Category Archives: language and linguistics

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“dadhi and dadhy are two different words”

The case of combination variants like dadhi and dadhy is used by Nyāya authors as an evidence of the fact that words are produced and modified. Mīmāṃsā authors, who think that language is without beginning, need to respond to that and explain therefore that dadhy is not a modification of dadhi, but an alternative word, and both are used in specific phonetic contexts.

Veṅkaṭanātha in his commentary on PMS 1.1.16 elaborates thereon and explains that they are described as archetype and ectype of each other for pedagogical reasons only (in order not to further multiply the number of words to be learnt). At this point, he faces two very different objections.

The first opponent says that the archetype-ectype relation could be reverted according to a different grammatical analysis. This probably means that dadhy could be considered as the archetype and dadhi as the ectype. Veṅkaṭanātha answers that one should choose the grammatical analysis based on its pedagogical merits, and the one suggested by the opponent is not pedagogically easier.

The other opponent says that the ectype-archetype relation is real and based on the similarity between the two. The “similarity” is not further elaborated upon, but we can guess something more about it through Veṅkaṭanātha’s reply. Veṅkaṭanātha answers that if similarity were the ground for real archetype-ectype connections, then there would be no way not to avoid over- and under-extensions. On the one hand, one could over-extend it to other cases of similarities, like yogurt (dadhi) and jasmine flowers, that are similar insofar as they are both white, although they are not considered to be archetype and ectype of each other. On the other hand, cow-dung and beetles are dissimilar, but are considered one the ectype of the other (beetles are believed to be a transformation of cow-dung).

Now, my problem regards a terminological choice. The first opponent says: vyākaraṇāntareṇa prakṛtivikṛtivaiparītyam. In his answer to the second opponent, Veṅkaṭanātha says na ca sādṛśyāt prakṛtivikṛtibhāvaḥ śaṅkhyaḥ, vaiparītyasyāpi prasaṅgāt. However, vaiparītya in the first case seems to be the opposite of what should be the case (the inversion of dadhi and dadhy as archetype and ectype). By contrast, in the second case vaiparītya seems to indicate just a different set of consequences. Comments welcome!

(Cross-posted on the indianphilosophyblog.com)

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Prescriptions in Kumārila, Uṃveka, Maṇḍana

Maṇḍana’s thesis of iṣṭasādhanatā is an answer to the problem of how to identify the core of a prescription. What makes people undertake actions? Kumārila’s śabdabhāvanā (‘linguistic urge’) theory and Prabhākara’s kāryavāda (‘theory about duty [being the motivator]’) had already offered their answers.

Kumārila’s theory had two pillars:

  • 1. a theory of rational behaviour being always goal-oriented,
  • 2. a strong hermeneutic basis linked to the analysis of prescriptive language.

In the 2. analysis, exhortative verbal endings are analysed as entailing a verbal part (tiṅ) and an exhortative part (liṅ). The former express the action (bhāvanā), the latter express the injunction (vidhi/śabdabhāvanā). And any action needs three components, namely something to be brought about by the action (bhāvya), an instrument to bring it about (karaṇa) and a procedure (itikartavyatā), which is equated to the instrument’s instrument. bhāvanā, vidhi, bhāvya, karaṇa and itikartavyatā are all conveyed by the Vedic prescriptive sentence, but are they conveyed *qua* bhāvanā etc.? The answer is clearly affirmative for bhāvanā and vidhi, which are directly conveyed by tiṅ and liṅ respectively. By contrast, bhāvya, karaṇa and itikartavyatā might need the application of some further investigation on the part of the knower, who will need to apply hermeneutical rules (nyāya) to correctly interpret the sentence and link the bhāvya to the word mentioning the eligible person and the karaṇa to the meaning of the verbal root.

The first pillar (1) is taken up by Maṇḍana.
In fact, Maṇḍana expands on Kumārila’s intuition about human behaviour being always goal-oriented by offering a radical reductionist hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, being a motivator is nothing but communicating that the action to be undertaken is an instrument to some desired result. In this sense, prescribing X to people desiring Y is *nothing but* explaining that X is the means to achieve Y. The “nothing but” part of the definition is key to distinguish Maṇḍana’s position from Kumārila’s. Also for Kumārila a prescription presupposes that one understands that the prescribed action will lead to something independently desired.

