I am again pleasantly stuck in a passage of Uttamur T. Vīrarāghavācārya’s learned commentary on the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā Sūtra. This time he is discussing PMS 1.1.26, which is an important sūtra for philosophy of language, but one whose wordings was unclear even within Mīmāṃsā:
loke sanniyamāt prayogasannikarṣaḥ syāt
Vedānta Deśika (13th c. South India) stages a discussion between thinkers of the Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya schools on the topic of the validity of cognitions. The first school thinks that validity is intrinsic, the latter thinks it is extrinsic. The Naiyāyika starts by stating “Valid cognitions are produced by the cause producing cognitions plus an additional element (producing their validity), because, while being an effect, they are specified by such an additional element, like invalid cognition are specified by an additional element distinguishing them from valid ones” (vigitā pramā samyaṅmithyāvabodhasādhāraṇakāraṇāt atiriktasahitāj jāyate, kāryatve sati tadviśeṣatvāt apramāvat).
But this does not hold in the case of the Lord’s cognition, which is permanent and uncaused (the Lord has no new cognitions, but perpetually knows everything).
Within his commentary on PMS 1.1.5, Veṅkaṭanātha discusses conflicts among different sources of linguistic communication, e.g., the Vedas and the Buddhist canon, or the Vedas and the Dharmaśāstras.
The second way is much trickier, because since the time of Kumārila every Mīmāṃsaka agrees that recollected texts such as Dharmaśāstras are also based on the Veda. Hence, how is contradiction at all possible? And, if there is any, how to deal with it?
The subcommentary by Uttamur T. Vīrarāghavācārya is worth quoting extensively:
Recollected texts and directly heard sacred text are either about something to be done or about a state of affairs (tattva). In the first case,
one experiences here and there an option among actions due to a specific sacred text and a specific recollected text [prescribing two different courses of actions].
Then, there is indeed option [between the contradictory commands], because one postulates (sambhū-) also a sacred text being the root for the recollected text which points to actions contradicting the available sacred text (so that the contradiction is no longer between an available sacred text and a recollected one, but between two sacred texts).smṛtyāgamayor […] kāryaviṣayakatvaṃ vā, tattvaviṣayakatvaṃ vā. ādye, kriyāvikalpasya śrutibhedena smṛ[ti]bhedena ca tatra tatra darśanāt pratyakṣaśrutiviruddhakriyāparasmṛtimūlabhūtaśruter api sambhāvitatvāt vikalpa eva.
I should add that only the first case (ādya) is addressed, because so does the main text (the Seśvaramīmāṃsā). Anyway, the concluding line is more complicated:
But, since on an optional matter one handles as one wishes, they prefer only the sacred text which is presently available —this [approach] is different than that.
paraṃ vikalpitasthale yathāruci anuṣṭhānāt pratyakṣaśrutam eva rocayanta ity anyad etat.
Now, a couple of things puzzle me here. First, what is the causal connection between the first clause and the second one? Why is it that if one handles as one wishes, one prefers the directly available sacred text? Second, what it meant by anyad etat?
Do readers have any suggestion?
Experts of the alaṅkāra schools have discussed in various ways how a double entendre or a different meaning can be obtained through śleṣa but also through kāku. The latter is a specific intonation which can change the meaning of a whole sentence. In some cases, kāku is enough to get a completely opposite meaning. European-trained readers might think of the well-known example of the Sybilla’s forecast “ibis redibis non peribis in bello”, which can be read with a different intonation as meaning either “You’ll go, come back and not die in war” or “You’ll go, not come back and die in war”.
Now, Uttamur T. Vīrarāghavācārya mentions kāku in a non-rhetorical context within his subcommentary on the Seśvaramīmāṃsā on Pūrva Mīmāṃsā Sūtra 1.1.3. The context is that of discussing Upavarṣa’s proposal to read PMS 1.1.3 (tasya nimittaparīṣṭiḥ “The examination of the cause of [knowing dharma]”) as in fact meaning that no examination should be done. Vīrarāghavācārya suggests that this meaning can be achieved through a kāku. This is a nice idea, since it avoids adding words to the sūtra.
However, I wonder how could one ever pronounce the sūtra in a way which suggests that no examination should be done. A clue is found in Veṅkaṭanātha’s Mīmāṃsā Pādukā 89: tannimittepariṣṭiḥ kartavyā neti vā syād iha vinigamanā sūtrakṛtkākubhedāt || 89 || “The decision between the two alternatives `an investigation should be done’ or `it should not’ given [the reading] tannimittepariṣṭiḥ is based on the different intonation by the author of the aphorism”. In other words, Upavarṣa must have suggested to read the sūtra as tasya nimittepariṣṭiḥ instead of tasya nimittapariṣṭiḥ. The difference between the affermative form and the negative one (tasya nimitte pariṣṭiḥ and tasya nimitte ‘pariṣṭiḥ respectively) could only be grasped through the speaker’s intonation.
