The following are a few random notes on permissions which have not (yet) found a place in an article.
1. A colleague wondered whether the command my co-authors and I have been discussing in several articles on Mīmāṃsā and called the “better-not permission” can be meaningfully described as permission at all. In fact, the term `permission’ in Euro-American philosophy or in Deontic Logic is strongly polysemic, covering, among others, acts that are not normed as well as acts that were previously prohibited and are permitted, and even rights.
Philosophers of the Mīmāṃsā school, by contrast, adopt the standard Sanskrit terms for permission, anujñā and anumati), but focus on only one aspect among better-not, encouraged or normatively indifferent, and use different terms for the others, thus offering a way out of the polysemy of `permissions’ (for instance, adhikāra comes close to rights, as I will discuss in a separate text).
Using the term `permission’ thus highlights a single shared aspect and suggests a way out of the polysemy of `permissions’.
2. Within the Mītākṣara commentary on Yājñavalkya, Vijñāneśvara discusses better-not permissions for Brāhmaṇas in distress. For instance, the general prohibition to steal is overrun by the permission to steal if one has not eaten for three days, provided one is stealing only from a non-brāhmaṇa (thus presupposing that the prohibition to stealing from a brāhmaṇa holds unconditionally).
The Mitākṣarā commentary further explains that stealing from a non-brāhmaṇa is permitted, provided one has not eaten for three days and one only takes enough for one meal and not additional supplies
Now, if one goes on like that for a long time, one might eventually die of starvation (because one is stealing only enough for one meal and only once every three days). Verse 44 suggests the solution (the king should take care of one), but this is not a solution one can count on in every case. Hence, Mitākṣarā verse 43 does not rule out a situation in which, in order to avoid violating the prohibition at stake (that of stealing in general), though weakened by the permission to steal from a non-brāhmaṇa if one has not eaten for 3 days,) and F(stealing from a brāhmaṇa/in general)) one ends up actually dying.
This further strengthens the point that there is no obligation to avoid starvation as the result of the general prohibition to perform any violence.
3. I use the term `command’ to cover all sorts of deontic statements. Thus, a command can convey an obligation, a prohibition or a permission. This terminology is different than the one adopted in Guhe, pp. 422–423, where `permission’ covers elective obligations. This distinction is due to the fact that E. Guhe relies on the definitions found in a late Nyāya primer, the Nyāyakośa, whereas I focus on Mīmāṃsā. It is historically interesting that later Nyāya authors considered elective rituals as permissions (they aren’t Mīmāṃsā better-not permissions, but they share with Euro-American permissions the fact that there is no risk connected with their lack of performance).
4. Permissions are not easily recognised by their linguistic form, because linguistic forms can be misleading in Sanskrit, as it can be in English (for instance, within a series of instructions, one can encounter statements in the indicative that are, however, to be analysed as commands, e.g. “One takes two cups of flour”, or “One threshes grains”). Therefore, Mīmāṃsā authors identify commands through a semantic and contextual analysis.
5. The Mīmāṃsā position is neatly distinguished from the one of, e.g., Hansson (2013), who thinks that introducing permissions even in the absence of general prohibitions is useful to define rights.
In fact, Mīmāṃsā authors deal with the category of rights differently, and I am currently working on its possible functional equivalent, namely adhikāra.
6. In general, the Mīmāṃsā analysis of commands focuses on commands occurring within a closed corpus of norms, such as the Veda, since only a closed corpus of norms provides the ideal setting for applying nyāyas.
(cross-posted on the Indian Philosophy Blog)
Naive and somewhat off-topic question (though I realize that this blog is written for people already familiar with your work).
Naively, one reads of Mimamsakas as karma-kandins. I am unable to see why this should automatically make them more interested than most others in smritis and their interpretations. If there is a causation here between the two, which way does it go? Also, is it that Mimamsakas got into these questions, getting the (by now “later”) Naiyayikas thinking “Hey shouldn’t this really be our domain” and thence to add themes or subschools to Nyaya, like how allegedly (according to wikipedia) advaita vedantic criticism wrung Navya Nyaya out of Gangesha?
Hi Sandeep, questions are welcome, but I am not sure I understand completely your points.
1. They are interested in smṛtis insofar as these are deontic texts (texts about duties), whose authority descends from the Veda.
2. Later Nyāya authors who started thinking on commands mainly did it because they incorporated Mīmāṃsā ideas, via Jayanta and Gaṅgeśa.
Thank you for your response. I am not making a point, merely asking a (genuine, non-rhetorical) question. Sorry I wasn’t clear, so let me try again:
1. What made its proponents interested in those deontic considerations? For instance:
(a) Was it a _natural/inevitable consequence_ of Mimamsic moorings: say the status of smritis, despite being secondary with their “derived authority”, could come to the fore with increased focus on the vedas?
(b) Or was it _contingent_: e.g., could it be that the same scholars who pioneered or viralized Mimamsic axioms also happened to be interested in smritis, and this happenstance caused the civilization to veer smArtically?
2. Regarding Jayanta and Gangesha: could you give some references or so? e.g., I would like to know if Mimamsic developments helped Nyaya by
(a) supplying tools for the execution of the Naiyayika projects, or instead
(b) opened up new territories (“interpretative deontics” if that makes sense?) where Naiyayika tools might apply.
Thank you again for the welcome. I don’t know where else to ask this question. It kind of drives me mad that I don’t have any realistic feel of how these ideas managed to get viral, resulting in the shape of present-day Hinduism.
Hi Sandeep, apologies for the reply, I had not noticed your comment. I am not sure I understand all your points, but here come some comments.
1. Most of the Mīmāṃsā hermeneutical efforts is dedicated to the Brāhmaṇas (which belong to śruti, not smṛti). Smṛtis and their validity are discussed in a specific chapter of the Mīmāṃsāsūtra and its commentaries, but are not the main topic.
2. The Brāhmaṇas, as understood by Mīmāṃsā authors, are primarily deontic texts prescribing rituals. Mīmāṃsā authors tried their best to extract a consistent ritual system out of them, reconstructing entire rituals, discussing archetypes and ectypes, substitutions, expiations, shared application of auxiliaries etc.
3. Concerning Jayanta, my impression is that Mīmāṃsā opened up new territories that were important for him, especially with regard the interpretation of sentences (vākyaśāstra), where he felt that the Nyāya tradition prior to him did not have enough to offer. Gaṅgeśa follows Jayanta here, in my opinion.
Thank you very much. I now see how I was unclear: I was writing “deontic” while having in mind “smriti-deontic”; and was wondering if the “shruti-deontism” of the Mimamsakas somehow psychologically, though not logically, nudged them into “smriti-deontism” as well (because, else why did the other schools not obsess so much with smritis?). What I was secretly hoping for was some explication along the lines of how the epistemic outlook that made the Mimamsakas obsess over the shrutis was likely to make them obsess over the smritis too.
But I take it that your #1 has answered that question: smriti-deontism is because a specific chapter of the Mimamsa sutras do deal with it, and anything beyond that is probably speculation. Thank you very much for #3 as well: I had never an idea about how Mimamsa of all things could so radically influence Nyaya!