In general, classical Indian philosophers tend to define śarīra ‘body’ as a tool for experience (bhogasādhana). Thus, many philosophers state that plants only seem to have bodies because of our anthropomorphic tendencies, which make us believe that they function like us, whereas in fact plants cannot experience. By contrast, Veṅkaṭanātha in the Nyāyasiddhāñjana defines śarīra in the following way:
Therefore, this śarīra is of two types: permanent and impermanent. Among them, permanent are God’s body —consisting of auspicious substrates, namely substances with the three qualities, time and [individual] souls— and the intrinsic form of Garuḍa, the snake (Ananta), etc. belonging to permanent [deities]. The impermanent [body] is of two types: not made of karman and made of karman. The first one has the form of the primordial natura naturans (the prakṛti of Sāṅkhya), etc.* of God. In the same way, [an impermanent body not made of karman] assumes this or that form according to the wish of the liberated souls, such as Ananta and Garuḍa. Also the [body] made of karman is of two types: made out of one’s decision and karman and made out of karman alone. The first type belongs to great [souls] like the Muni Saubhari. The other one belongs to the other low [souls] (i.e., all normal human beings and the other conscious living beings). Moreover, the body in general is of two types, movable and unmovable. Wood (i.e., trees) and other [plants] and rocks and other [minerals] are unmovable. […] That there are souls also in rock-bodies is established through stories such as that of Ahalyā.
tad etat śarīraṃ dvividham —nityam anityañ ceti. tatra nityaṃ triguṇadravyakālajīvaśubhāśrayādyātmakam īśvaraśarīram; nityānāñ ca svābhāvikagaruḍabhujagādirūpam. anityañ ca dvividham —akarmakṛtaṃ karmakṛtañ ceti. prathamam īśvarasya mahadādirūpam. tathā anantagaruḍādīnāṃ muktānāñ ca icchākṛtatattadrūpam. karmakṛtam api dvividham. svasaṅkalpasahakṛtakarmakṛtaṃ kevalakarmakṛtañ ceti. pūrvaṃ mahatāṃ saubhariprabhṛtīnām. uttarañ ca anyeṣāṃ kṣudrāṇām. punaḥ śarīraṃ sāmānyato dvidhā jaṅgamam ajaṅgamañ ceti. kāṣṭhādīnāṃ śilādīnāñ ca ajaṅgamatvam eva. […] śilādiśarīriṇo ‘pi jīvā vidyante iti ahalyādivṛttāntaśravaṇāt siddham (Nyāyasiddhāñjana, pp. 174–176).
Thus, the deities have an intrinsic form which is permanent and can assume further impermanent ones at wish, not depending on karman.
As for rocks and stones, the rationale of their inclusion is the story of Ahalyā, who was transformed into a stone and then back into a woman, a fact which proves that a soul was present also while she was a stone. Her story is told, e.g., in the Rāmāyaṇa.
*The first commentary explains this ādi as referring to God’s emanations, the vyūhas, which are a typical mark of Pāñcarātra theology throughout its history.
Note the limitation in the precinct of application of karman, which seem to only determine one’s body and not one’s entire life. Further, why do you think Veṅkaṭanātha does not explain away Ahalyā’s story? What is he aiming at through the inclusion of stones?
On nature and sentience of plants in Classical Indian Philosophy, see this post and this one (in general) and this one (on Buddhist philosophy) and in general this label in my old blog. On Veṅkaṭanātha, see this label.
Apologies for the late comment, but the statement “Thus, most philosophers state that plants only seem to have bodies because of our anthropomorphic tendencies”, implying that most Indian philosophers argued that plants were insentient, seems unsubstantiated. Vedanta (and Jain) philosophers explicitly argued for the sentience of plants (not just “trees”, but plants in general), in fact making it a point to argue against the Buddhist view of non-sentient plants. Venkatanatha is hardly an outlier – this was the common view of Vedanta in general.
I understand if you don’t find this topic worthy of interest anymore (especially considering how old this post is), but I just thought I’d contribute.
