खपुष्पं भवत्सिद्धान्त इत्यादिप्रयोगेषु तु भाट्टानां पुष्पे खसम्बन्धित्वारोपेण आरोपितखपुष्पपदार्थनिष्ठासत्त्वादीनां सिद्धान्ते सत्त्वेन प्रयोगः । इदं न खपुष्पम् इत्यत्र तु पुरोवर्त्तिनो ज्ञानाविषयत्वभाव एवार्थः स्यात् । इति तन्मते आरोपविषयता शब्दजन्यविकल्पवृत्तिविषयता चालीकस्याङ्गीक्रियेते , तथैव तस्य अभावात्मकधर्म्माश्रयत्वमपि । अत एव तद्रीत्या अलीकलक्षणं किं स्यात् इति चिन्तनीयम् , न हि तन्नये मनोवृत्तिविषयत्वसामान्याभावोलीके इति । कालासम्बन्धस्तु तल्लक्षणं वक्तुं शक्यते ।
वेदान्तिनां नये तुच्छस्याध्यारोपाविषयत्वात् कथञ्चिच्छब्दमहिम्ना शशशृङ्गपदेन विकल्पात्मकमनोवृत्तौ जातायामलीकत्वस्य विषयत्वमङ्गीक्रियते । तथापि विकल्पस्य ज्ञानत्वानङ्गीकारात् ज्ञानाविषयत्वमलीकस्य सम्भवति । अथापि विकल्पस्य ज्ञानाद्विविच्य प्रदर्शनाय तैः सत्त्वेन प्रतीत्यनर्हम् अलीकम् इत्युच्यते । उक्तानर्हताया अवच्छेदकञ्च किञ्चिद्वक्तव्यम् इति अत एव तन्नये तदेवावच्छेदकं तल्लक्षणं – सर्व्वदेशकालवृत्त्यत्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वे सत्युत्पत्त्यादिशून्यत्वम् – इति सम्भवति ।
अथवा – उक्तप्रतियोगित्वे सति कालासम्बन्धित्वमेवालीकत्वं तदस्तु ।
तार्किकनये तु अलीकस्य ज्ञानसामान्याविषयत्वम् इति तन्नये न विकल्पवृत्तिरङ्गीक्रियते इति प्राप्तम् । अत एव ज्ञानाविषयत्वमेवालीकलक्षणम् । कालासम्बन्धित्वं वा ।
एतेषु सर्व्वेषु पक्षेषु इदं चिन्त्यं यत् –
तत्तन्मते तुच्छस्य यल्लक्षणं ज्ञानाविषयत्वदि तत् किं तुच्छे वर्त्तते न वा । वर्त्तते चेत् तस्यापि स्वरूपं प्राप्तं , नास्ति चेत् कथं तस्य तुच्छत्वम् ।
– इति ;
तुच्छस्यापदार्थत्वेनैव भेदप्रतियोगित्वादिभावधर्म्मानाश्रयत्वे सति पदार्थेषु तद्व्यावृत्तिः कथं सिद्ध्येत । तदसिद्धौ पदार्थानां तुच्छाभेदेनालीकत्वमापतेत् , तत्सिद्धौ च तुच्छे प्रतियोगित्वादिकमङ्गीकर्त्तव्यमापतेत् ।
– इति च ।
(My friend, Sudipta Munsi brought this post from the Bharatiya Vidvat Parisat to my notice and obtained permission from the author to cross-post it on this blog. Except for his name, the learned author, Srimallalitalalita, prefers to remain anonymous.)
In Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika it is unfair to argue that svarupavattva of seven padārthas is jnanavisyattva, since tuccha is jnana-avisaya. Actually it is Prabhakaras who argue that satta jati is nothing but vastusvarupa or vastusvabhava which is pramanagamya and that is why tuccha is avastu. But Nyāya must maintain that vastusvarupa is not conditioned in being jnanagamya. Padarthas which are already svarupasat can only be jnana-visaya. Moreover, since vastusvarupa are many and individually different Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika distinguishes between satta jati and svarupasatta and takes satta jati as a principle for anugata jnana and ekasabdapravritti.
Dear Tamoghna,
thank you for joining the discussion.
Let me see whether I understood your point and please correct me if I am wrong. You claim that:
Prābhākaras: sattā is vastusvarūpa = pramāṇagamya / tuccha is jñāna-aviṣaya and avastu
NV: sattā is vastusvarūpa not necessarily pramāṇagamya / tuccha cannot be defined as jñāna-aviṣaya
Correct?
It is a PrAbhAkara argument that svarUpavattva of seven padArthas is jnAnaviShyattva, since tuccha is jnanAviShaya. Yes PrAbhAkara argue that sattA jAti is nothing but vastusvarUpa and tuccha is svarUpashunya, that is why tuccha is sattAshunya. This vastusvarUpa or sattA is pramANagamya. So there is a connection between tuccha being avastu and PrAbhAkara argument about sattA jAti. But NV do not straightaway equate sattA with vastusvarUpa. There is a fine distinction between sattA and svarUpasattA. VastusvarUpa-s are many and individually different, so sattA jAti can not be vastusvarUpa. It can only produce anugata jnAna and never be the cause of differentiation.
व्याकरणदर्शने श्रीनागेशभट्टदिशा बाह्यार्थविसंवादित्वे सति बौद्धार्थविषयत्वम् अलीकत्वम् इति अलीकस्वरूपं वाराणसेयाssचार्यमनुदेवभट्टाचार्येभ्यः प्राप्तम्।
Another interesting thing that Mm. Manudeva Bhattacharya brought to my notice with regard to a specific example of alika (viz. “Bandhyaputra” or ‘the son of a barren woman’) is the following –
If a son is adopted by a barren woman, then according to Dharmasastra rules she becomes a mother, but according to the medical sciences such a son is fit to be called a “bandhyaputra” or the ‘son of a barren woman’. Then the question arises as to whether such an alika thing as a bandhyaputra does not exist at all or a separate grade of existence (may be a linguistic or ideational one?) is to be hypothecated with regard to them.
In Nyāya, alīka or tuccha is a non-entity as it can not be the content of any pramān̟a. Śaśaśṛnga, i.e, horn delimited by hareness, is not the content of any valid means of cognition. There is a definite cognition of the absence of horn in a Hare and this nisćaya acts as the deterrent to generate any cogntion from the expression ‘a horn delimited by Hareness’. Those ignorant persons who do not have the definite cognition of the absence of horn in a Hare may only have an erroneous cognition of the horn in a hare, since apramā is a cognition of a relation which is actually not there. That is why, when we have the cognition ‘There is no horn delimited by hareness’ it means that there is no actual relation between a hare and a horn (śaśe śṛngābhāva). Just because ‘horn delimited by hareness’ is alīka and we do not have any valid cognition of it, there can not be any cognition of ‘the absence of horn delimited by hareness’ as well. Only those who accept vyādhikaran̟dharmāvacchinna abhāva can uphold the thesis of the absence of alīka. But, Nyāya in general does not accept this type of absence. Udayana in his Nyāyakusumānjali famously says that if we have an erroneous cognition of Śaśaśṛnga, it is due to the presence of defects in the causal set of perception and if there is non-apprehension of Śaśaśṛnga we must admit that there is no defective causal set of perception.