May 2020 on this blog has mostly been dedicated to Śālikanātha. A short summary of the most important points we have seen in the last weeks:

—Śālikanātha (around the 9th c.), a thinker of the Prābhākara subschool of Mīmāṃsā, has been incredibly influential for almost all Sanskrit philosophy

—a typical methodology of Sanskrit philosophers for finding the truth is examining definitions and refining them by eliminating what is wrong or superfluous and trying to find the perfect definition (see here for Śālikanātha’s refutation of the Buddhist definitions)

—concerning the issue of knowledge, Śālikanātha’s perfect definition of it sounds pretty minimalist: knowledge is experience. This is enough, he thinks, because it excludes memory (which is not experience) and because there is no need to exclude doubt or error. In fact, doubt is not a single cognition but a sum of two correct cognitions. Erroneous cognitions, in turn, do not exist as such, but are only incomplete cognitions. For instance, we might believe that something shiny we see on the beach is silver, whereas it is in fact mother-of-pearl. This is not a real mistake, since the “this” part of the cognition “This is silver” is correct. The “silver” part is just a memory, since it corresponds to the silver we have seen elsewhere and we have been reminded of because of the equally shiny mother-of-pearl. Thus, experience are always correct and “knowledge is experience” is a sufficient definition of knowledge.

What we are going to see today:
Śālikanātha’s definition of sense-perception

Why should we care?
1. Because Śālikanātha is a great thinker, who influenced almost all later Sanskrit philosophers.
2. Because Śālikanātha is an elegant writer, a pleasure to read.
3. Because Śālikanātha has interesting arguments to offer on the topic at stake.

On 3: One might think that the definition of “sense-perception” is easy and that there is no need to discuss it at length. We would probably all agree that it depends on sense-faculties and much of the disagreement has already been dealt with under the heading of the definition of knowledge (such as the issue of infallibilism).
However, this is not the case. First of all, Śālikanātha needs to discuss the (wrong, in his opinion) definitions coming from Dharmakīrti’s school, Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā itself. Much of these definitions is wrong because of reasons already discussed in connection with the definition of pramāṇa.

Accordingly, his definition of sense-perception will be minimalist: A direct experience (sākṣātpratīti) generated from the connection of the sense-faculties with the knowable items, i.e., substances, universals and qualities, with or without concepts:

sākṣātpratītiḥ pratyakṣaṃ meyamātṛpramāsu sā |

meyeṣv indriyayogotthā dravyajātiguṇeṣu sā ||

savikalpāvikalpā ca pratyakṣā buddhir iṣyate |

(Amṛtakālā v. 4–5ab)

Since the definition needs to contain nothing redundant, let us analyse each element of it:

• sākṣātpratītiḥ (“it is a direct cognition”): to exclude inference etc. (agreed upon by all schools)
• meyamātṛpramāsu sā (“it is about object, knower and knowledge”): sense-perception can grasp, besides substances, also qualities and even universals (agreed upon by Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā, against Dharmakīrti’s school). Śālikanātha specifies on p. 142 of the pramāṇapārāyaṇa that if one were not to accept that, there would not be anything left to cognise via sense-perception, since one never grasps substances on their own.
• meyeṣu indriyayogotthā (“it is generated by a contact of the sense-faculties with the objects”): against the idea of intellectual intuition (agreed upon by Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā, against Dharmakīrti’s school and Nyāya)
• dravyajātiguṇeṣu sā (“it is about substances, universals or qualities”): sense-perception can grasp, besides substances, also qualities and even universals (agreed upon by Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā, against Dharmakīrti’s school). Śālikanātha specifies on p. 142 of the pramāṇapārāyaṇa that if one were not to accept that, there would not be anything left to cognise via sense-perception, since one never grasps substances on their own.
• savikalpāvikalpā (“it is conceptual or non-conceptual”): it can be conceptual and non-conceptual (agreed upon by Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā, against Dharmakīrti’s school)

Next, Śālikanātha has to define what counts as perception. Possible candidates are (according to Dharmakīrti’s school):
1. sense-perception
2. mental perception (mānasapratyakṣa)
3. self-awareness (svasaṃvedana)
4. intellectual intuition (yogipratyakṣa)

1. is clearly accepted.

2. is, surprisingly and against Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā, accepted (see the discussion about meyamātṛpramāsu sā above). All cognitions are therefore immediately accessible to self-awareness.

3. is refuted. This might be slightly complicated, since manas is not defined as in Nyāya and Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā, namely as the inner sense faculty, which can grasp pleasure and pain. Śālikanātha succintly defines mānasapratyakṣa as “produced by the cognition through the sense-faculties together with the instant immediately following the one the instant (kṣaṇa) which has been previously cognised (by the sense faculties)”. The commentator, Jayapuri Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa, explains that it is therefore produced by the object and the cognition together. The terminology and the topic itself make Śālikanātha steer here in the direction of discussing Dharmakīrti’s school. He then later (p 142 of the pramāṇapārāyaṇa) refutes it, explaining that it is nothing different than continuous perceptions (dhārāvāhikajñāna), like the ones we have while staring for a long time the same object. By contrast, the so-called mental perception that continues also once the contact with the sense faculties has ceased, is just no longer a case of knowledge, Śālikanātha explains.
4 is refuted. Why? Because what we think to be grasping directly but without the senses (e.g., the four noble truths during deep meditation) is nothing but our memory presenting us with some content we were already acquainted with. There is nothing new that derives from meditation itself. Claiming the opposite is something you can do for religious reasons, not on epistemological bases.

What I would like you to remember of this series?
—Go check Śālikanātha’s extensive Prakaraṇapañcikā if you want to make a stroll in philosophical landscapes, almost all topics are covered, and always with interesting ideas.
—”Knowledge is experience”: there is no error.
—Intellectual intuition is nothing but memory.