikāra to do x means that one will not get to do x and will therefore be asamartha with regard to y, if x is a part of y.

This leads to the adhikāra for vedādhyayana. This presupposes:

  1. desire to obtain the result of the action
  2. ability to perform the action (see PMS, book 6.1 on animals not being able to perform sacrifices)
  3. sanction by an authoritative text

Which kind of sanction? In the case of vedādhyayana, it seems to be a positive obligation (or vidhi). What would be the distinction between adhikāra and any other enjoined action, then? That the vidhi which lies at the basis of adhikāra establishes one’s general entitlement to do x, and not just one’s duty to perform x in a given case.

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Sarvagatatva in Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika: ātman, aether and materiality (mūrtatva)

The Sanskrit philosophical school called Vaiśeṣika is the one most directly dealing with ontology. Its fundamental text is the Vaiśeṣikasūtra, which is commented upon by Prāśastapada in the Pādarthadharmasaṅgraha (from now one PDhS) (the following is a summary of Padārthadharmasaṅgraha ad 8.7).

The school distinguishes substances and qualities. The first group includes four types of atoms (earth, water, fire, air) and then aether, time, space, ātmans and internal organs (manas). The latter are needed as a separate category, because they are point-sized and therefore not made of atoms, unlike the external sense faculties.
Among the 17 qualities, it recognises parimāṇa or `dimension’. This encompasses at first two possibilities, namely atomic (aṇu), or extended (mahat). The former covers partless entities that have allegedly no spatial dimension, like points in Euclidean geometry and atoms themselves. These are considered to be without extension and permanent through time (nitya). The latter is subdivided into mahat and paramahat. The first covers all objects one encounters in normal life, from triads of atoms (imagined to be of the size of a particle of dust, the first level of atomic structure to be extended) to the biggest mountain. These entities have parts and extension and have an origin and an end in time. The second subdivision covers special substances, listed as ākāśa `aether’, space, time and ātmans, which need to be imagined to be present at each location. Such entities are also imagined to be nitya, that is permanent through time. In other words, they are present at each location of time and space.
The above also implies that entities considered to be permanent through time can only be either atomic or all-pervasive.

However, space, time, aether and selves (ātman) are present at all locations in different ways.

About aether, to begin with, texts like Jayanta’s Nyāyamañjarī say that it needs to be accepted as a fifth substance in order to justify the diffusion of sound across multiple media. Texts of the Vaiśeṣika school, and of the allied school of Nyāya specify that aether does not occupy all locations, but rather is in contact with each individual atom):

[The aether’s] all-pervasiveness consists in the fact that it is in contact with each corporal (mūrta) substance.
(sarvamūrtadravyasaṃyogitvam vibhutvam (Tarkasaṃgrahadīpikā ad 14).)

This means that aether does not pervade atoms, but is in contact (saṃyoga) with each one of them.

This point is already explicit in the allied school of Nyāya, the Nyāyabhāṣya, and is needed because of the point-sized nature of atoms. If these were pervaded by aether, then they would have parts, and thus not be permanent. These undesired consequences are examined in the following:

This is impossible, because of the penetration through aether || NS 4.2.18 ||

It is impossible for an atom [to be] partless and permanent. Why? Because of the penetration through ether, that is, because an atom, if it were permeated, that is `penetrated’ by aether, within and outside, then, because of this penetration it would have parts, and due to having parts it would be impermanent.

Or, the aether is not all-located} || 4.2.19 ||

Alternatively, we don’t accept that. There is no aether within the atoms and therefore aether ends up not being all-located

(ākāśavyatibhedāt tadanupapattiḥ || 4.2.18 ||
tasyāṇor niravayasya nityasyānupapattiḥ. kasmāt. ākāśavyatibhedāt. antarbahiścāṇur ākāśena samāviṣṭo vyatibhinno vyatibhedāt sāvayavaḥ sāvayavatvād anitya iti.
ākāśāsarvagatatvaṃ vā || 4.2.19 ||
athaitan neṣyate paramāṇor antar nāsty ākāśam ity asarvagatatvaṃ prasajyeta iti.)

Aether is postulated as a substrate of sound (which can move through solids, liquids and air, thus proving that it has neither earth, nor water, nor air as substrate). Thus, it needs to be unitary (multiple aethers would not explain the propagation of sound, sound would stop at the end of the respective aether) and it needs to be present at all locations (for the same reason). More in detail: Only because of the unitary nature of aether is it possible for sound to travel between different loci. Otherwise, one would have to posit some mechanism to explain how the sound encountered in one aether travels to another one. Instead, the simpler solution is to posit that aether is necessarily both single (eka) and present at all locations (vibhu).

