Why should one study Mīmāṃsā? In order to understand the meaning of the Veda, say Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā authors. But why should one learn the Veda? According to Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā, because a Vedic prescription itself tells you to do so. The prescription at stake is svādhyāyo ‘dhyetavyaḥ “One should study one’s portion of the Veda”, called adhyayanavidhi. This, however, leads to several problems.
Category Archives: Mīmāṃsā
Does a prescription with two results become meaningless? UPDATED
In his Seśvaramīmāṃsā, Veṅkaṭanātha (aka Vedānta Deśika) discusses why it is the case that we need to study Mīmāṃsā.
The most likely candidate as a prescription causing one to undertake such study is svādhyāyo’dhyetavyaḥ ‘one should learn the portion of the Veda learn in one’s family’. Veṅkaṭanātha will conclude that this prescription culminates in the learning by heart of the phonemes, leaving aside the grasping of the meaning.
Before that point, however, he analyses the view of those who say that the prescription remains valid until one has studied Mīmāṃsā. These think that each prescription needs an indipendently desirable result (phala). The learning alone cannot be construed as such a result (p. 20 of the 1971 edition), because it is not independently desirable. If one were to construe both the learning of one’s portion of the Veda and the understanding of its meaning as the result (bhāvya), the prescription would end up being meaningless.
Therefore, one should
1. either postulate heaven as the result, according to the Viśvajit rule (according to which one can postulate heaven as result whenever no result is mentioned)
2. or postulate that all results could be achieved, since learning the Veda pleases the deities and the ancestors, who would then grant one all results.
I will come back to why these hypotheses are refuted, but meanwhile, why is it the case that the prescription would become meaningless? Because neither the learning of the sheer Vedic phonems, nor the understanding of the meaning are intrinsically desirable, and each prescription needs a desirable goal.
The Sanskrit passage reads as follows:
svādhyāyārthabodhayos tu bhāvyatve vidhyānarthakyaprasaṅgāt
What is the purpose of PMS 1.1.26?
Sucarita, Vedānta Deśika and Uttamur T. Vīrarāghavācārya thereon
I am again pleasantly stuck in a passage of Uttamur T. Vīrarāghavācārya’s learned commentary on the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā Sūtra. This time he is discussing PMS 1.1.26, which is an important sūtra for philosophy of language, but one whose wordings was unclear even within Mīmāṃsā:
loke sanniyamāt prayogasannikarṣaḥ syāt
Intrinsic and extrinsic validity of cognitions
A discussion in Seśvaramīmāṃsā ad 1.1.5
Vedānta Deśika (13th c. South India) stages a discussion between thinkers of the Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya schools on the topic of the validity of cognitions. The first school thinks that validity is intrinsic, the latter thinks it is extrinsic. The Naiyāyika starts by stating “Valid cognitions are produced by the cause producing cognitions plus an additional element (producing their validity), because, while being an effect, they are specified by such an additional element, like invalid cognition are specified by an additional element distinguishing them from valid ones” (vigitā pramā samyaṅmithyāvabodhasādhāraṇakāraṇāt atiriktasahitāj jāyate, kāryatve sati tadviśeṣatvāt apramāvat).
But this does not hold in the case of the Lord’s cognition, which is permanent and uncaused (the Lord has no new cognitions, but perpetually knows everything).
Contradictions among śruti and smṛti
Uttamur T. Vīrarāghavācārya on the topic
Within his commentary on PMS 1.1.5, Veṅkaṭanātha discusses conflicts among different sources of linguistic communication, e.g., the Vedas and the Buddhist canon, or the Vedas and the Dharmaśāstras.
The second way is much trickier, because since the time of Kumārila every Mīmāṃsaka agrees that recollected texts such as Dharmaśāstras are also based on the Veda. Hence, how is contradiction at all possible? And, if there is any, how to deal with it?
The subcommentary by Uttamur T. Vīrarāghavācārya is worth quoting extensively:
Recollected texts and directly heard sacred text are either about something to be done or about a state of affairs (tattva). In the first case,
one experiences here and there an option among actions due to a specific sacred text and a specific recollected text [prescribing two different courses of actions].
