What happens when the Veda prescribes malefic actions?

Vīrarāghavācārya's take on the Śyena

To my knowledge, Veṅkaṭanātha’s Seśvaramīmāṃsā (henceforth SM) has been commented upon only once in Sanskrit, namely in the 20th c. by Abhinava Deśika Vīrarāghavācārya.
Vīrarāghavācārya continues Veṅkaṭanātha’s agenda in reinterpreting Mīmāṃsā tenets in a Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta way.

Why should one study the meaning of the Veda? I.e., why studying Mīmāṃsā?

(It is hard to present your research program to the public)

At a certain point in the history of Mīmāṃsā (and, consequently, of Vedānta), the discussion of the reasons for undertaking the study of Mīmāṃsā becomes a primary topic of investigation. When did this exactly happen? The space dedicated to the topic increases gradually in the centuries, but Jaimini and Śabara don’t seem to be directly interested in it.

Is there a Sanskrit word for “intelligence” (or any other word)?

A reader wrote me:

I would like to know whether there is a similar term in Indian philosophy (sanskrit) for ‘Intelligence’. Can we equate it with the term prajñānam?

The problem with such questions (I do not know about you, but I often receive them), is that they are based on an atomic concept of sentences, as if there were a 1:1 correspondence among concepts and words and among language 1 and language 2. This theory has long been superseded both in linguistics (see Saussure’s discussion of how not even “tree” can be easily translated) and in translation theories. Moreover, as a scholar of Mīmāṃsā, I tend to imagine that the contribution of each word in a sentence is at least also a result of the contributions of the other words in the same sentence.

Thus, at least in case of philosophical concepts, one cannot focus on a single term, i.e., on a “dictionary approach”, but rather on what Umberto Eco calls the encyclopedic approach, i.e., offering a broader definition instead of a 1:1 translation. Moreover, each discussion of a (European) philosophical term needs to be preceded by an analysis of the term itself. Ideally, one should reconstruct it, too, through an encyclopedic approach (what does “X” entail? in which contexts is it used?).

In the case of “intelligence”, prajñā (not prajñāna) is often used, even more so in Mahāyāna texts, for “wisdom”, it can mean also “discrimination” and can therefore be compared to “intelligence”. I would, however, rather suggest buddhi, which stands for one’s ability to engage intellectually, especially because it does not have the sapiential aspect of prajñā and because buddhimat `having buddhi‘ can often be used in contexts in which in English one would speak of “intelligent” people. Another possibility would be prekṣā, again because of the use of prekṣāvat in order to define people who are able to consider things before deliberating.

What do readers think? How do you conceive “intelligence” in Sanskrit?

Cross-posted on the Indian Philosophy blog

Genitive compounds and brahmajijñāsā (or dharmajijñāsā)

All commentators on the Brahmasūtra starts by dealing with the wording of the first sūtra, namely

athāto brahmajijñāsā
Now, after that, there is the desire to know the brahman.

Several topics are discussed in this connection, namely:

  • What does “Now” (atha) exactly mean?
  • What does “after that” (ataḥ) mean? What does it refer to?
  • How should one interpret the compound brahmajijñāsā ‘desire to know the brahman’?
  • Why the desiderative in jijñāsā `desire to know’?

On Uttamur T. Vīrarāghavācārya

Have you ever seen a copy of the Upayukta Mīmāṃsā?

I already discussed here my admiration and fascination for Uttamur T. Viraraghavacarya and his work. Vīrarāghavācarya is known in his Tamil works as Uttamur (or Uthamur) T. Vīrarāghavācarya (with various graphic variants) and in his Sanskrit works mainly as Abhinava Deśika Vīrarāghavācarya.

He wrote countless books, mostly commentaries on Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta books in Tamil, Maṇipravāḷa and Sanskrit. However, he also wrote directly on texts he deemed important for religious, e.g., stotras and Upaniṣads, theological, e.g., Udayana’s Nyāyakusumañjali, and philosophical reasons, e.g., Kaṇāda’s Vaiśeṣika Sūtra and Pāṇini’s Aṣṭādhyāyī. His commentaries display his originality and deepness as a thinker, an instance of which has been discussed here.

The Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta community also reveres the figure of U.T. Vīrarāghavācārya, so that one can find on the web several interesting webpages dedicated to him and many of his works have been uploaded on archive.org (mostly under the name “Uttamur T. Viraraghavacharya”, see here). However, I could not find in any library or catalogue a copy of a text he refers to in his commentary on Vedānta Deśika’s Seśvaramīmāṃsā, namely his Upayukta Mīmāṃsā. According to the way he presents it (in his commentary on the beginning of the SM), this should constitute an attempt of making Pūrva Mīmāṃsā consistent with Vedānta, thus a very interesting topic. It is also referred to, for instance, in this and this page dedicated to U.T. Vīrarāghavācārya, still not a copy seems to be available for purchase (or download).

Do readers have suggestions about where to look for a copy of it?
(I already wrote to the Uttamur Swami Trust)

Proximity, semantic fitness and syntactic expectancy as criteria for the sentence meaning

Words (for the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā authors) get connected into a complex sentence meaning through proximity (sannidhi), semantic fitness (yogyatā) and syntactic expectancy (ākāṅkṣā).
These three criteria correspond to the requirement of being uttered one after the other with no intervening time (unlike in the case of the words “a cow” and “runs” pronounced on two different days), being semantically fit to connect (unlike the words “watering” and “with fire”) and being linkable through syntactic expectancy (as in the case of a verb and its arguments).
It is in this connection noteworthy that the example of expectancy always refer to syntax rather than semantics and typically have a verb expecting a complement or vice versa.

The Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā authors also adopt the same criteria in order to rule the understanding of the sentence meaning out of the connected words and avoid the objections (mentioned above) about the fact that out of a random heap of words one would not know how to start to get to the sentence meaning.

Maṇḍana on the Śyena

We already discussed (here, on November the 30th 2017) Jayanta’s position on the Śyena sacrifice. In this post we will observe that Jayanta was in fact inspired by Maṇḍana and, perhaps, by Maṇḍana’s commentator Vācaspati (it is still unsure whether Vācaspati was inspired by Jayanta or the other way around).

According to Maṇḍana, there are two kinds of Vedic prescriptions, the ones regarding the person (puruṣārtha) and the ones regarding the sacrifice (kratvartha).

In the case of puruṣārtha actions, the Vedic prescriptions do not motivate people to undertake them, since one would undertake them anyway because thery lead to happiness (prīti).
Rather, the Vedic prescriptions motivate people to undertake these actions with a certain set of auxiliaries. Similarly, in the case of the Śyena, the prescription about it does not promote it, since it is in itself puruṣārtha. The Śyena remains an anartha. (Vidhiviveka, p. 279, Goswami edition)

(ef and Sudipta Munsi)

Āyurvedic mantras

In the Caraka Saṃhitā, cikitsāsthāna, 23, vv. 90–94, the one who prepares the antidote to poison called Mahāgandhahastin should utter the following mantra:

While grinding [the ingredients] one should pronounce this siddha mantra:
“My mother is called jayā, my father jaya (victory). I, the son of jaya and jayā, am victorious (or: “I am Vijaya”) and win.
Praise to Viṣṇu Narasiṃha, Viśvakarman, Sanātana, Kṛṣṇa, Bhava and Vibhava. I bestow (or: “I restrain”) the splendour of Vṛśākapi and the direct splendour of Brahmā and Indra
Just like ‘I don’t know the defeat of Vāsudeva, nor the marriage of my mother, nor the draining of the ocean’, so, through this truthful statement may this antidote be successful.
O, best among the medications, mixed with Hilimili, may you protect [me], hail!”

Dissent among a Viśiṣṭādvaitin and a Mīmāṃsaka: What do Vedic words mean?

Within his Mīmāṃsā commentary, the Seśvaramīmāṃsā, Veṅkaṭanātha explicitly dissents from Śabara (also) in his commentary on Pūrva Mīmāṃsā Sūtra (henceforth PMS) 1.1.31 on Vedic words seemingly expressing proper names, e.g., Prāvāhaṇi and Babara (which are used by opponents as an evidence of the impermanent nature of the Vedas).

Śabara suggested that such seeming names in fact only express something else and offered alternative etymological explanations. Veṅkaṭanātha replies that out of context it is clear that specific people must be referred to, but that these people’s roles are recurrently covered at each new era.