As for ātman, the self is by definition permanent (otherwise, no afterlife nor cycle of rebirths would be possible). It cannot be atomic, though, because the ātman is the principle of awareness and people become aware of things potentially everywhere. The fact that they don’t become perceptually aware of things being, e.g., behind a wall, by contrast, is only due to the fact that the ātman needs to be in touch (via the internal sense organ, manas, which is believed to be atomic and to move quickly from one to the other sense-faculty) to the sense faculties (indriya) in order for perceptual awareness to take place. Yogins are able to perceive things their bodies are not in contact with because their ātmans are omnipresent, like our ātman, and are able, unlike our ātman, to connect with other bodies’ sense faculties.
Within Sanskrit philosophy, Jaina philosophers suggested that the ātman is co-extensive with the body, since it can experience whatever the body can experience. Vaiśeṣika and other non-Jaina authors disagree, because this would lead to the absurd consequence of an ātman changing in size through one’s life.

A further element to be taken into account with regard to theories of location, and in particular while adjudicating whether they are about occupation or non-occupation is materiality.
Occupation of space seems to occur only from the level of atomic triads up to big, but not all-located, objects. Atoms are said to be mūrta and mūrta is usually translated as `material’, but taken in isolations, atom do not have parts and are only point-sized. In this sense, their being mūrta refers more about their being fundamental for material entities, rather than being material if taken in isolation. The distinction is theoretically relevant, but less evident at the pragmatic level, given that atoms are never found in isolation. Being mūrta is attributed to atoms of the four elements (not to aether) as well as to the inner sense organ (Nyāyakośa, s.v.), but not to ātman neither to aether.

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Quick summary of Maṇḍana’s Vidhiviveka, uttarabhāga (siddhānta view), on nitya vs kāmya sacrifices

We concluded today a great workshop on Maṇḍana’s Vidhiviveka and these are my first comments on what we could establish. My deepest gratitude goes to all participants (Akane Saito, Andrew Ollett, Elliot Stern, Kei Kataoka, Lawrence McCrea, Nilanjan Das, Parimal Patil, Patrick Cummins, Wintor Scott and others). (For more on the workshop, read here: https://philosophy.utoronto.ca/event/workshop-maṇḍana-on-ritual-duties/)

Structure:
vv. 2.1–2.6: Maṇḍana’s siddhānta on iṣṭābhyupāyatā (chapter 11 in Elliot Stern’s forthcoming edition)

v. 2.7: summary of chapter 11, opening the new topic (chapter 12)

v. 2.8: yathāśakti provision applies to nitya sacrifices, sarvāṅgopasaṃhāra in kāmya ones (chapter 13)

v. 2.9: time needs to be the distinguishing factor between nitya/namimittika and kāmya rituals. For the former, kāla is included in nimitta, that ensures avaśyakartavyatā (chapter 14)

Summary of Chapters 13–14:
Chapter 13 tries to find a suitable candidate as phala for nitya sacrifices. The Prābhākara opponent insists on akaraṇe pratyavāya, whereas the siddhāntin (or quasi-siddhāntin) prefers pāpakṣaya. A first proposal in this sense, however, is refuted, because it would lead to just vāstava nityatva, and this would not guarantee the application of the yathāśakti provision. This can only be guaranteed by the ought-implies-can metarule and thus by a śābda nityatva, prescribed as such by the Veda. Hence, Maṇḍana wants both levels.

The akaraṇe-pratyavāya alternative is discussed at length. A preliminary possibility saying that akaraṇe there is pratyavāya, and that the sacrifice, being duḥkha, leads in an ānuṣaṅgika way to the production of pāpakṣaya.
This is finally refuted because there is no Vedic text justifying this view (it would be just inflicting whimsical pain to oneself).

At this point, the discussion becomes more technical. The acceptance of the yathāśakti provision implies that one contracts (saṅkoca) the meaning of either the mention of the adhikāra (so that only a samartha adhikārin is meant) or of the various aṅgavidhis. Which one is better? The constant risk to be avoided is that the same view could be applied to nitya and kāmya rituals, thus ending up in their being non-different.

The opponent suggests the application of Kāmsyabhojinyāya and of bādha based on bhūyastva in order to get to the result that the single adhikāraśruti should be contracted and not the many aṅgavidhis. By contrast, Maṇḍana (atha matam, p, 671 in ES’ edition, 17.5.2023) thinks that the aṅgavidhis are restricted, bc otherwise two unwanted consequences would follow (vaicitrya-risk in the prayoga) and because a single śruti is not evidence, since words are used in context (naitat sāram, p. 672).

Thus, this solution is putting much wait on yāvajjīvam-śruti, whereas chapter 14 will put in the context of naimittika sacrifices.

In this chapter, the new risk is adhikārātikrānti and the additional hurdle are naimittika sacrifices, which are not performed every day, but are otherwise identical to the nitya ones. To the atha matam and naitat sāram positions mentioned above something else is added, namely the definition of nimitta as not being a viśeṣaṇa of the adhikārin (this is what the Prābhākara opponent argues for), but just a nimitta. Time (kāla) also belongs to the nimitta in the case of nitya and naimittika sacrifices, although it is an aṅga for kāmya ones and can hence be a distinguishing factor (v. 2.9).