The other relevant passages read as follows. Seśvaramīmāṃsā: yat tu upavarṣavṛttau “tasya nimittapariṣṭir na kartavye”ti nañam adhyāhṛtyātimahatā kleśena vyākhyānam, tad apy anena nirastam. “Upavarṣa’s gloss supplies (adhyāhṛ-) a negation (nañ) and reads [the aphorism], thereby making an enormous mistake, as “The examination (pariṣṭi) of the condition for it (dharma) should not be done.” This (reading) too has been refuted by the [above argument].”
Uttamur T. Vīrarāghavācārya’s subcommentary: nañam adhyāhṛtyeti. pariṣṭir ity atra kākusvarakalpanopalakṣaṇam idam. “Supplies a negation: this secondarily indicates the postulation of a kāku accent in examination“.
Uttamur T. Vīrarāghavācārya discusses the reasons for having to deal with epistemology while trying to understand dharma in the context of PMS 1.1.3: We need to deal with epistemology because there are too many disagreements about what dharma is and how to know it. Here he summarises the Lokāyata position:
Vīrarāghavācārya was a 20th c. Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedāntin whose editorial and commentarial contribution to his school will remain impressive for many generations to come. Personally, I am particularly pleased by his attempts to think along the tradition in a creative way.
Within his subcommentary on Vedānta Deśika’s Seśvaramīmāṃsā, Vīrarāghavācārya is at times closer to Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta than Vedānta Deśika’s pro-Mīmāṃsā attitudes. At other times, he just elaborates further on Vedānta Deśika’s hints. In one of such cases, he describes how the choice of words in Pūrva Mīmāṃsā Sūtra 1.1.2 (codanālakṣaṇo ‘rtho dharmaḥ ‘Dharma is that goal which is known through Vedic injunctions’) was not at all casual. Rather, each word had a direct meaning and also further suggested something more. For instance, codanālakṣaṇa is not just the same as codanāpramāṇa, but rather suggests that the Vedic injunction also defines what dharma is. dharma is also to be interpreted etymologically as ‘instrument of dhṛti‘, where dhṛti means prīti ‘happiness’. Similarly, artha indicates that bhakti is the result to be achieved, consisting in pleasing God. Then he sums up:
Through the word dharma, which means instrument for dhṛti, Jaimini also suggests that this ritual action devoid of desire which is a purpose in itself (svayamprayojana) is different than the instruments for the results consisting in the four human aims, which are expressed with reference to their own contents (svaviṣaya) [only]. [He suggests it] because through this [word dharma] also pleasing the Revered one (bhagavat) is communicated (uddeśya).
dharmapadena dhṛtisādhanavācinā caturvargaphalopāyāḥ ye svaviṣayāḥ vācyāḥ tais saha anlat svayaṃprayojanaṃ niṣkāmakarmāpy asūcayat bhagavatprītes tatroddeśyatvāt.
In other words, bhakti points beyond oneself, to God, whereas all other purposes remain confined to oneself.
A new article by Andrew Ollett, Matteo Pascucci and myself has been published OA on History and Philosophy of Logic. You can download it here. Don’t forget to let me know what you think about it!
The common background of all Mīmāṃsā authors is based mainly on Jaimini’s Mīmāṃsā Sūtra (henceforth PMS) and Śabara’s Bhāṣya `commentary’ thereon (henceforth ŚBh). I refer to this phase in the history of Mīmāṃsā as ”common Mīmāṃsā”, since the authority of these texts was accepted by all later Mīmāṃsā authors.
Various later Mīmāṃsā authors rethought this inherited background, in particular, on two connected issues:
They will implement in both cases reductionistic strategies which, however, were based on very different presuppositions. They introduced to the background Mīmāṃsā new assumptions, although these were —according to the ancient Indian étiquette— concealed as (re)interpretations of the ancient lore.
As for No. 1, the Mīmāṃsā school operates presupposing that prescriptions could enjoin:
Here one can see already how the scheme offers the chance for different interpretations, precisely according to one’s interpretation of No. 2, namely of the understanding of what is the real motivator of one’s action, as below:
| elective | specific desire |
| occasional | occasion, generic desire |
| fixed | generic occasion (being alive), generic desire |
According to the Mīmāṃsā school, especially in its Bhāṭṭa sub-school, each prescription needs to have a goal, which is independently desirable. Without a goal, a prescription is purposeless and meaningless (anarthaka). Does it also mean that it must have only one goal?
