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Coffee Break Conference, Oxford 2018 Call for papers

We invite proposals for papers for the 9th Coffee Break Conference, which will be hosted at Wolfson College, University of Oxford, 4-6 December 2018.

The theme of the conference this year is “Science and Technology in Premodern Asia.” We welcome proposals of papers on the topics of (1) Mathematics & Astronomy and (2) Technology & Applied Science, both in premodern Asia. The papers can be based upon all research methods; cross-cultural or cross-disciplinary approaches are especially welcome. Doctoral students are also invited to submit proposals.

Before the conference, papers and handouts will be pre-circulated among all the participants. Each speaker will be allotted 20 minutes for the paper and another 20 minutes for discussion.

We will be able to cover the 3-night accommodation in Oxford for every participant. We may also have funding to partly cover travel expenses (in principle, only within Europe), but we expect participants to pay for most of their other expenses. There are no registration fees for the conference.

We are delighted to announce that our keynote speaker for the conference will be Prof. Christopher Minkowski, Boden Professor of Sanskrit at the University of Oxford.

If you would like to give a paper on the theme of Mathematics & Astronomy, please send a title and abstract (max. 300 words) to Matt Kimberley, Matt.Kimberley@bl.uk, by 31 October.

For papers on the theme of Technology & Applied Science, please send a title and abstract (max. 300 words) to Dr. Jonathan Duquette, jonathan.duquette@orinst.ox.ac.uk, by 31 October.

Further information about the conference will soon be available.

For any other question, please contact Yiming Shen (yiming.shen@wolfson.ox.ac.uk) or Dr. Jonathan Duquette (jonathan.duquette@orinst.ox.ac.uk).

Das Schicksal gewährt uns unsre Wünsche, aber auf seine Weise, um uns etwas über unsere Wünsche geben zu können.

Johann Wolfgang Goethe
Die Wahlverwandtschaften (dtv Gesamtausgabe, 1953), 167

“In der Komödie sehen wir eine Heirat als das letzte Ziel eines durch die Hindernisse mehrerer Akte verschobenen Wunsches, und im Augenblick, da es erreicht ist, fällt der Vorhang, und die momentane Befriedigung klingt bei uns nach. In der Welt ist es anders; da wird hinten immer fortgespielt, und wenn der Vorhang wieder aufgeht, mag man gern nichts weiter davon sehen noch hören.”

(the count speaks)

Johann Wolfgang Goethe
Die Wahlverwandtschaften (dtv Gesamtausgabe, 1963), 63

“Die Ehe ist der Anfang und der Gipfel aller Kultur. Sie macht den Rohen mild, und der Gebildetste hat keine bessere Gelegenheit seine Milde zu beweisen. Unauflöslich muß sie sein: denn sie bringt so vieles Glück, daß alles einzelne Unglück dagegen gar nicht zu rechnen ist. Und was will man von Unglück reden? Ungeduld ist es, die den Menschen von Zeit zu Zeit anfällt und dann beliebt er sich unglücklich zu finden. Lasse man den Augenblick vorübergehen, und man wird sich glücklich preisen, daß ein so lange Bestandenes noch besteht. […] Unbequem mag es manchmal sein, das glaub’ ich wohl, und das ist eben recht. Sind wir nicht auch mit dem Gewissen verheiratet, das wir oft gerne los sein möchten, weil es unbequemer ist als uns je ein Mann oder eine Frau werden könnte?”

(Mittler speaks)

Johann Wolfgang Goethe
Die Wahlverwandtschaften (dtv Gesamtausgabe, 1963), 61
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Adding theism on top of atheism

The “chapter on the refutation of a connection” is the chapter Kumārila uses to discuss his anti-theistic arguments. Bhavanātha does it too, but he then adds, at the very end of his discussion:

evam īśvare paroktam eva anumānaṃ nirastam, na tv īśvaro ‘pi.