Now, I am grateful to Sudipta Munsi, who recently made me read Uṃveka’s commentary on ŚV codanā 214, where Uṃveka rejects a view that seems a proto-version of Kumārila’s one, since it speaks of bhāvanā, of a desired bhāvya and of the meaning of the verbal root, but without mentioning the fact that this conveys the karaṇa. In this proto-Kumārila view, the prescriptive sentence impels (pravṛt-), but since one might doubt this impulsion, it implies (ākṣip-) a bhāvya in the form of something desirable and therefore orients the listener’s understanding to move past the meaning of the verbal root towards the identification of something really desirable. Uṃveka does not use the verb abhidhā- ‘directly denote’, but says that the prescriptive sentences conveys (avagam-) this meaning. The doubt (āśaṅkā) about the impulsion seems to be the reason for the implication (ākṣepa). Uṃveka does not frame this as a case of śrutārthāpatti (postulation of a linguistic element based on cogent evidence), because ākṣepa performs almost the same role (but without the postulation of an explicit linguistic unit, which remains implied).
Uṃveka contrasts to this view his own (vayaṃ tu brūmaḥ), according to which a prescriptive sentence first conveys an impulsion (preraṇā) and then (uttarakālam) conveys (pratī-) a desired goal. Here, there are important points that appear to be influenced by Maṇḍana (please remember that Uṃveka commented on Maṇḍana’s Bhāvanāviveka):

  • The mention of the destruction of accumulated bad karman as the desired result for fixed sacrifices
  • The connection between impulsion and the fact that the action impelled leads to a desirable goal

However, unlike in Maṇḍana, Uṃveka distinguishes impulsion (preraṇā) from the fact of being the instrument to a desired goal, whereas Maṇḍana’s main claim is that the two are completely identical. Uṃveka is possibly the first person mentioning the temporal sequence linking impulsion and the understanding (pratī-) of something as a desirable goal. Like in the discussion of the proto-Kumārila view, Uṃveka does not use the word abhidhā, but he says that the prescriptive content is conveyed (avagam-).

Pārthasārathi (another commentator of Kumārila) de facto embedded Maṇḍana’s view of iṣṭasādhanatā, i.e., the prescribed action is an instrument to a desired result, as part of Kumārila’s śabdabhāvanā theory, more precisely as its procedure (itikartavyatā).

This was just a quick summary. Specifications or corrections are welcome.

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The role of convention in signification

In his Seśvaramīmāṃsā ad 1.1.12, Veṅkaṭanātha explains that the example of proper names does not prove that language in general depends on convention. He writes that the case of proper names is not a dahanadṛṣṭānta, possibly ‘an example which sets on fire [the whole theory]’.

Why so? Because

प्रकृते यथोपलम्भं स्वभावसहकार्यादिनियमात्*

Because in the case at hand (i.e., language, composed of proper names and common words) there is a restrictive rule regarding the role of intrinsic signification and its auxiliaries according to how [linguistic expressions] are grasped.

In other words, convention, as an auxiliary of intrinsic signification, plays a role, but only in the case of proper names. And the distinction is possible based on one’s experience of linguistic expressions, insofar as linguistic expressions which are not proper names are immediately grasped as significant by people who know the language. By contrast, they might have doubts when they encounter proper names of unknown places or people.

These are, as usual, my thoughts only. Should you have a different understanding, you are welcome to share it. I would be happy and grateful to read it.

*(The editions add a च after प्रकृते, which makes the connection with the previous sentence unclear. The manuscripts provide a better reading, without the च).

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What is the purpose of PMS 1.1.26?

Sucarita, Vedānta Deśika and Uttamur T. Vīrarāghavācārya thereon

I am again pleasantly stuck in a passage of Uttamur T. Vīrarāghavācārya’s learned commentary on the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā Sūtra. This time he is discussing PMS 1.1.26, which is an important sūtra for philosophy of language, but one whose wordings was unclear even within Mīmāṃsā:

loke sanniyamāt prayogasannikarṣaḥ syāt

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Changing the meaning through intonation

Experts of the alaṅkāra schools have discussed in various ways how a double entendre or a different meaning can be obtained through śleṣa but also through kāku. The latter is a specific intonation which can change the meaning of a whole sentence. In some cases, kāku is enough to get a completely opposite meaning. European-trained readers might think of the well-known example of the Sybilla’s forecast “ibis redibis non peribis in bello”, which can be read with a different intonation as meaning either “You’ll go, come back and not die in war” or “You’ll go, not come back and die in war”.