Then, there is indeed option [between the contradictory commands], because one postulates (sambhū-) also a sacred text being the root for the recollected text which points to actions contradicting the available sacred text (so that the contradiction is no longer between an available sacred text and a recollected one, but between two sacred texts).smṛtyāgamayor […] kāryaviṣayakatvaṃ vā, tattvaviṣayakatvaṃ vā. ādye, kriyāvikalpasya śrutibhedena smṛ[ti]bhedena ca tatra tatra darśanāt pratyakṣaśrutiviruddhakriyāparasmṛtimūlabhūtaśruter api sambhāvitatvāt vikalpa eva.
I should add that only the first case (ādya) is addressed, because so does the main text (the Seśvaramīmāṃsā). Anyway, the concluding line is more complicated:
But, since on an optional matter one handles as one wishes, they prefer only the sacred text which is presently available —this [approach] is different than that.
paraṃ vikalpitasthale yathāruci anuṣṭhānāt pratyakṣaśrutam eva rocayanta ity anyad etat.
Now, a couple of things puzzle me here. First, what is the causal connection between the first clause and the second one? Why is it that if one handles as one wishes, one prefers the directly available sacred text? Second, what it meant by anyad etat?
Do readers have any suggestion?
Changing the meaning through intonation
Experts of the alaṅkāra schools have discussed in various ways how a double entendre or a different meaning can be obtained through śleṣa but also through kāku. The latter is a specific intonation which can change the meaning of a whole sentence. In some cases, kāku is enough to get a completely opposite meaning. European-trained readers might think of the well-known example of the Sybilla’s forecast “ibis redibis non peribis in bello”, which can be read with a different intonation as meaning either “You’ll go, come back and not die in war” or “You’ll go, not come back and die in war”.
Now, Uttamur T. Vīrarāghavācārya mentions kāku in a non-rhetorical context within his subcommentary on the Seśvaramīmāṃsā on Pūrva Mīmāṃsā Sūtra 1.1.3. The context is that of discussing Upavarṣa’s proposal to read PMS 1.1.3 (tasya nimittaparīṣṭiḥ “The examination of the cause of [knowing dharma]”) as in fact meaning that no examination should be done. Vīrarāghavācārya suggests that this meaning can be achieved through a kāku. This is a nice idea, since it avoids adding words to the sūtra.
However, I wonder how could one ever pronounce the sūtra in a way which suggests that no examination should be done. A clue is found in Veṅkaṭanātha’s Mīmāṃsā Pādukā 89: tannimittepariṣṭiḥ kartavyā neti vā syād iha vinigamanā sūtrakṛtkākubhedāt || 89 || “The decision between the two alternatives `an investigation should be done’ or `it should not’ given [the reading] tannimittepariṣṭiḥ is based on the different intonation by the author of the aphorism”. In other words, Upavarṣa must have suggested to read the sūtra as tasya nimittepariṣṭiḥ instead of tasya nimittapariṣṭiḥ. The difference between the affermative form and the negative one (tasya nimitte pariṣṭiḥ and tasya nimitte ‘pariṣṭiḥ respectively) could only be grasped through the speaker’s intonation.
The other relevant passages read as follows. Seśvaramīmāṃsā: yat tu upavarṣavṛttau “tasya nimittapariṣṭir na kartavye”ti nañam adhyāhṛtyātimahatā kleśena vyākhyānam, tad apy anena nirastam. “Upavarṣa’s gloss supplies (adhyāhṛ-) a negation (nañ) and reads [the aphorism], thereby making an enormous mistake, as “The examination (pariṣṭi) of the condition for it (dharma) should not be done.” This (reading) too has been refuted by the [above argument].”
Uttamur T. Vīrarāghavācārya’s subcommentary: nañam adhyāhṛtyeti. pariṣṭir ity atra kākusvarakalpanopalakṣaṇam idam. “Supplies a negation: this secondarily indicates the postulation of a kāku accent in examination“.
What do Lokāyatas think about dharma?
Uttamur T. Vīrarāghavācārya on PMS 1.1.3
Uttamur T. Vīrarāghavācārya discusses the reasons for having to deal with epistemology while trying to understand dharma in the context of PMS 1.1.3: We need to deal with epistemology because there are too many disagreements about what dharma is and how to know it. Here he summarises the Lokāyata position:
Why is bhakti different than the other human purposes?