Within the discussion on the need to study Mīmaṃsā, Veṅkaṭanātha discusses the prescription which would promote such duty. He discusses at length whether the injunction to learn by heart the Vedas (svādhyāyo ‘dhyetavyaḥ) could be considered responsible also for the duty to study Mīmāṃsā or whether it stops its functioning at the learning by heart of the Vedic phonemes, without the need to undertake a systematic study of its meaning, as it happens within Mīmāṃsā. This leads to further discussions about the purpose of the injunction to learn. Can it really aim only at learning by heart the phonic form of the Veda? How could this be considered to be an independently desirable goal? By contrast, grasping the meaning of the Veda could be a goal in itself, because it enables one to perform useful Vedic sacrifices. In this connection, Veṅkaṭanātha notes that learning by heart the phonemes cannot be a goal and adds a cryptic remark:
svādhyāyārthabodhayos tu bhāvyatve vidhyānarthakyaprasaṅgāt (Seśvaramīmāṃsā ad PMS 1.1.1, 1971 p. 21)
Because, if both the [learning by heart] of one’s portion of the Veda and the understanding of its meaning were the goal to be realised, the prescription would end up being purposeless
What does this mean? Is a prescription meaningless when it has two purposes?
The problem of theodicy is at its basis the problem of evil. How can there be a God who is both benevolent and able to alleviate or avoid our sufferings, given that such sufferings are still there?
How can He exist, given that also infants and animals suffer, i.e., also creatures suffer, who cannot have deserved it? The role of karman cannot really solve the issue. In fact, if God cannot remove karman, than He is not omnipotent and Mīmāṃsā authors might be right in insisting that we should use only karman to explain present sufferings and avoid God altogether. If God could change one’s karman, but usually decides not to do so, then how can He avoid the accusation of being cruel?
Whereas the topic of theodicy is one of the major Leitmotivs running throughout the whole history of modern European and Euro-American theology and philosophy of religion, it is not formulated as a distinct topic in Sanskrit philosophy (for the similar case of free will, see
Freschi, ”Free Will in Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta: Rāmānuja, Sudarśana Sūri and Veṅkaṭanātha”, Religion Compass). Why so?
Part of the reason is linked to an accidental fact, namely the genius of Gottfried Leibniz, who wrote a Causa Dei `Trial of God’ and coined the term théodicée. Apart from that, the main reason for the relative absence of the problem of the contradiction between the presence of evil and the existence of God lies most probably in the fact that theism is a late-comer in the history of South Asian philosophy. In fact, in order to put God on trial for the presence of evil in the world, one needs the philosophical concept of an omnipotent and benevolent God, as it is found in Europe within rational theology. This is the kind of concept of God defended by some Nyāya authors, most typically by Udayana, and attacked by Mīmāṃsā authors, typically by Kumārila.
In fact, Kumārila’s attacks are the ones even later theists will have to be able to defeat. Kumārila shows that the idea of a God who is at the same time all-mighty and benevolent is self-contradictory, since if the Lord where really all-might, he would avoid evil, and if he tolerates it, then he is cruel. If one says that evil is due to karman or other causes, Kumārila continues, then this shows that there is no need to add the Lord at all as a further cause and that everything can be explained just on the basis of karman or any other cause.
The discussion on evil in the Ślokavārttika is prompted by a discussion on God’s creation. Kumārila asks why God would create the world:
prāṇināṃ prāyaduḥkhā ca sisṛkṣāsya na yujyate || 49 ||
The desire to create a world which is mostly painful for the living beings does not suit God || 49 ||
To the possible argument that God creates the world out of compassion, Kumārila replies as follows:
abhāvāc cānukampyānāṃ nānukampāsya jāyate |\\
sṛjec ca śubham evaikam anukampāprayojitaḥ || 52 ||Given the absence of people to have compassion of [prior to creation], He could not have compassion |\\
And, if He were prompted by compassion, He would create only a splendid [world] || 52 ||
The next move of Kumārila’s opponent is found also in some Christian theologians, namely the claim that evil is not completely avoidable:
athāśubhād vinā sṛṣṭiḥ sthitir vā nopapadyate |\\
ātmādhīnābhyupāye hi bhavet kiṃ nāma duṣkaram || 53 ||\\
tathā cāpekṣamāṇasya svātantryaṃ pratihanyate |[Obj:] Without evil, the world could not be created nor continue to exist |
[R:] Why would this be impossible, given that the instrument [to make it possible] depends on God Himself? || 53 ||
And if you were to say that He also underlies some limitations, than His autonomy would be destroyed |