Seeing absences through metacognitive feelings or dispositions
Anna Farennikova had claimed that absence must be perceptually known especially because the phenomenology of it shows that we know it immediately, not via a secondary reflection. This is basically Udayana’s point about absence being known via perception because of its being sākṣātkāra ‘making present (its object, namely absence)’. (I thank Jack Beaulieu for having discussed the topic with me).
Beside this main argument, two additional points again the idea that absence is obtained through a secondary reflection (what she calls the cognitive view) by AF are the following:
- 2. the “phenomenology of absence exhibits resilience to change of belief”. Suppose we find out that the keys are not missing from the table where they should be, it’s just a skilfully devised mirror illusion that makes us think that this is the case (example adapted from Martin and Dokic 2013). We would still perceive their absence. Hence, absence is not a judgement.
- 3. perceiving absence gives one an adaptive advantage (e.g., in the case of perceiving the absence of predators) and for this purpose it must happen quickly and without intermediation.
3. is, unless I am misunderstanding it, weak. For instance, some people claim they can feel when people are looking at them from behind. Others think that the first ones are not really perceiving other people’s looks, but rather inferring them out of the fact that the person behind them has not been moving for a while, etc. Having such a perceptual capacity would surely be an adaptive advantage, but would we want to claim that it is therefore perceptual?
1+2 are, by contrast, quite strong and any epistemology of absences will need to be able to account for them. (Are they, by the way, also strong arguments against Dharmakīrti’s theory of absences being only inferred? Not really, since Dharmakīrti wants to account for *knowledge*, not for illusory cognitions, like the ones hinted at in 2.)
Anna Farennikova’s work on absence as being perceptually known prompted an answer by Jean-Rémy Martin and Jerôme Dokic. Martin and Dokic agree with Farennikova against the “cognitive view” of the grasping of absences. But, they think that they can counter Farennikova’s claims 1+2 through what they call the “metacognitive view”. They start by saying that the grasping of absence is accompanied by a feeling of surprise, just like every time something unexpected occurs (including an unpredicted element in a sequence, not just its absence). Metacognitive feelings “reflect a specific kind of affective experience caused by subpersonal monitoring of (perceptual) processes” (p. 118).
The idea is really interesting, if only one accepts the existence of metacognitive feelings. Vaidya, Bilimoria and Shaw (2016) introduce further elements in the debate, namely:
- a. there can be experience of absence even without surprise. Suppose (the example is mine), I tell you “Come to see how my flat looks like now that I sold my grand piano. You come to my flat and grasp the absence of the grand piano, even if you are not surprised by it.
- b. the absence can be explained through the assumption of dispositions for the cognition of X.