Vīrarāghavācārya on Pūrva Mīmāṃsā Sūtra 1.1.2
Vīrarāghavācārya was a 20th c. Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedāntin whose editorial and commentarial contribution to his school will remain impressive for many generations to come. Personally, I am particularly pleased by his attempts to think along the tradition in a creative way.
Within his subcommentary on Vedānta Deśika’s Seśvaramīmāṃsā, Vīrarāghavācārya is at times closer to Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta than Vedānta Deśika’s pro-Mīmāṃsā attitudes. At other times, he just elaborates further on Vedānta Deśika’s hints. In one of such cases, he describes how the choice of words in Pūrva Mīmāṃsā Sūtra 1.1.2 (codanālakṣaṇo ‘rtho dharmaḥ ‘Dharma is that goal which is known through Vedic injunctions’) was not at all casual. Rather, each word had a direct meaning and also further suggested something more. For instance, codanālakṣaṇa is not just the same as codanāpramāṇa, but rather suggests that the Vedic injunction also defines what dharma is. dharma is also to be interpreted etymologically as ‘instrument of dhṛti‘, where dhṛti means prīti ‘happiness’. Similarly, artha indicates that bhakti is the result to be achieved, consisting in pleasing God. Then he sums up:
Through the word dharma, which means instrument for dhṛti, Jaimini also suggests that this ritual action devoid of desire which is a purpose in itself (svayamprayojana) is different than the instruments for the results consisting in the four human aims, which are expressed with reference to their own contents (svaviṣaya) [only]. [He suggests it] because through this [word dharma] also pleasing the Revered one (bhagavat) is communicated (uddeśya).
dharmapadena dhṛtisādhanavācinā caturvargaphalopāyāḥ ye svaviṣayāḥ vācyāḥ tais saha anlat svayaṃprayojanaṃ niṣkāmakarmāpy asūcayat bhagavatprītes tatroddeśyatvāt.
In other words, bhakti points beyond oneself, to God, whereas all other purposes remain confined to oneself.
Duty and Sacrifice: A Logical Analysis of the Mīmāṃsā Theory of Vedic Injunctions
A new OA article on deontic logic and Mīmāṃsā
A new article by Andrew Ollett, Matteo Pascucci and myself has been published OA on History and Philosophy of Logic. You can download it here. Don’t forget to let me know what you think about it!
From unfinished starting points to new balances
The common background of all Mīmāṃsā authors is based mainly on Jaimini’s Mīmāṃsā Sūtra (henceforth PMS) and Śabara’s Bhāṣya `commentary’ thereon (henceforth ŚBh). I refer to this phase in the history of Mīmāṃsā as ”common Mīmāṃsā”, since the authority of these texts was accepted by all later Mīmāṃsā authors.
Various later Mīmāṃsā authors rethought this inherited background, in particular, on two connected issues:
- How later Mīmāṃsā authors reconsidered the classification of obligations implemented in the early Mīmāṃsā
- What later Mīmāṃsā authors considered to be the real trigger for obligations
They will implement in both cases reductionistic strategies which, however, were based on very different presuppositions. They introduced to the background Mīmāṃsā new assumptions, although these were —according to the ancient Indian étiquette— concealed as (re)interpretations of the ancient lore.
As for No. 1, the Mīmāṃsā school operates presupposing that prescriptions could enjoin:
- nitya-karman `fixed sacrifices’, to be performed throughout one’s life, such as the Agnihotra, which one needs to perform each single day
- naimittika-karman `occasional sacrifices’, to be performed only on given occasions, e.g., on the birth of a son
- kāmya-karman `elective sacrifices’, to be performed if one wishes to obtain their result, e.g., the citrā sacrifice if one desires cattle
Here one can see already how the scheme offers the chance for different interpretations, precisely according to one’s interpretation of No. 2, namely of the understanding of what is the real motivator of one’s action, as below:
| elective | specific desire |
| occasional | occasion, generic desire |
| fixed | generic occasion (being alive), generic desire |