Today, I went to the panel on Buddhism and Philosophy of Mind, which was announced as involving Christian Coseru, Mark Siderits and Jonardon Ganeri. In fact, Ganeri could not make it (“obviously he did not feel fit for the match” commented Coseru at the beginning, among general laughter), but this had the beneficial consequence that there was a whole slot free for discussion.
Category Archives: Mīmāṃsā
First day at the IABS: Apoha in Dignāga according to Kataoka
I am at the end of the first day of the IABS conference in Vienna. I will try to keep the few of you who could not come updated through my impressions of the talks.
When Sacred Texts prescribe violence…
Are you allowed to perform a malefic sacrifice? If you are, then it seems like the Veda contradicts itself, since elsewhere it prohibits violence. If you are not, why not, given that such sacrifices are prescribed in the Veda?
On the Indian lack of distinction between linguistic and external reality
In his contribution to a recent symposium (Does Asia think differently? –Symposium zu Ehre Ernst Steinkellners), as well as in many other publications of him (e.g., Langage et Réalité: sur un épisode de la pensée indienne, 1999), Johannes Bronkhorst answered that yes, there is a substantial difference between “our” thought and the Indian one, in so far as the latter does not distinguish between purely linguistic problems and genuine ones.
Workshop with Lawrence McCrea
Workshop
Veṅkaṭanātha on malefic sacrifices and dharma
| Date: | Mon, 18 August, 10am – 5pm, Tue, 19 August, 1pm – 5 pm |
| Venue: | Institut für Kultur- und Geistesgeschichte Asiens, Seminarraum 1 |
| Apostelgasse 23, 1030 Wien | |
| Organisation: | Elisa Freschi (IKGA) |
The workshop will be conducted by Larry McCrea.
Topic
The workshop will focus on Veṅkaṭanātha’s (1269–1370) approach to Mīmāṃsā through the works he dedicated to this school, i.e., Seśvaramīmāṃsā, Mīmāṃsāpādukā and, secondarily, Śatadūṣaṇī and Tattvamuktākalāpa.
Veṅkaṭanātha was the foremost systematizer of the Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta and immensely contributed to its positioning within the Indian philosophical landscape, while still presenting his contribution as doing nothing more than explicating his predecessors’ position. In particular, he chose to introduce the Mīmāṃsā within the Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta, notwithstanding the fact that the Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta is essentially a Vaiṣṇava school, whereas the Mīmāṃsā is usually regarded as atheistic. Veṅkaṭanātha further needed to take into account his predecessors’ (chiefly Yāmuna and Rāmānuja) sceptical standpoint on Mīmāṃsā.
Parallel passages dealing with selected topics in the three texts will be read in the original Sanskrit and analysed, with a particular focus on Veṅkaṭanātha’s innovations in his interpretation of Mīmāṃsā and on his solutions to the problems hinted at above.
Topics to be dealt with
- artha and anartha within the Veda: The conundrum of malefic sacrifices:Seśvaramīmāṃsā ad Pūrva Mīmāṃsā Sūtra 1.1.2.
- Is the Veda the instrument to know dharma? Seśvaramīmāṃsā ad 1.1.2.
Texts to be read and editions used
- For the Seśvaramīmāṃsā and the Mīmāṃsāpādukā: 1971 edition, Ubhaya Vedānta Granthamālā.
NB: Scans of the relevant texts can be received from Elisa Freschi. Hard copies will be distributed at the beginning of the workshop.
Are Bādarāyaṇa and Vyāsa the same person?
As part of his aikaśāstrya agenda, Vedānta Deśika wanted to prove that Jaimini (the author of the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā Sūtra) was a pupil of Bādarāyaṇa (the author of the Uttara Mīmāṃsā, aka Vedānta, Sūtra). In order to prove that, he can use a verse from the Mahābhārata referring to Vyāsa:
The Lord, the best, the benefactor, taught the Vedas, of which the Mahābhārata is the fifth, to Sumantu, Jaimini, Bailva and Śuka, his own son and to Vaiśampāyana.
They (the students) recited separately [parts] of the Mahābhārata, which had been put together [by Vyāsa] (vedān adhyāpayām āsa mahābhāratapañcamān | sumantuṁ jaiminiṁ pailaṁ śukaṁ caiva svam ātmajam || prabhur variṣṭho varado vaiśaṁpāyanam eva ca | saṁhitās taiḥ pr̥thaktvena bhāratasya prakāśitāḥ || MBh 10.57.74–5)
What remains to be done, at this point, is to establish the identity of Vyāsa and Bādarāyaṇa. This is also a wide-spread idea, but Vedānta Deśika wants to establish through a motivation of this double name:
In the island mixed with (i.e., endowed with) Badarika (jujube) tress, out of Parāśara, Satyavatī (the mother of Vyāsa) begot a child, a destroyer of foes (parantapa), Bādarāyana, the imperishable.
dvīpe badarikāmiśre bādarāyaṇam acyutam |
parāśarāt satyavatī putraṃ lebhe parantapam ||
Unfortunately, however, I could not locate the source of the latter verse. Do you know it?
I am surprised to notice that I never discussed aikaśāstrya on this blog. You can, however, read about it in my forthcoming article on the volume I will edit with Philipp Maas, a preliminary version of which can be read here.
When does one name one’s sources?
I am inclined to think that classical (non-Buddhist) Indian philosophers did not name or identify their sources if:
- They were part of their own tradition
- One agreed with them
Kiyotaka Yoshimizu on Kumārila, Buddhism and the sources of dharma
On September the 1st, Kiyotaka Yoshimizu will read a paper at the Austrian Academy of Sciences, IKGA (Apostelgasse 23, 1030):
Kumārila’s Criticism of Buddhism as a Religious Movement in his Views on the Sources of dharma
Kiyotaka Yoshimizu on “Semantics or Pragmatics?”
On September the 2nd and the 3rd, Kiyotaka Yoshimizu will be at the Austrian Academy of Sciences (Apostelgasse, 23, 1030, ground floor) for a workshop on “Semantics or Pragmatics?”. The workshop wil regard Dignāga’s and Kumārila’s distinction of semantics from pragmatics (an innovation both shared, if compared to Nyāya) and their different solutions to the issue (with Dignāga priviledging semantics and Kumārila focusing on pragmatics).
More in detail,
2.9: apoha in Dignāga (showing his focus on semantics over pragmatics)
3.9: Kumārila’s understanding of the grahakaikatvanyāya as an evidence of his focus on pragmatics
Texts to be read: PS and PSV 41-44; PS and PSV 50a (2.9). TV on 3.1.(7).13-15 (3.9).
References: Kiyotaka Yoshimizu “The Theorem of the Singleness of a Goblet (graha-ekatva-nyāya) : A Mīmāṃsā Analysis of Meaning and Context”, Acta Asiatica 90, 2006.
Kiyotaka Yoshimizu “How to Refer to a Thing by a Word: Another Difference between Dignāga’s and Kumārila’s Theories of Denotation”, in Journal of Indian Philosophy, 39(4-5), 2011.
Forging Indian philosophical texts
Did Indian authors forge their authorities? Did they need it, given the freedom commentators enjoyed (so that Śaiva texts have been used by Vaiṣṇava authors (see the Spandakārikā) and dualist texts by non-dualist authors (see the Paratriṃśikā) as their authorities)?