Thanks
Anantha
Thanks for the comment, Anantha. Jaina philosophers are an absolute exception to the point I was making and I agree with you here. As for Vedānta authors, I guess it depends on the individual authors (please share some specific quotes). In general, I updated the post.
Thank you for the reply. Here are some quotes from philosophical works that I’ve managed to find regarding the lifehood of plants.
1) Shankaracharya’s commentary on Chandogya Upanishad 6.11.2
https://archive.org/details/Shankara.Bhashya-Chandogya.Upanishad-Ganganath.Jha.1942.English/page/344/mode/2up?view=theater
“That the tree is ensouled by the ‘Living Self’ has been indicated by the phenomena of the flowing of juices and withering of—as shown by the illustration also vouched for the Vedic text; which means that immovable (apparently inanimate) objects (like the tree) are endowed with sentience; and this also shows that there is no truth in the Bauddha and Vaiśeṣika view that ‘immovable objects are insentient.’”
2) The Sivajnana Siddhiyar by Arulnandi Shivachariar (12-13th Cent.) – a Tamil Shaiva philosophical work. The text explicitly criticizes the view that plants have no life in the section refuting Buddhism.
English translation of the verses in question (Refer to verses 35 and 36 on the following page): https://archive.org/details/sivajnanasiddhiyarofarunandisivacharya1913/page/n107/mode/2up?view=theater
The 16th century commentator also makes it a point to note that not just trees but all plants, including grass, have life.
3) A 17th century Tamil Advaita Vedanta text, Prabodha Chandrodayam, also criticizes the Buddhists for the view that plants have no life, along the same lines as the above Shaiva work. (Unfortunately, I couldn’t find an English translation, but the critique is the same as the above one)
https://archive.org/details/PrabodhaChandirothayaVachanam/page/n231/mode/2up
4) Finally, in the 17th century, a Tamil Shaiva text on vegetarianism (Kolai Marutthal), takes up the topic of plant lifehood – and confirms that they do have life, and even that one accrues a small amount of sin in killing and eating them.
https://archive.org/details/Acc.No.14124KolaiMaruthal2009/page/n45/mode/2up?view=theater
My translation: “Since both immovable and movable bodies house Jivas, it is certain that one incurs sin from killing immovable life. However, unlike killing movable creatures, the sin incurred is small.”
I understand your expertise is more on the side of Sanskrit philosophy, so I apologize for quoting Tamil texts instead of just Sanskrit ones – it’s just that I’m familiar with Tamil, so these texts came to mind.
You may say that citing Tamil works doesn’t reveal the broad consensus among philosophers, considering the bulk of intellectual activity in India took place in Sanskrit. Apart from the fact that Shankaracharya (in Sanskrit) admits the existence of plant life, the authors of Tamil works above make sure to say that they are basing their works on Sanskrit texts. I’m positive that more instances across both Sanskrit and other Indian languages can easily be found. It seems clear to me that most “Hindu” philosophers thought that plants did have life, and that Buddhists were notorious for thinking otherwise. I’m quite surprised you came to a different conclusion.
It’s a minor debate withing the Indian philosophical tradition, but nevertheless, I find it interesting. How a particular philosophy looks at plants and non-human animals gives us a key on its conception of selfhood, like how Descartes thought that animals were like machines because they lacked rational thought – a consequence of his notion that the soul/self is a thinking thing. Perhaps the Buddhist denial of plant life follows similar lines.
Thanks,
Anantha
Hindu devotional literature often treats plants as sentient, though I guess you really want vedantist philosophers’ writings, from which I don’t know an example.
P. S.: Sorry for my pointless comment on adhikara and rights.
Thank you, Sandeep. I have no doubt that devotional literature (as well as many narratives) treats plants are sentient. The interesting point is that this is obvious in these genres, but not at all so in philosophical texts, that have more problems in justifying the sentience of plants. The asymmetry is very much present in Buddhist philosophical texts.
P.S.: Nothing to apologise for, comments are always welcome (provided they are real comments).
