किमर्थम् पदानित्यत्वं निषेद्धव्यम् ?
मीमांसकास् “शब्दो नित्य एव” इति मन्यन्ते । यथा वयं वृद्धव्यवहारे शब्दार्थसम्बन्धानधिगच्छामः, तथा भूते काले वृद्धाः अपि −इत्यनादिरेव शब्दप्रयोग इति ।
Category Archives: Mīmāṃsā
शब्दनित्यत्वविषये शबरवेदान्तदेशिकयोर् मतौ
मीमामसाशास्त्रे, सूत्रषु ६–२४ अनेकाः पूर्वपक्षाः (तेषामुत्तराणि च) कथ्यन्ते । शब्दः कर्तृक इति ते पूर्वपक्षिन मन्यन्ते । यद्येवं स्यात्, शब्दस्यार्थेन नित्यसम्बन्धो ऽप्यसम्भव एव । एतस्मात् करणात् ते पूर्वपक्षाः न मीमांसकानामुक्ताः, अपि तु नैयायिकादीनाम् ।
सूत्राणाम् १।१।६–११पर्यन्तात् शबरस्वामिनः भाष्यं स्वल्पमेव । श्रीवेदान्तदेशिकैस्तु स्फोटनिरासः, केषांचिच्चोपनिषद्वाक्यानां व्याख्यमपीह लिखितम् ।
६-सूत्रम् “कर्मैके तत्र दर्शनात्” इति । भाष्यपठणात्पूर्वम् “शब्द कर्म एव, इति केचिद्वदन्ति, क्रियानन्तरं शब्दस्य दर्श्नात्” इति मयावगतम् । शाबरभाष्ये ऽपि शब्दो ऽनित्यः क्रियमानत्वादिति व्याख्यातम् ।
श्रीवेदान्तदेशिकानां सेश्वरमीमांसायां तु “कर्म” इति शब्दस्य वाचक्तवं, न तु शब्द एव । “तत्र दर्श्नात्” इति च “संकेते सति वाचकत्वदर्शनात्” इति ।
यथा कात्यायनवार्त्तिके अादौ “सिद्ध शब्दस्यार्थेन संबन्धः“, तथा मीमांसासूत्रेषु १।१।१–१।१।५ अपि शब्दार्थसंबन्ध एव नित्यः, न तु शब्द स्वयम् । नैयायिकास्तु शब्द नाद एव इति मन्वानः शब्दस्यानित्यत्वं स्वीकुर्वन्ति ।
अतः मीमांसादृष्टौ वेदान्तदेशिकमतं युक्तमेव । नैयायिकदृष्टौ तु शबरस्वामिनः ।
एतस्मिन् “ब्लोगे” संस्कृत“पोस्ट्” मासे मासे प्रथमे सोमवासरे पठितव्यानि ।
How to justify Testimony? Indian and Western views
Concerning the Epistemology of Testimony, one can first distinguish between reductionists (claiming that Testimony is just a subset of Inference) and anti-reductionists (claiming that Testimony is a distinct instrument of knowledge). In India and in the West, we have reductionists (David Hume, Elisabeth Fricker, Buddhist Pramāṇavāda, Vaiśeṣika) and anti-reductionists (Thomas Reid, Jennifer Lackey, Arindam Chakrabarti, Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā).
Interestingly, however, in the West reductionists insist on the need for testimony to be grounded on something else (e.g., on the reliability of the speaker), whereas anti-reductionists claim that we have a “presumptive right” to accept testimony, so that it “is a source of justification in its own right” (Gelfert 2010).
Is the Veda the body of God? (Yoshimizu 2007–II part)
How can one interpret a Vedic passage by saying that a certain meaning was not “intended” (vivakṣita), while still thinking that the Veda has no personal author?
The Mīmāṃsā cannot renounce the idea that the Veda has no personal author (apauruṣeyatva): its whole theory about the Veda’s validity depends on this principle. However, Kumārila needs also to explain in which sense one can decide whether an interpretation of the Veda is right or not on the basis of whether it is intended (vivakṣita). How can one speak of intention if there is no author?
Rule-extension strategies in ancient India (Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang, 2013)
This study focuses on the devices implemented in Classical Indian texts on ritual and language in order to develop a structure of rules in an economic and systematic way. These devices presuppose a spatial approach to ritual and language, one which deals for instance with absences as substitutions within a pre-existing grid, and not as temporal disappearances. In this way, the study reveals a key feature of some among the most influential schools of Indian thought. The sources are Kalpasūtra, Vyākaraṇa and Mīmāṃsā, three textual traditions which developed alongside each other, sharing – as the volume shows – common presuppositions and methodologies. In the intentions of its authors, the book will be of interest for Sanskritists, scholars of ritual exegesis and of the history of linguistics.
Further informations here.
Plurality of subjects in Mīmāṃsā: Kiyotaka Yoshimizu 2007
Is the plurality of subjects compatible with the idea of a Vedāntic kind of liberation (in which there seems to be no distinction among different souls)? And can there be an absolute brahman if there are still distinct subjects?