Posted on

What is the target of Kumārila’s atheist arguments?

Kumārila’s attacks certainly target the belief in supernatural beings who should be able to grant boons to human beings (the devatās), insofar as they show that this belief is inherently self-contradictory. For instance, these deities should be the actual recipients of ritual offerings. However, how could they receive offerings at the same time from different sacrificers in different places?

Kumārila also targets the belief in a Lord akin to the one defended by rational theology, both in Europe and in South Asia, again because this leads to contradictions. Kumārila explains that there is no need of such a Lord in order to explain the creation of the world, since there is no need to adduce further evidence in order to justify the world as it is now (i.e., existing), whereas one would need to adduce a strong external evidence to justify everything contradicting the world as we know it. Therefore, the continuous presence of the world becomes the default status and the theist has the burden of the proof and needs to be able to establish independently of his religious belief that there has been a time when the world did not exist. Similarly, Kumārila shows that the idea of a Lord who is at the same time all-mighty and benevolent is self-contradictory, since if the Lord where really all-might, he would avoid evil, and if he tolerates it, then he is cruel. If one says that evil is due to karman or other causes, Kumārila continues, then this shows that there is no need to add the Lord at all as a further cause and that everything can be explained just on the basis of karman or any other cause.

Are Kumārila’s criticisms also targeted at the idea of an impersonal and non-dual brahman? Kumārila does not explicitly address the issue of the possible distinction between one and the other target. However, a few scant hints may help readers. In a fragment from his lost Bṛhaṭṭīkā preserved in the work of a Buddhist opponent (the Tattvasaṅgraha), Kumārila speaks of deities as being vedadeha, i.e., ‘embodied in the Veda’ (so Yoshimizu 2008, fn. 78). In a verse of the TV, he says that they are ṛgvedādisamūheṣu […] pratiṣṭhitāḥ, i.e., ‘who reside in the Ṛgveda and all other [Vedic scriptures]’ (Yoshimizu 2007b, p. 221). Does this mean that Kumārila was accepting a conception of deities inhabiting the Vedas? I discussed the idea with a colleague who just said that the verses must be interpolated.

What do readers think? Was there local atheism in ancient India?

See also Yoshimizu’s comment to my post on Bhavanātha.

Posted on

On the philosophy of faith

A PhD student wrote me asking: “Being a student of theology, from the philosophical background, I have understood the role of reason in theology. But I cannot assimilate the place of faith in philosophy.”

I would answer quoting Anselm of Canterbury, who stated “credo ut intelligam, intelligo ut credam”, namely “I believe in order to understand, I understand in order to believe”. The latter part corresponds to what the students labelled as the role of reason in theology, namely the need to continue improving one’s understanding of theological truths in order to deepen one’s faith in them. The first part is an answer to the student’s query about the role of faith.
In other words, unless one had faith in, say, the real presence of Śrī Viṣṇu in a given idol, one would not start elaborating a theory about the arcāvatāra. In a Catholic milieu, one might think at Antoine Arnauld’s discussion of the signification of demonstrative pronouns inspired by his faith in the transubstantiation during the Mess (in his L’Art de penser).

Long story short:
1. Faith, I think, can motivate one to look at a topic one would have not thought of.
2. Moreover, it can help one overcome one’s initial disbelief and think more thoroughly about a topic.

This should not be confused, however, with the case of stiffening in a position without accepting to discuss counter-positions. Faith can promote philosophy if it is so self-confident to be able to lead to an open-minded intellectual journey.

What do readers think? Can faith help philosophical enterprises?

Posted on

Assistant Professor – South Asian Philosophy, University of Toronto

Assistant Professor – South Asian Philosophy
Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto

Job category Junior faculty / Tenure-track or similar
AOS South Asian Philosophy
AOS categories Asian Philosophy
AOC Open
Workload Full time
Vacancies 1
Organization’s reference number SAP 1803366
Location Toronto, Ontario, Canada
Start date July 1, 2019

[T]he last few years have witnessed widespread interest in debates around atheism well beyond the boundaries of the academy. […] [M]any of these debates seem to be trapped within a particular mental world-view that is a product of Enlightenment modernity. The assumptions and history of this world-view are rarely questioned or even acknowledged, with the result that the world-view itself comes to appear as a timeless given rather than as an historical product. Participants in the debate may thus be forced into positions and faced with alternatives that are dictated by this world-view, and deprived of the opportunity of exploring alternative approaches and ways of thinking.

Gavin Hyman
A Short History of Atheism (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010), IX-X

Wie schwer ist es, daß der Mensch recht abwäge, was man aufopfern muß gegen das, was zu gewinnen ist! wie schwer, den Zweck zu wollen und die Mittel nicht zu verschmähen! Viele verwechseln gar die Mittel und den Zweck, erfreuen sich an jenen, ohne diesen im Auge zu behalten. Jedes Übel soll an der Stelle geheilt werden, wo es zum Vorschein kommt, und man bekümmert sich nicht um jenen Punkt, wo es eigentlich seinen Ursprung nimmt, woher es wirkt. Deswegen ist es so schwer Rat zu pflegen, besonders mit der Menge, die im Täglichen ganz verständig ist, aber selten weiter sieht als auf morgen. Kommt nun gar dazu, daß der eine bei einer gemeinsamen Anstalt gewinnen, der andre verlieren soll, da ist mit Vergleich nun gar nichts auszurichten. Alles eigentlich gemeinsame Gute muß durch das unumschränkte Majestätsrecht gefördert werden.

Johann Wolfgang Goethe
Die Wahlverwandtschaften
Posted on

Looking at the structure of temples

Gerald Kozicz sent me a link to a new website he has been intensely working on. The website offers the chance to look at shrines and temples in the Himālayas (better: from Himachal) from different points of view. Not only you can see photos from different perspectives, but you can see the shrine being built in front of your eyes, layer after layer and focus on its different structural elements.
This also means that you are likely to better understand what the experience of believers entering the temple was, which is one of my main reasons for being impressed by Gerald’s work.

You can read more about Kozicz’ work on this blog, here. Don’t miss especially this post on the “Laternendecke”.

Posted on

Assistant professor in Asian Philosophy at British Columbia

Evan Thompson pointed out this ad for an assistant professor (tenure stream) position in “Asian Philosophy” (South Asian and/or East Asian) in the Department of Philosophy at the University of British Columbia.

Here is a link to the posting: https://www.philjobs.org/job/show/10990

Good luck to all possible applicants!

Posted on

Bhavanātha and the move towards theistic Mīmāṃsā

The Mīmāṃsā school of Indian philosophy started as an atheist school since its first extant text, Jaimini’s Mīmāṃsā Sūtra. At a certain point in its history, however, it reinterpreted its atheist arguments as aiming only at a certain conception of god(s). In other words, it reinterpreted its atheism as being not a global atheism, but a form of local atheism, denying a certain specific form of god(s) and not any form whatsoever.