With all due respect, I feel you’re mistaken on two accounts –
1) It is not true that the sentience of plants is not obvious in philosophical texts. Vedanta philosophers explicitly did argue for the sentience of plants, and criticized the Buddhists for holding otherwise. I provided multiple quotations in my reply to your comment (which for some reason has not been uploaded yet). There is absolutely zero room for doubt here – their words are incredibly clear.
2) On a deeper note, the idea that there is a “gap” between devotional and philosophical literature is unjustified. “Philosophy” in India is essentially just the interpretation of canonical texts, rather than the purely independent thinking that characterizes Western philosophy. The Puranas, Itihasas, Smritis and so on are not in contest with philosophy – they are quite literally the content of Indian philosophy. If it is said that plants are sentient in the Puranas, then yes, the “philosophers” most definitely held that plants are sentient.
Thanks,
Anantha Krishna
Professor Freschi, Sorry if I am being stupid, but is it possible that one of Anantha Krishna’s comments with vedantist quotes on plant sentience was wrongly caught by the wordpress spam detector, and is languishing in a spam folder somewhere?
Yes, it was. My apologies to you and Anantha!
Thank you, much appreciated.
Thank you for the reply. Here are some quotes from philosophical works that I’ve managed to find regarding the lifehood of plants.
1) Shankaracharya’s commentary on Chandogya Upanishad 6.11.2
https://archive.org/details/Shankara.Bhashya-Chandogya.Upanishad-Ganganath.Jha.1942.English/page/344/mode/2up?view=theater
“That the tree is ensouled by the ‘Living Self’ has been indicated by the phenomena of the flowing of juices and withering of—as shown by the illustration also vouched for the Vedic text; which means that immovable (apparently inanimate) objects (like the tree) are endowed with sentience; and this also shows that there is no truth in the Bauddha and Vaiśeṣika view that ‘immovable objects are insentient.’”
2) The Sivajnana Siddhiyar by Arulnandi Shivachariar (12-13th Cent.) – a Tamil Shaiva philosophical work. The text explicitly criticizes the view that plants have no life in the section refuting Buddhism.
English translation of the verses in question: https://archive.org/details/sivajnanasiddhiyarofarunandisivacharya1913/page/n107/mode/2up?view=theater
The 16th century commentator also makes it a point to note that not just trees but all plants, including grass, have life.
3) A 17th century Tamil Advaita Vedanta text, Prabodha Chandrodayam, also criticizes the Buddhists for the view that plants have no life, along the same lines as the above Shaiva work.
https://archive.org/details/PrabodhaChandirothayaVachanam/page/n231/mode/2up
4) Finally, in the 17th century, a Tamil Shaiva text on vegetarianism (Kolai Marutthal), takes up the topic of plant lifehood – and confirms that they do have life, and even that one accrues a small amount of sin in killing and eating them. The declaration is matter-of-fact – there is no indication that he is stating an unpopular opinion here.
https://archive.org/details/Acc.No.14124KolaiMaruthal2009/page/n45/mode/2up?view=theater
My translation: “Since both immovable and movable bodies are Jivas, it is certain that one incurs sin from killing immovable life. However, unlike killing movable creatures, the sin incurred is small.”
I’m not entirely sure whether you’re familiar with Tamil, so I apologize for quoting Tamil texts instead of Sanskrit ones.
You may say that citing Tamil works is incorrect considering the bulk of intellectual activity in India took place in Sanskrit. Apart from the fact that Shankaracharya (in Sanskrit) admits the existence of plant life, the authors of Tamil works above make it a point to say that they are basing their works on Sanskrit texts. I’m positive that more instances across both Sanskrit and other Indian languages can easily be found. There seems to have been a broad consensus among most “Hindu” philosophers that plants did have life, and that Buddhists were wrong for thinking otherwise. I’m quite surprised you came to a radically different conclusion.
It’s a minor debate withing the Indian philosophical tradition, but nevertheless, I find it interesting. How a particular philosophy looks at plants and non-human animals gives us a key on its conception of selfhood, like how Descartes thought that animals were like machines because they lacked thought – a consequence of his notion that the soul/self is thinking thing. Perhaps the Buddhist denial of plant life follows similar lines.
Thanks,
Anantha Krishna