Did Kumārila believe in the language-independent existence of deities? In their efficacy within sacrifices? I believe he did not. Sacrifices work independently of deities who at most might be Epicurean-like entities, with no function in human lives. For this purpose, I am going to examine a passage in Kumārila’s Ṭupṭīkā ad 9.1, adhikaraṇa 4, p. 1652ff (Śubbāśāstrī 1929 edition).

The whole passage starts because Śabara is discussing the role of the deity in sacrifice. He explains that the deity does not promote the sacrifice (na devatā prayojikā and na devatāprayuktāḥ pravartiṣyāmahe). An opponent mentions the fact that the deity is mentioned as the target (sampradāna) of the action (given that it is in the dative case). Śabara quickly dismisses the point as related to the fact that the sacrifice is the real instrument to realise the result and moves on. Kumārila elaborates on it and comes to the conclusion that the deity has a primary role because of its grammatical function, which makes it needed for the performance of the sacrifice.

“[Obj:] But the deity is mentioned as the target (sampradāna) [and hence needs to be the one that prompts one to sacrifice, like the teacher to whom one gives a gift prompts one to give it].

[R:] The sacrifice, which is enjoined with regard to a result. requires a performance. And this performance is not possible without a deity and a sacrificial substance (to be offered). And the substance and the deity which are required (by the performance) are required only on the side of the complement, not as the thing to be realised [by the sacrifice] (which is the real motivator). Among the two, the substance becomes a complement through the third-case ending. The deity through a suffix or through the fourth-case ending.”

Here Pārthasārathi’s Tantraratna adds an intermediate objection explaining that this makes the deity seemingly into the principal element. The response is that this is not a problem.

“And if this deity-complement did not reach the condition of being primary with regard to the sacrifice (as required by the dative ending expressing the target), the sacrifice would not be performed at all. And without the performance of the sacrifice, there would not be the complement either. And if the sacrifice did not reach the condition of being its (complement’s) secondary element (guṇa), it would not come into being.

Therefore the sacrifice needs to reach the condition of being secondary as something/through an activity which is unavoidably concomitant (to the grammatical form used). And also the deity-complement [needs to reach] the condition of being primary as something unavoidably concomitant (to the grammatical form used).”

The addition of “unavoidably concomitant” (nāntarīiyaka) may seem puzzling, since neither Kumārila nor Pārthasārathi explain it. Clooney 1997 makes the bold move to interpret it as na antarīyaka (not… intermediary). I can see his motivation, but antarīyaka is not a Sanskrit word I am aware of. (NB: The L manuscript and the Tantraratna read tasmād yāgena nāntarīyakeṇa vyāpāreṇa guṇabhāvaḥ pratipattavyaḥ (instead of tasmād yāgena nāntarīyako guṇabhāvaḥ pratipattavyaḥ)).

At this point, Pārthasārathi’s Tantraratna adds that this does not mean that the sacrifice has become because of that for the sake of the deity. The following explains why.

“Nor is it the case that the unavoidable functioning is the cause for being primary or secondary, since it is not what is enjoined (and only the injunction determines real primary status). For, [one thinks:] “Since I have been enjoined towards the result, I realise the result through the sacrifice, not otherwise” (and this shows how the injunction puts the result as the primary thing and the sacrifice as its instrument).”

The Tantraratna has an interesting variant here, namely yāgo hi phale coditaḥ. This fits the beginning of the passage, which also read yāgaḥ phale codito…. The translation, in this case, would be as follows: “The sacrifice, being enjoined with regard to the result, does not realise the result otherwise [but through the deity as target]”.

“In this way, the unavoidable functioning needs to be the secondary element with respect to the deity.”

PSM adds: “in order to realise the sacrifice’s being an instrument towards the result”. It also specifies: “the secondary status is not enjoined”.

“Hence, in all cases there are two parts (a principal one, and a secondary one). Among them, we need to understand which one is what is wished to be expressed and which one is not. Among these two possibilities, in worldly experience what is wished to be expressed is determined by the force of things. In the Veda, by contrast, by language. And through language the sacrifice is the primary element, because it realises the result, given that it is proximate [to the result], The deity, by contrast, is understood to be the secondary element. Nor is it the case that the subordination (śeṣatva) is characterised as being an auxiliary (upakāra). Rather, it is established that it is characterised by the Vedic injunction.”

PSM explains that the “Nor…” sentence is the cause of the previous one.

“[UP:] What is the purpose of this investigation?

[R:] If the sacrifice had the purpose of gladdening the deity, then the deity were the one to be worshipped and the sacrifice would be a worship. And the worship is a thing known in worldly experience. Within a worship, what would be the confidence [one could have] in the claim that Sūrya is worshipped in the same way as Agni? The very opposite might be the case (namely that Sūrya dislikes what Agni likes). (Hence, the ectype for Sūrya should not be performed as the archetype sacrifice for Agni!)”

Thus, Kumārila concludes, the fact that the material trumps the deity when it comes to determining the procedure to be followed shows that the sacrifice is not a worship aimed at the deity and that the deity’s seeming predominant role is due to grammar only. I don’t see any important difference between Kumārila’s and Śabara’s conclusions here.