Should we try to periodise Indian philosophy or shall we give up any attempt, since each one will be criticised and is in some respect flawed? Periodisation, as recently highlighted by Julius Lipner, is a form of classification and as such also a form of controlling (Lipner 2013).
Category Archives: Philosophy
Before “Classical Indian Philosophy”: the influence of the Sāṅkhya logic UPDATED
We discussed already on this blog about how our conception of “classical Indian philosophy” is contingent and historically determined. For instance, if you were to ask me what “classical Indian philosophy” for me means, I would at first answer with “debate between Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā and Buddhist Pramāṇavāda”. However, as soon as one throws a closer look at the texts, one sees how this balance was precarious and how the debate had different protagonists at different times.
A theist caught in the paradoxes of free will
Can a theist believe in God’s omniscience&omnipotence and in free will? I have argued in other posts that one can think in a compatibilist way (because God wants to be freely loved) and that this entails that no punishment/ban from God’s presence can be eternal. Here I would like to test it in the case of Vedānta Deśika/Veṅkaṭanātha, a Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedāntin who also wrote Mīmāṃsā works.
From a Mīmāṃsā standpoint, free will is a fundamental presupposal, since Vedic prescriptions are in a dialectical relation with one’s desire (rāga): one always decides on the basis of the one or the other. That rāga itself might lie beyond one’s free will is an idea never discussed by Mīmāṃsā authors, possibly because they are interested in the phenomenology of free will and not in its ontology.
Can the Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta point of view agree with this perspective? On the one hand, one might think that the omnipotency of God as conceived by Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta authors leads back to the initial problem. On the other, according to Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta human beings are nothing but specifications (viśeṣas) of the only existing reality, God Himself. In some forms of Vaiṣṇavism (e.g., in Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavism), God can freely choose to self-delude Himself as part of His play (līlā). Thus, the child-Kṛṣṇa can willfully forget His omnipotence in order to enjoy His mother’s protection.
Can one conceive the freedom enjoyed by human beings also as a case of self-delimitation?
Further thoughts on free will in Indian Philosophy can be read here.
Can a theist believe in God’s omniscience&omnipotence and in free will? Suppose God leaves us free because S/He wants us to be free, still, why does not S/He interfere with our choices when they would lead to the eternal absence of happiness? Read my thoughts here.
Do we need to waste our time proving that unicorns do not exist?
Do we need to prove that unicorns, tooth fairies, hobbits and so on do not exist? The question is not just funny, insofar as an upholder of the existence of ghosts and the like could easily claim that —strictly speaking— there is no evidence of their non-existence. In Indian epistemology, this amounts to saying that there are no bādhakas ‘invalidating cognitions’ telling us that the existence of ghosts, etc. is invalid.
Conference for Early Career Philosophers: CfP
Are you a young scholar working on philosophy? Perhaps you might enjoy a conference designed for cooperative enhancing your paper (instead of demolishing it).
किं स्वतः परतो वा प्रामाण्यम्?
किं प्रामाण्यं स्वतः, परतो वा उत्पद्यते, ज्ञायते च ?
सांख्यानां प्रामाण्याप्रामाण्यौ उभौ स्वतः । नैयायिकानां वैशेषिकानां च प्रामाण्याप्रामाण्यौ उभौ परतः । बौद्धप्रमाणवादिनां प्रामाण्यं परतः, अप्रमाण्यं तु स्वतः । मीमांसकानां तु प्रामाण्यं स्वतः, अप्रमाण्यं च परतः । इति चत्वारः पक्षाः ।
Should we investigate about the epistemology of testimony in order to improve other people’s testimonial habits? If so, we should avoid too strict criteria, or people will withdraw precious testimonies for fear of not being justified in testifying about them. If, by contrast, the epistemology of testimony merely describes common testimonial norms, then, why does it have so high expectations? You can read my thoughts from the point of view of (Western) epistemology here.
Epistemology of perception, or In order to be in a maṇḍala, you must know what a maṇḍala is (Kozicz 2008–9).
What experiences the practitioner when he is in an architectural setting of high symbolic value?
Here is the link for the newest edition of the Philosophers’ Carnival. If you agree that it should include also the perspectives and stimuli of other points of view (e.g., of Indian philosophy), make a point to submit proposals for the next one!