Monthly Archives: March 2021

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Very basic elements of a bibliography—UPDATED for premodern sources

Some students may wonder whether they should follow the Chicago Manual of Style or any other convention. My answer to such a question would be to focus on what is a bibliography meant for, i.e., enabling your readers to check your sources.

As a consequence of that, any convention will do, if only:

  1. Sources are easily identifiable (“Potter 1994” will not be enough, unless there is a bibliography at the end of the paper stating title and journal (or publishing house and place in case of a book). Doing that means that you have understood the role of sources for the epistemology of testimony, which is not just a formal thing, but a philosophically relevant aspect of your research.
  2. Sources are consistently listed. Listing once the title, then the author, then the date of publication and last the journal, and next the other way round, suggests that you are not familiar with the principle of an ordered classification. And classifying is primarily a logical exercise, not just a meaningless formality. Follow the Chicago Manual of Style or any other convention, but be consistent.

This being said, there are further points which need a separate treatment:

A. Because of 1., the bibliography at the end of one’s paper needs to be in alphabetic order according to the author’s last name. Put everything a person wrote or edited according to the year of publication. Don’t put all books first and then all edited volumes etc. But: First put all publications by, e.g. Ram Smith, and then start listing collaborations like “Smith, Ram and Devadatta Bhaṭṭa”. As for the alphabetic order of surnames, this is trivially easy when one only deals with contemporary Euro-American authors, but might be difficult outside of this narrow precinct. Where to put “Kumārila Bhaṭṭa” or “Dvarikadāsa Śāstrī Svāmī” or “Saint Augustine”? Let 1. guide you: Your source need to be easily identified. “Saint” or “Professor”, like “Bhaṭṭa” and “Svāmi” are not at all identifying elements. There are thousands of professors, saints and svāmins and dozens of Bhaṭṭas. Thus, chose instead the less common (and most identifiable) part of the name. If in doubt, check worldcat.org, where many of these problems have already been succesfully dealt with.

B. However, there is a point in which the worldcat.org might be irritating, namely when it comes to distinguish between the contribution of author, editor and translator. Thus, let me add my humble opinion: Saying “Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Dvarikadāsa Śāstrī (1978), Ślokavārttika…” conveys the erroneous thought that Kumārila and Dvarikadāsa sat together and wrote the ŚV as a joint effort. This is not the case. Same with “Martin Buber, Walter Arnold Kaufmann (1970), I and Thou…”. Buber and Kaufmann did not collaborate on that book, whose sole author is Buber. Kaufmann is its translator, like Dvarikadāsa is the editor of Kumārila’s Ślokavārttika. Be sure to convey it. E.g., by saying “Martin Buber, I and Thou, translated by W.A. Kaufmann”. Similarly, state clearly whether someone is the author or the editor of a certain article or book. For instance, suppose that Rāma Miśra contributed an article called “The role of lakṣaṇā in Kumārila Bhaṭṭa” in a book edited by Kalpanā Dvivedi and called “Mīmāṃsā Philosophy of Language”. It would be incorrect to write “Miśra, Rāma and Kalpanā Dvivedi, “The role of lakṣaṇā in Kumārila Bhaṭṭa”. Rather, write as follows (adjust according to the system you follow): Miśra, Rāma, 2001. “The role of lakṣaṇā in Kumārila Bhaṭṭa”. In Kalpanā Dvivedi (ed.), Mīmāṃsā Philosophy of Language, Amsterdam: Bloomsbury, pp. 1–23.

C. In the case of websites, before citing them ask yourself whether their authors fulfil the Nyāya criteria (is the author competent? honest? desirous to communicate?). If you don’t know (e.g., in the case of Wikipedia or any other website without a precise author), DON’T USE IT (unless it’s for an anthropological research). If it has a reliable author, cite it as if it were a scholarly publication (e.g. “Kraut, Richard, “Plato”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/plato/>.”).
What about websites that are easy summaries by reliable authors, e.g., Plantinga’s videos summarizing his philosophy? Use them as an entrance gate into his philosophy, but then go the extra mile and quote his books or articles.

Since we are discussing the final bibliography, let me add a few lines about how to refer to your sources within your essay:

(i) Don’t cheat, quote. You are not looking smarter by not saying whence you know where a certain philosopher was born. Testimony is a valid source of knowledge, whereas vague hearsay is not. Thus, state your sources.

(ii) Add quotation marks when you are quoting. It is not enough to add the name of the author at the end of a passage.

(iii) Add page numbers! You can’t expect your readers to have to read a whole article or book in order to check what you said.

 

Now, for pros: What about pre-modern sources? If there is a standard critical edition, you have to refer to it. However, I would also suggest adding ways for your reader to locate the passage even if they have a different edition at hand. For instance, if you are citing a passage from the Nyāyabhāṣya, mention the aphorism it is commenting on. Thus:

—worst option: NBh, p. 121 (of a random edition)

—intermediate option: NBh, p. 131 (of Anantalal Thakur’s edition)

—best option: NBh on 1.1.2, p. 131 of Anantalal Thakur’s edition

What if your text is not a commentary on a set of aphorisms? Surely it has another internal partition. For instance, if you are quoting the Vidhiviveka, you might clearly identify the verses (they are numbered) and identify the portion of text commenting on a given verse as “VV on v. 2.6” and the like. Since the Vidhiviveka has been critically edited and the critical edition by Stern is a monumental achievement, it makes sense to also refer to Stern’s partitions of the text (e.g., chapter 11.6.1).