Now, Uttamur T. Vīrarāghavācārya mentions kāku in a non-rhetorical context within his subcommentary on the Seśvaramīmāṃsā on Pūrva Mīmāṃsā Sūtra 1.1.3. The context is that of discussing Upavarṣa’s proposal to read PMS 1.1.3 (tasya nimittaparīṣṭiḥ “The examination of the cause of [knowing dharma]”) as in fact meaning that no examination should be done. Vīrarāghavācārya suggests that this meaning can be achieved through a kāku. This is a nice idea, since it avoids adding words to the sūtra.
However, I wonder how could one ever pronounce the sūtra in a way which suggests that no examination should be done. A clue is found in Veṅkaṭanātha’s Mīmāṃsā Pādukā 89: tannimittepariṣṭiḥ kartavyā neti vā syād iha vinigamanā sūtrakṛtkākubhedāt || 89 || “The decision between the two alternatives `an investigation should be done’ or `it should not’ given [the reading] tannimittepariṣṭiḥ is based on the different intonation by the author of the aphorism”. In other words, Upavarṣa must have suggested to read the sūtra as tasya nimittepariṣṭiḥ instead of tasya nimittapariṣṭiḥ. The difference between the affermative form and the negative one (tasya nimitte pariṣṭiḥ and tasya nimitte ‘pariṣṭiḥ respectively) could only be grasped through the speaker’s intonation.

The other relevant passages read as follows. Seśvaramīmāṃsā: yat tu upavarṣavṛttau “tasya nimittapariṣṭir na kartavye”ti nañam adhyāhṛtyātimahatā kleśena vyākhyānam, tad apy anena nirastam. “Upavarṣa’s gloss supplies (adhyāhṛ-) a negation (nañ) and reads [the aphorism], thereby making an enormous mistake, as “The examination (pariṣṭi) of the condition for it (dharma) should not be done.” This (reading) too has been refuted by the [above argument].”

Uttamur T. Vīrarāghavācārya’s subcommentary: nañam adhyāhṛtyeti. pariṣṭir ity atra kākusvarakalpanopalakṣaṇam idam. “Supplies a negation: this secondarily indicates the postulation of a kāku accent in examination“.

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How to make a reader? UPDATED

What is a reader? An anthology of texts put together because of a specific purpose, i.e., learning about a given topic (say “A reader on Sanskrit philosophy of language”) or gaining proficiency in a specific language (e.g., “A Vedic reader”). A reader is rarely a high scientific achievement, but it might be extremely useful for students and laypersons, hence I think it makes sense to give the genre some thoughts.

The last reader I used is Tamiḻ Matu, by Kausalya Hart, which is meant to be at the same time a historical anthology of Tamil literature and guide students in their learning of Tamil. It comprises a short text by K. Hart herself introducing a given period of Tamil literature and is followed by an excerpt of real Tamil literature of that time. After each text comes a glossary and a global glossary is repeated at the end of the book, together with some questions in Tamil about the content of each chapter. Apart from the short English equivalents given in the glossary, the book is entirely in Tamil. This has surely advantages, but if I were to write a reader, I would try to focus clearly on my readers. If my target readers are not proficient in the topic or in the language the reader is about, I will provide a TOC and all other auxiliary materials (e.g., index locorum) in English or in a language accessible to them (typically non-technical English). I would also:

  • Provide a general glossary at the end of the book (not everyone would read the book in a short time and they might forget the words learnt in Unit 1 by the time they reach Unit 14). UPDATE: I would prepare both the general glossary and the glossaries of each chapter in alphabetic order and not in order of occurrence (I am grateful to Francesco for having pointed out this issue).

Next comes the nature of the reader. What does one exactly want to achieve through it? There might be multiple purposes, but one needs to be the main one. As much as you want to achieve them all, focus on one, or you will fail to achieve any.

