Why do we find Pāñcarātra first refuted by Vedānta scholars and then defended by other Vedāntins? What happened between the two groups? And what was at stake with Pāñcarātra?
Category Archives: Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta
Mystical perception, God’s intellectual intuition and normal people’s sense-perception
Is mystical perception (aka yogipratyakṣa) a kind of perception? Can we go without it, if we want to ground religious beliefs?
पदनित्यत्वं वेदनित्यत्वं च
किमर्थम् पदानित्यत्वं निषेद्धव्यम् ?
मीमांसकास् “शब्दो नित्य एव” इति मन्यन्ते । यथा वयं वृद्धव्यवहारे शब्दार्थसम्बन्धानधिगच्छामः, तथा भूते काले वृद्धाः अपि −इत्यनादिरेव शब्दप्रयोग इति ।
More than one cause at once: Veṅkaṭanātha on sacrifices and other causes UPDATED
What if one offers a Citrā sacrifices, but does not obtain the promised cattle? And what if one after the sacrifice does obtain some cattle, but only because one has received it as a gift?
Who are the Vedāntins?
Who wrote the following quotes?
There is an Upaniṣadic sayiong that the Brahman is one only, without a second. But the existence of something different than the Brahman refutes this. To this we say: in the mention of “without a second” what does the compound intend? Is it a tatpuruṣa or a bahuvrīhi (attributive compound)? […]
Moreover, which consciousness modifies itself (vivṛt-) in the form of the deployment (prapañca)? To begin with, it is not the notion of [simple objects] like a pot, since the [deployment] is seen also when such notions are not present. And since it is not the case that one can say that if such a notion were not produced, or if it were destroyed, the whole world would not exist. And if one were to say it, [one’s assertion] would be invalidated by one’s sense-perception. […]
If X appears without Y, even Y appears also without X. For instance, [a cloth] appearing even without a pot [and] a pot itself [appearing] without a cloth.
You have surely understood that we are within a Vedāntic framework (i.e.: using the Upaniṣads as one’s foundamental point of reference, evoking the brahman). What else?
Would you have understood that the framework is not-Advaitin? Probably so, given that the last verse mentioned refutes the sahopalambhaniyama (the rule according to which if two things are simultaneously grasped, like cognitions and external objects —which are only grasped through cognitions— they are not different). However, you might be surprised to know that the author is Yāmuna (in his Āgamaprāmāṇya).
In the light of that, what does the distinctive contribution of Śrī Rāmānuja consists in, apart from systematization and more accurate treatment of many detailed features?
You can read some more open questions on Rāmānuja by clicking on the category “Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta”.
Rāmānuja’s Śrī Bhāṣya and its readers
Rāmānuja is usually considered the real founder of Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta. The Śrī Bhāṣya is usually considered his masterpiece. Thus, what would one expect in it?
Secondary signification for Kumārila, Prabhākara and Rāmānuja
Can the Absolute be at the same time One and still be defined as existence, knowledge and bliss? Rāmānuja discusses this topic with an opponent in his Śrī Bhāṣya on Brahma Sūtra 1.1.1. The opponent says that if the Absolute brahman is only Oneness, then all attributes would end up as having to be understood only metaphorically (lakṣaṇā). Rāmānuja replies that this would not be a problem, since contextual meaning (tātparyavṛtti) —which, we understand, includes the possibility of secondary signification (lakṣaṇā)— overrules direct meaning (abhidhānavṛtti):
Is the Veda the body of God? (Yoshimizu 2007–II part)
How can one interpret a Vedic passage by saying that a certain meaning was not “intended” (vivakṣita), while still thinking that the Veda has no personal author?
The Mīmāṃsā cannot renounce the idea that the Veda has no personal author (apauruṣeyatva): its whole theory about the Veda’s validity depends on this principle. However, Kumārila needs also to explain in which sense one can decide whether an interpretation of the Veda is right or not on the basis of whether it is intended (vivakṣita). How can one speak of intention if there is no author?
Plurality of subjects in Mīmāṃsā: Kiyotaka Yoshimizu 2007
Is the plurality of subjects compatible with the idea of a Vedāntic kind of liberation (in which there seems to be no distinction among different souls)? And can there be an absolute brahman if there are still distinct subjects?
Does God have a body? And in which sense? Have a look at the whole problem, from the point of view of Western philosophy, but with an answer inspired by Vedānta Deśika in this post of mine.