I started last year to organise small workshops at the end of each graduate class, for graduate students to present their work. This year’s topic is Kumārila (you probably guessed it).
It will take place on Dec 3 morning and Dec 4 morning, 9-12 Toronto time.
The idea is a low-stake workshop where students get feedback so that they can improve their final papers (or embed ideas in future articles).
Did Kumārila believe in the language-independent existence of deities? In their efficacy within sacrifices? I believe he did not. Sacrifices work independently of deities who at most might be Epicurean-like entities, with no function in human lives. For this purpose, I am going to examine a passage in Kumārila’s Ṭupṭīkā ad 9.1, adhikaraṇa 4, p. 1652ff (Śubbāśāstrī 1929 edition).
The whole passage starts because Śabara is discussing the role of the deity in sacrifice. He explains that the deity does not promote the sacrifice (na devatā prayojikā and na devatāprayuktāḥ pravartiṣyāmahe). An opponent mentions the fact that the deity is mentioned as the target (sampradāna) of the action (given that it is in the dative case). Śabara quickly dismisses the point as related to the fact that the sacrifice is the real instrument to realise the result and moves on. Kumārila elaborates on it and comes to the conclusion that the deity has a primary role because of its grammatical function, which makes it needed for the performance of the sacrifice.
“[Obj:] But the deity is mentioned as the target (sampradāna) [and hence needs to be the one that prompts one to sacrifice, like the teacher to whom one gives a gift prompts one to give it].
[R:] The sacrifice, which is enjoined with regard to a result. requires a performance. And this performance is not possible without a deity and a sacrificial substance (to be offered). And the substance and the deity which are required (by the performance) are required only on the side of the complement, not as the thing to be realised [by the sacrifice] (which is the real motivator). Among the two, the substance becomes a complement through the third-case ending. The deity through a suffix or through the fourth-case ending.”
Here Pārthasārathi’s Tantraratna adds an intermediate objection explaining that this makes the deity seemingly into the principal element. The response is that this is not a problem.
“And if this deity-complement did not reach the condition of being primary with regard to the sacrifice (as required by the dative ending expressing the target), the sacrifice would not be performed at all. And without the performance of the sacrifice, there would not be the complement either. And if the sacrifice did not reach the condition of being its (complement’s) secondary element (guṇa), it would not come into being.
Therefore the sacrifice needs to reach the condition of being secondary as something/through an activity which is unavoidably concomitant (to the grammatical form used). And also the deity-complement [needs to reach] the condition of being primary as something unavoidably concomitant (to the grammatical form used).”
The addition of “unavoidably concomitant” (nāntarīiyaka) may seem puzzling, since neither Kumārila nor Pārthasārathi explain it. Clooney 1997 makes the bold move to interpret it as na antarīyaka (not… intermediary). I can see his motivation, but antarīyaka is not a Sanskrit word I am aware of. (NB: The L manuscript and the Tantraratna read tasmād yāgena nāntarīyakeṇa vyāpāreṇa guṇabhāvaḥ pratipattavyaḥ (instead of tasmād yāgena nāntarīyako guṇabhāvaḥ pratipattavyaḥ)).
At this point, Pārthasārathi’s Tantraratna adds that this does not mean that the sacrifice has become because of that for the sake of the deity. The following explains why.
“Nor is it the case that the unavoidable functioning is the cause for being primary or secondary, since it is not what is enjoined (and only the injunction determines real primary status). For, [one thinks:] “Since I have been enjoined towards the result, I realise the result through the sacrifice, not otherwise” (and this shows how the injunction puts the result as the primary thing and the sacrifice as its instrument).”
The Tantraratna has an interesting variant here, namely yāgo hi phale coditaḥ. This fits the beginning of the passage, which also read yāgaḥ phale codito…. The translation, in this case, would be as follows: “The sacrifice, being enjoined with regard to the result, does not realise the result otherwise [but through the deity as target]”.
“In this way, the unavoidable functioning needs to be the secondary element with respect to the deity.”
PSM adds: “in order to realise the sacrifice’s being an instrument towards the result”. It also specifies: “the secondary status is not enjoined”.
“Hence, in all cases there are two parts (a principal one, and a secondary one). Among them, we need to understand which one is what is wished to be expressed and which one is not. Among these two possibilities, in worldly experience what is wished to be expressed is determined by the force of things. In the Veda, by contrast, by language. And through language the sacrifice is the primary element, because it realises the result, given that it is proximate [to the result], The deity, by contrast, is understood to be the secondary element. Nor is it the case that the subordination (śeṣatva) is characterised as being an auxiliary (upakāra). Rather, it is established that it is characterised by the Vedic injunction.”
PSM explains that the “Nor…” sentence is the cause of the previous one.
“[UP:] What is the purpose of this investigation?
[R:] If the sacrifice had the purpose of gladdening the deity, then the deity were the one to be worshipped and the sacrifice would be a worship. And the worship is a thing known in worldly experience. Within a worship, what would be the confidence [one could have] in the claim that Sūrya is worshipped in the same way as Agni? The very opposite might be the case (namely that Sūrya dislikes what Agni likes). (Hence, the ectype for Sūrya should not be performed as the archetype sacrifice for Agni!)”
Thus, Kumārila concludes, the fact that the material trumps the deity when it comes to determining the procedure to be followed shows that the sacrifice is not a worship aimed at the deity and that the deity’s seeming predominant role is due to grammar only. I don’t see any important difference between Kumārila’s and Śabara’s conclusions here.
I will not be able to take part in any new project hosted by publishing houses that are ready to send my work to LLMs (I have a few ongoing and will conclude them). Allow me to explain why.
I am deeply concerned by the LLMs being a big risk for the environment, our students’ mental health and deskilling as well as their being based on intellectual theft. Thus, I will not volunteer my time and energy to help publishers that will then give my work to feed LLMs.
I asked various publishing houses about their politics with regard to LLMs and received (disappointing) answers on how “LLMs are the future”, “LLMs are inevitable” etc., all leading to the same conclusion, namely that I cannot opt out from my work being used to feed them. Such being the case, I am sorry to say that I prefer to pass.
I apologise for not being able to help the various editors who asked me to contribute or peer review for their volumes, but time is limited and I prefer to volunteer my time to help publishers who have higher standards. If a publisher wants to just focus only on profit, they should start paying their contributors, editors, peer reviewers… I know that my decision will not change anything (alternative peer-reviewers or contributors will be found etc.), but perhaps if enough people were to refuse working for free for publishers that comply to LLMs’ demands, then some change could be achieved.
UPDATE:
—Journals and publishing houses that have answered that LLMs are unavoidable etc.: CUP (author can opt out, but not in the case of open-access publications), OUP (basically, LLMs are the future, like google search is the present), Springer Nature (“peer review reports and unpublished manuscripts are not used for training LLMs, while accepted articles are”), Taylor and Francis (“In terms of licensing we do permit some trusted partners to use specific content for the purposes of training AI. We feel this is important as Publishers need to engage with these companies and control the use of content – for instance making sure it is used appropriately, within licence terms, with authors being fully attributed for their work, and to be paid for this use where contracts specify royalties. If we do not do this there is a real risk that these firms will simply access our content without permission and try to establish this as a form of fair use. In fact this has already happened with one major firm doing precisely this.”).
—Journals and publishing houses that have answered that they offer authors the option to opt out of LLMs, but cannot guarantee that it will be respected: Brill
—Journal and publishing houses that have answered that they don’t feed our work to LLMs: University of Hawai’i press (Philosophy East and West)