In this way I have refuted the inference to the existence of the Lord said by other scholars, but I have not refuted the Lord Himself. (NV, tarkapāda, end of sambandhākṣepaparihāra)

Thus, it is quite clear that:

  • Bhavanātha (and perhaps also other Mīmāṃsā authors?) did not understand Kumārila’s refutation of theism as a refutation of any form of theism.
  • This distinction might have looked obvious enough to Bhavanātha, since he did not feel the need to elaborate about that.
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How to address an academic

short promemoria for younger colleagues

It happens time and again that a male colleague or student I never met writes me addressing me as “Madam” (or any other form of it). This is not a crime, but I wonder whether they are aware of what they are implicitly communicating by doing it, namely that they consider the fact of being a woman more relevant than the fact of being a scholar. Fine, if you are inviting someone to the opera, but somehow weird if you are asking them to review a book, write an article or participate in a conference…

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What is the target of Kumārila’s atheist arguments?

Kumārila’s attacks certainly target the belief in supernatural beings who should be able to grant boons to human beings (the devatās), insofar as they show that this belief is inherently self-contradictory. For instance, these deities should be the actual recipients of ritual offerings. However, how could they receive offerings at the same time from different sacrificers in different places?

Kumārila also targets the belief in a Lord akin to the one defended by rational theology, both in Europe and in South Asia, again because this leads to contradictions. Kumārila explains that there is no need of such a Lord in order to explain the creation of the world, since there is no need to adduce further evidence in order to justify the world as it is now (i.e., existing), whereas one would need to adduce a strong external evidence to justify everything contradicting the world as we know it. Therefore, the continuous presence of the world becomes the default status and the theist has the burden of the proof and needs to be able to establish independently of his religious belief that there has been a time when the world did not exist. Similarly, Kumārila shows that the idea of a Lord who is at the same time all-mighty and benevolent is self-contradictory, since if the Lord where really all-might, he would avoid evil, and if he tolerates it, then he is cruel. If one says that evil is due to karman or other causes, Kumārila continues, then this shows that there is no need to add the Lord at all as a further cause and that everything can be explained just on the basis of karman or any other cause.

Are Kumārila’s criticisms also targeted at the idea of an impersonal and non-dual brahman? Kumārila does not explicitly address the issue of the possible distinction between one and the other target. However, a few scant hints may help readers. In a fragment from his lost Bṛhaṭṭīkā preserved in the work of a Buddhist opponent (the Tattvasaṅgraha), Kumārila speaks of deities as being vedadeha, i.e., ‘embodied in the Veda’ (so Yoshimizu 2008, fn. 78). In a verse of the TV, he says that they are ṛgvedādisamūheṣu […] pratiṣṭhitāḥ, i.e., ‘who reside in the Ṛgveda and all other [Vedic scriptures]’ (Yoshimizu 2007b, p. 221). Does this mean that Kumārila was accepting a conception of deities inhabiting the Vedas? I discussed the idea with a colleague who just said that the verses must be interpolated.

What do readers think? Was there local atheism in ancient India?

See also Yoshimizu’s comment to my post on Bhavanātha.

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On the philosophy of faith

A PhD student wrote me asking: “Being a student of theology, from the philosophical background, I have understood the role of reason in theology. But I cannot assimilate the place of faith in philosophy.”

I would answer quoting Anselm of Canterbury, who stated “credo ut intelligam, intelligo ut credam”, namely “I believe in order to understand, I understand in order to believe”. The latter part corresponds to what the students labelled as the role of reason in theology, namely the need to continue improving one’s understanding of theological truths in order to deepen one’s faith in them. The first part is an answer to the student’s query about the role of faith.
In other words, unless one had faith in, say, the real presence of Śrī Viṣṇu in a given idol, one would not start elaborating a theory about the arcāvatāra. In a Catholic milieu, one might think at Antoine Arnauld’s discussion of the signification of demonstrative pronouns inspired by his faith in the transubstantiation during the Mess (in his L’Art de penser).

Long story short:
1. Faith, I think, can motivate one to look at a topic one would have not thought of.
2. Moreover, it can help one overcome one’s initial disbelief and think more thoroughly about a topic.

This should not be confused, however, with the case of stiffening in a position without accepting to discuss counter-positions. Faith can promote philosophy if it is so self-confident to be able to lead to an open-minded intellectual journey.

What do readers think? Can faith help philosophical enterprises?