Colleagues and students: What can I add to make this list more helpful?

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Preliminary thoughts on truth and justification in U.T. Vīrarāghavācārya —UPDATED

U.T. Vīrarāghavācārya’s Sūkṣmārthaṭīkā defines `validity’ (prāmāṇya) as “the fact of being about a thing (viṣaya) appearing in the cognition in the same way in which it exists” (ad 1.1.5, p. 77 1971), thus showing an awareness of the distinction between the knowledge-independent real thing and its representation in knowledge. If the two correspond, there is knowledge.

Contrary to the common use of the word viṣaya (see Freschi, Keidan), Vīrarāghavācarya appears to denote the knowledge-independent real thing as viṣaya. This thing is said to specify (viśeṣaṇa) a cognition when this is about it. In the case of a valid cognition, the viṣaya specifies the cognition which appears as specified by that viṣaya.

Now, what happens in case of invalid cognitions? Can it be that the knowledge-independent thing has no impact at all on the invalid cognition? Vīrarāghavācārya distinguishes therefore between the prakāra `mode’ of cognition, i.e., the apparent content of it, the viṣeṣaṇa `specification’ of the cognition, and the viṣaya `knowledge-independent thing’. Suppose two people see a piece of mother-of-pearl on the beach and one of the two mistakes it for silver. Both have in front of them the same viṣaya, which influences (viśiṣ-) the cognition in the same way. However, the prakāra of the cognition is different, being in one case mother-of-pearl and in the other silver. In other words, we have valid cognitions when the prakāra appearing in the cognition is about the viṣaya and invalid cognitions when the viṣaya does not appear in the cognition as its viśeṣaṇa.

Thus, an erroneous cognition is prompted by a certain viṣaya (e.g., mother-of-pearl) and has a different prakāra (e.g., silver), but it continues to be determined by its viṣaya. Why not just speaking of viṣaya and prakāra? Possibly because the viṣaya belongs to the ontological field, whereas the way it affects cognitions is via its determining them (viṣeṣyakatva).

The latter term needs to be introduced in order to avoid the naïve assumption that the cognition represents directly the external object. prakāra and viṣaya are connected via the fact that a viṣaya determines the cognition, which therefore displays the resulting prakāra.

Last, U.T. Vīrarāghavācārya also speaks of characteristic (dharma) and characteristic-bearer (dharmin). The dharma is the presentation-mode of a certain external object. In this sense, the dharma-dharmin pair on the ontological level corresponds to the prakāra-viṣaya one on the epistemic one. A correct cognition recognises as its prakāra the same dharma which actually inheres in a given dharmin.

At this point one might wonder whether the picture of the SĀṬ corresponds broadly to an externalist account. In fact, it mentions an external check (the correspondence between the viṣaya and the prakāra) for truth. However, such account of truth is only normatively relevant. For all practical purposes, truth does not need to be ascertained. U.T. Vīrarāghavācārya is an upholder of intrinsic validity and, hence, the externalist account of truth is accompanied by an account of justification which requires neither external nor internal reasons.
There is also something else which is interestingly new with respect to the Seśvaramīmāṃsā account of epistemology, namely the link between access to cognitions and justification of validity (and here I would be glad to read your thoughts!). In fact, first U.T. Vīrarāghavācārya says that validity is intrinsic because a knower grasps at the same time what appears as the content of a cognition and the cognition’s determining factor. Then, his Naiyāyika opponent retorts that validity is extrinsic, because what appears as the content of a given cognition is not the same thing as what appears once one thinks about the cognitive event.

Then, U.T. Vīrarāghavācārya replies that this is not a real problem, since it is enough for justification that what appears at the metalevel is connected to what appears in the cognition, thus pointing to svataḥprāmāṇya vs parataḥprāmāṇya as being about cognition-objects and their representations at a meta-cognitive level. If the two happen to diverge, then, it appears, an additional step of external justification is needed.

In other words, the picture gets more complex once one adds to the above quasi-externalist account of truth the awareness of validity (see next posts) and U.T. Vīrarāghavācārya seems more open to the Nyāya point of view than Veṅkaṭanātha.

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On helping and being a teacher as an egoistic pleasure

I don’t like writing about myself, but the following lines might be useful. At once it dawned on me that many misunderstandings around me are caused by a simple fact: I enjoy helping other people.

It’s not just that I think it is my duty to help them, I also enjoy seeing them happier and I relish their progresses. The moment in which a student, whom I accompanied in their first steps in Sanskrit (or) philosophy first corrects me (usually tentatively and almost embarassed) is my moment of glory.

If I were to read with a group of people, I would enjoy helping the one who is doing their best, but still struggling. I know that others would just prefer to go on and don’t like having people keeping the pace slow. They are right in many senses (there would be otherwise no advancement of knowledge!). Still, I like helping the slow-paced ones. In many cases, I also discover that I can understand things better while explaining them. In others, I realise that the passage was not as straightforward as I thought and that the person being seemingly “slow” was just being more accurate and insightful. Thus, I have also selfish reasons for helping.

If I were to lead a reading group, I would like people to join knowing that they might start at “K” level and leave at “12” level and that they will be helped by me and the others first and will have to help the new ones later.

This being said, I am aware of the fact that not everyone is like that. Probably, because some are not like that, they cannot understand me (like I might have troubles understanding them) and ascribe me obscure motives. This is not the case. I am not accusing/blaming/reproaching anyone. I am just trying to be useful.