I am at the end of the first day of the IABS conference in Vienna. I will try to keep the few of you who could not come updated through my impressions of the talks.
Category Archives: Pramāṇavāda
On the Indian lack of distinction between linguistic and external reality
In his contribution to a recent symposium (Does Asia think differently? –Symposium zu Ehre Ernst Steinkellners), as well as in many other publications of him (e.g., Langage et Réalité: sur un épisode de la pensée indienne, 1999), Johannes Bronkhorst answered that yes, there is a substantial difference between “our” thought and the Indian one, in so far as the latter does not distinguish between purely linguistic problems and genuine ones.
Kiyotaka Yoshimizu on Kumārila, Buddhism and the sources of dharma
On September the 1st, Kiyotaka Yoshimizu will read a paper at the Austrian Academy of Sciences, IKGA (Apostelgasse 23, 1030):
Kumārila’s Criticism of Buddhism as a Religious Movement in his Views on the Sources of dharma
Kiyotaka Yoshimizu on “Semantics or Pragmatics?”
On September the 2nd and the 3rd, Kiyotaka Yoshimizu will be at the Austrian Academy of Sciences (Apostelgasse, 23, 1030, ground floor) for a workshop on “Semantics or Pragmatics?”. The workshop wil regard Dignāga’s and Kumārila’s distinction of semantics from pragmatics (an innovation both shared, if compared to Nyāya) and their different solutions to the issue (with Dignāga priviledging semantics and Kumārila focusing on pragmatics).
More in detail,
2.9: apoha in Dignāga (showing his focus on semantics over pragmatics)
3.9: Kumārila’s understanding of the grahakaikatvanyāya as an evidence of his focus on pragmatics
Texts to be read: PS and PSV 41-44; PS and PSV 50a (2.9). TV on 3.1.(7).13-15 (3.9).
References: Kiyotaka Yoshimizu “The Theorem of the Singleness of a Goblet (graha-ekatva-nyāya) : A Mīmāṃsā Analysis of Meaning and Context”, Acta Asiatica 90, 2006.
Kiyotaka Yoshimizu “How to Refer to a Thing by a Word: Another Difference between Dignāga’s and Kumārila’s Theories of Denotation”, in Journal of Indian Philosophy, 39(4-5), 2011.
Veṅkaṭanātha’s Buddhist quotes
Veṅkaṭanātha (also known as Vedānta Deśika) quotes relatively often from Buddhist texts, especially from Pramāṇavāda ones (as was possibly customary within Indian philosophical circles. Does it mean that he could still directly access Pramāṇavāda texts? Or does he depend on second-hand quotations?
Kumārila on sentence meaning
Who are the opponents in Kumārila’s Ślokavārttika (henceforth ŚV), chapter on sentence-meaning? And did the ŚV set the standard for all further discussions on the topic?
Who invented the apoha theory? On Kunjunni Raja 1986 SECOND UPDATE
Who invented the apoha theory? If you, like me, are prone to answer “Dignāga” and to add that Dignāga (as shown by Hattori) was inspired by Bhartṛhari’s theory and that Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara later fine-tuned Dignāga’s one, you are ready to have your view challenged by K. Kunjunni Raja’s article in Buddhist Logic and Epistemology (ed. by B.K. Matilal and R.D. Evans, 1986, I am grateful to Sudipta Munsi who sent me a copy of it).
Sucarita Miśra on apoha —On Kataoka 2014a
Who is the most productive scholar on Indian Philosophy? Kei Kataoka is surely in the top-10 (have a look at his publications here).
Helmut Krasser, the Rebel Sanskritist —UPDATED
Photo by Birgit Kellner
I met Helmut Krasser during my Erasmus year in Vienna, back in the Nineties. We sat together (meaning that he, Horst Lasic and Ernst Steinkellner prepared and led the meetings whereas I and other people tried to follow and to add minor points from time to time) at the Academy, reading Jinendrabuddhi’s commentary on Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya.
What is unreal?
The term tuccha means in Classical Sanksrit “worthless”, “insignificant”. In Vedānta, however, it gets a more specific technical meaning, to denote the absolute unreality of chimeral entities, such as the khapuṣpa (flower in the air), which will not and cannot ever exist.