The relevant passage by Śabara on PMS 1.1.31 reads:

[The name] ”Prāvāhaṇi” derives from `flowing forth’ (pravah-). [The name] ”Babara” imitates a sound. Therefore, these two [linguistic expressions] express only a permanent referent (artha). Therefore it is said \textbf{The other [ephemeral things mentioned in the Vedas], by contrast, are merely similar in the way they sound.

pravāhayati, sa prāvāhaṇiḥ. babara iti śabdānukṛtiḥ. tena yo nityārthas tam evaitau śabdau vadiṣyataḥ. ata uktam – paraṃ tu śrutisāmānyamātram iti

Veṅkaṭanātha’s rejection of this view reads as follows:

Only Half-Materialists (ardhacārvāka) like this construction (yojanā) [of the sūtra]. Otherwise, how could [such meanings] be connected (anvaya) with [linguistic expressions such as] ”he desired”? (How could ”Babara” be connected with ”he desired” if it is only an onomatopoeia?)

[Obj./in favour of Śabara:] Also in regard to that (”he desired”) one postulates a different meaning.

[R.:] Why should not [a different menaning] be postulated in this way in every case?

All four manuscripts of the Seśvaramīmāṃsā reproduce Śabara’s passage in a slightly different way, including a reference to vāyu as a referent of Prāvāhaṇi:

[The name] ”Prāvāhaṇi” derives from `flowing forth’ (pravah-). [The name] ”Babara” imitates a sound. Therefore, these two linguistic expressions express only a permanent referent (artha), [i.e.], the wind (which flows forth).

pravāhayati iti prāvāhaṇiḥ. babara iti śabdānukṛtiḥ. tena yo nityo ‘rthas tam imau śabdau vadiṣyataḥ vāyum. ata uktam – paraṃ tu śrutisāmānyamātram iti

The mention of vāyu is not present in the published version of the Śābarabhāṣya. Nonetheless, the reference to the wind is well-attested in the Mīmāṃsā subcommentaries on this adhikaraṇa, thus Veṅkaṭanātha could easily be aware of it.

Did ṛṣis author the Veda? UPDATED

A Mīmāṃsā and Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta view about it

In his Seśvaramīmāṃsā (ad 1.1.29), Veṅkaṭanātha discusses the problem of the authorship of the Veda while being a Mīmāṃsaka, but also trying to condede something to theism.

For instance, he is less straightforward than Mīmāṃsā authors in ruling out the role of the ṛṣis. Mīmāṃsā authors spoke of the ṛṣis mentioned in connection with some Vedic parts as having just recited (and not authored) those parts in an excellent way. Veṅkaṭanātha does not deny his opponent’s claim that ṛṣis could see parts of the Veda they did not learn with a teacher. Nonetheless, they only see what they are eligible to see, through powers given to them by Prajāpati. They also don’t see anything new:

For this very reason, also the fact that the ṛṣis have done the sūtras, the [Vedic] parts (kāṇḍa) (Brāhmaṇa and Upaniṣads) and the mantras (i.e., the Vedic saṃhitās), conforms to previous acts (i.e., they have uttered them as they were in the previous kalpa), [and] the immediate perception (sākṣatkaraṇa) of a part of the Veda which has not been studied [by them] by ṛṣis who had specific powers given [to them] by Prajāpati conforms with their various eligibilities. For this reason, in this way there is no author of the Veda. Therefore, in all times the Vedas are only recited by a sequence (paramparā) of people depending on someone else (paratantra).

ata eva ṛṣīṇām sūtrakāṇḍamantrakṛttvam api prācīnakarmānuguṇaṃ prajāpatipradattaśaktiviśeṣāṇāṃ tattadadhikārānuguṇam anadhītavedabhāgasākṣātkaraṇam eva. tad evaṃ na vedakarteti sarvadā paratantrapuruṣaparamparādhītā eva vedāḥ.

In other words, ṛṣis are an exception to the normal transmission of the Veda, they are not at its origin. And they don’t see anything more than what people learn through their teachers.

Now a question to you, dear readers: I am not sure about my interpretation of the compound sūtrakāṇḍamantrakṛttvam. This is found in the same context also in Veṅkaṭanātha’s Nyāyapariśuddhi, but I could not find it in any other text. I am not sure about its meaning, since the Vedic kāṇḍas (karmakāṇḍa and jñānakāṇḍa) do include mantras. Nor did Veṅkaṭanātha mention here mantras of altogether different origin… Moreover, sūtras are generally accepted to have an author, so that they don’t really belong to the same group. What could be meant here?