One point we did not have the time to discuss: Vācaspati (on 13.5) discusses a tantra vs prasaṅga approach and concludes that the first one should be preferred. What two things are centrally performed via tantra? Vācaspati clearly says that one is a kāmya and the other one is a nitya ritual (e.g. “ubhayor api kāmyanityayoḥ karmaṇoḥ […] tantram anuṣṭhānam” or “tasmān na kāmye ‘nuṣṭhīyamāne prāsaṅgikatvaṃ nityasya”, p. 660), but what are these referring to? A suggestion: There is a nitya sacrifice corresponding to the śābda nityatva, and a kāmya sacrifice corresponding to the vāstava nityatva and the two are performed at the same time.

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Conference on “Spiritual exercises, self-transformation and liberation in philosophy, theology and religion”

Pawel Odyniec, who is among the foremost experts on Vedānta and on K.C. Bhattacharya, organised a conference that looks extremely thought-provoking on May 22nd–24th. Please read more about the participants (among which Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad, James Madaio, Jessica Frazier, Karl-Stephan Bouthilette…) and the program, and how to register at the link below:
https://konferens.ht.lu.se/spiritual-exercises

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Lecturer in Philosophy (including comparative philosophy engaging with more than one tradition)

Lancaster University is hiring a lecturer in philosophy (full time, indefinite position), to start on August the 1st 2023 or as soon as possible thereafter.

The post is “open to all those working in all areas of Philosophy, though we would particularly welcome applicants whose work addresses topics in either (a) feminist philosophy or (b) history of philosophy, including areas of the history of philosophy which consider the contributions of marginalised groups and comparative philosophy that engages with more than one tradition.”

More details: https://hr-jobs.lancs.ac.uk/Vacancy.aspx?id=9897&forced=1

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Maṇḍana on sacrificial duties

Maṇḍana’s theory of commands centers around his attempt to reduce them to statements of instrumentality. Commanding to X to do Y would amount to say that Y is the instrument to realise a goal of X. Maṇḍana establishes (in his eyes) this point in the first part of the siddhānta within one of his masterpieces, the Vidhiviveka ‘Discrimination about Commands’. This consists in some verses and a very extended autocommentary thereon. The first part of the Vidhiviveka covers objectors, the second one (the siddhānta) opens with six verses and commentary explaining this view.

However, Maṇḍana then has to harmonize this point with the pre-existing Mīmāṃsā account of duties distinguishing between three sets of sacrifices, namely:

  1. —nitya karman ‘fixed sacrifice’, to be performed regularly (typically each day), no matter what, but where a performance yathāśakti ‘as much as one can’ is acceptable.
  2. —naimittika karman ‘occasional sacrifice’, to be performed whenever the occasion arises (e.g., an eclypse or the birth of a son). As in the above case, yathāśakti performance is acceptable.
  3. -kāmya karman ‘elective sacrifice’, to be performed only if one wants their results and which needs to be performed exactly as prescribed (yathāvidhi or yathānyāya), no relaxing of the norms allowed.

Once a sacrifice has been undertaken, even if it is kāmya, its completion becomes compulsory and the way of such completion remains yathāvidhi in the case of kāmya sacrifices.
How can this difference be kept if all commands are nothing but statements about instrumentality? Would not a statement about instrumentality correspond only to the kāmya category?

Maṇḍana dedicates to this problem the next verses and commentary of his Vidhiviveka, where he examines several possibilities. The main constraints, are, again, keeping the distinction between nitya/naimittika sacrifices on the one hand and kāmya sacrifices on the other hand, as well as the distinction between yathāśakti and yathāvidhi modes of performance. He therefore explores multiple possible understanding of śakti ‘ability’, phala ‘result’ and adhikāra ‘eligibility, especially in conversation with Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā interlocutors insisting on how all sacrifices are compulsory and how the mentions of result found in conjunction with kāmya rituals is only a way to identify the adhikārin ‘eligible person’ for their performance. For instance, which kind of result could make it possible for a command about a nitya karman to lead one to perform the sacrifice every single day? Are there really results that are always desired? And even if such a result could be found, why would one need to keep a distinction in the yathāśakti and yathānyāya performance? If all sacrifices are instruments to realise a certain result, why would some of them need an accurate performance and other not so? The situation is further complicated by the presence of elective sacrifices prescribed to people ‘who desire heaven’ (svargakāma). In which sense are they different from nitya sacrifices, that also lead to heaven?

Unfortunately, the Vidhiviveka is characterised by a terse style, to say the least. Maṇḍana was probably so much into the topic that at times he seems to take important intermediate passages for granted and just leaves the reader wonder. Fortunately, a more generous commentator, Vācaspati, solves most of the doubt and adds further interesting discussions in his Nyāyakaṇikā.
Last, Sanskritists and philosophers of duty have a duty of gratitude to Elliot Stern, who created the first critical edition of the text, including also its previously unpublished commentaries.

Curious to know more? We will discuss chapters 12–14 of the Vidhiviveka in this workshop: https://philosophy.utoronto.ca/event/workshop-maṇḍana-on-ritual-duties/