  1. If, for instance, one wants to primarily teach a language, one should be sure to start with the easiest texts and move towards the most complex ones. One might also decide to oversimplify concepts (say, just saying that Govinda, Kṛṣṇa and Nārāyaṇa are names of the same God).
  2. If, by contrast, one wants to accompany intermediate students while they explore a given literature, one might prefer to go chronologically. (I really enjoy this type of readers, since they are an entertaining way to learn about the history of a given genre but can easily see why the first type is way more appealing to publishing houses).
  3. Again, if one wants to primarily introduce students or laypersons to a fascinating field, one might want to proceed thematically (e.g. “devotional literature”, “commentaries”, “epic”) and explain as much as possible of the culture involved.

What about translations? They are extremely useful for self-study (including both working on one’s own or in a group where no one is ufficially the teacher) and can make a reader a useuful tool for the purposes 2 and 3 above. But where to put them? Again, if one’s purpose is 1, then translations should be found in a separate section of the book, otherwise one would be constantly tempted to check them too soon. If one wants to achieve primarily 2 or 3, then translations can be printed as parallel texts.

In sum: Choose one goal (e.g., teaching a language) and focus on it. You can have a subsidiary one (e.g., introducing readers to interesting topics within that language), but no more than one. Be straightforward about what you are doing in your introduction and tell your readers what they will find in your book and how you conceived it.

What do readers think? Which readers did you use and appreciate?

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A quote from the Mahābhārata on sphoṭa?

Within a discussion on the sphoṭa in the Seśvaramīmāṃsā, Veṅkaṭanātha adds a quote he ascribes to the Mahābhārata. The quote is found in a different form in other printed works by Veṅkaṭanātha and in the various manuscripts of the Seśvaramīmāṃsā. However, I could not identify anything similar in the Mahābhārata itself.

The SM 1902 edition reads:

sphoṭas tvaṃ varṇasaṃghasthaḥ iti mahābhāratavacanam

The Mahābhārata statement “You are the sphoṭa, which is present in the conjunction of phonemes”.

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Can you guess what manuscripts say?

A debate on sphoṭa

I am editing a portion of the Seśvaramīmāṃsā on a linguistic controversy about what is the vehicle of meaning. As often the case in Indian philosophy, an upholder of the sphoṭa theory speaks and says that the sphoṭa is the vehicle of the meaning, as hinted at by our own intuition that we understand a meaning śabdāt, i.e., from a unitary linguistic unit, not from various phonemes. The opponent replies saying that no independent sphoṭa exists independently and above the single phonemes, like no unitary assembly (pariṣad) exists independently of the single people composing it. The Sphoṭavādin replies that phonemes are unable to convey the meaning either one by one or collectively (because they never exist as a collective entity, given that they disappear right after having been pronounced.

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Siddha and sādhya in Viśiṣṭādvaitavedānta

Has anyone read the Bhagavadguṇadarpaṇa?

At the beginning of his Seśvaramīmāṃsā, Veṅkaṭanātha tries to synthetise what he (and Rāmānuja) calls Pūrva and Uttara Mīmāṃsā, with the further addition of the Devatā Mīmāṃsā.
In this connection he needs to address an apparent divergence, namely that between the siddha and sādhya interpretation of the Veda. In other words: Does the Veda always convey something to be done? Or does it always convey something established? The unity of the three Mīmāṃsās and of the Veda as their basis does not allow for a different interpretation of the statements in the Upaniṣads and in the Brāhmaṇas.

Veṅkaṭanātha cites Rāmānuja in order to show that there is no real opposition and that the sādhya-aspect is parasitical upon a siddha one. The example he reuses from Rāmānuja is that of taking action in regard to a hidden treasure: One starts acting only after having known that the treasure is really there. Thus, the sādhya element (taking action) depends on the siddha one (the acquired cognition of something existing).

At this point he also quotes from anoter Vaiṣṇava author, namely Parāśara Bhaṭṭa. His Bhagavadguṇadarpaṇa is a commmentary on the Viṣṇusahasranāma and here comes the quote:

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Reading and comparing theories on sentence-meaning (part 1)

The Mīmāṃsaka Śālikanātha is Prabhākara’s main interpreter, yet he is also an original thinker. How much of Śālikanātha’s anvitābhidhāna theory for sentence signification is already there in Prabhākara’s Bṛhatī? We will find out reading the Bṛhatī and comparing it with Śālikanātha’s commentary thereon and with Śālikanātha’s elaboration of the topic in his independent treatise, the Vākyārthamātṛkā, during this workshop.