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Recommendation letters while applying to grad school

If you are from (or studied in) North America, you will not need the following, but some students from Europe, India (and perhaps other parts of the world) will find it useful (please feel free to add your views in the comments).

North American universities require recommendation letters from candidates. Why? And, given that all letters will be unanimously positive, what is their purpose?

First of all, the basis, as explained in this post (https://elisafreschi.com/2024/03/02/recommendation-letters-dos-and-dents/), North American universities (at least as far as I know), expect letters coming from people who know you well, not from “superstars” whom you met once at a conference. The latter are useless and I will not discuss them here. The former, by contrast, are useful, (but only) insofar as they can give the committee additional information that could not be derived from the transcripts, writing sample etc. This means that a letter should address aspects of your personality that cannot be present in the transcript. For instance, a letter can explain why you took longer than expected in your BA (e.g., because you were seriously ill), or why you had a bad first term and how you completely changed now. On top of that, a letter can explain your personality traits and how they mean that you are a great student (you are collegial, a team-player etc.), and will make a great colleague. Ask your letter-writer to be very specific (tell about that time when you were brilliant in class, about that time when your paper ended up sparking a unique discussion etc.).
In sum, the letter should complement your application, not just repeat what is written elsewhere (although it can repeat some of the key elements of your letter and transcripts), it should *not* be a generic statement of praise.

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Workshop on “Vedānta and theology”

The following is the program for the “Vedānta and theology” workshop, UofT, December 5 and 6 2024. Careful readers will notice that we will move from Advaita Vedānta to Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta and from a literary approach to sacred texts to a theological-philosophical one.

Place: room 318, JHB

December 5:

breakfast: 8.30–9

Morning session: Advaita Vedānta, theology and literature (chaired by Ajay Rao)

—Anusha Rao (PhD student, Religion) “Literary Chameleonism and Advaita in Early Modern South India” (9–10)
—Shashank Rao (PhD student, Religion) “The Heart Lotus in the Ragale of Akka Mahadevi: A Literary Vedanta” (10.05–11.05)
—Sarang Patel (PhD student, Religion) “The Role of Metaphor in Material Vitality and Śaṃkara’s Advaita Vedānta” (11.10–12.10)

lunch break: 12.10–1pm

Afternoon session: Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta theology (chaired by Srilata Raman)

—Francis X. Clooney “Between Indology and Theology: Śrīvaiṣṇava Studies in Our Times” (1–2pm)
—Nick Halme (PhD student, Philosophy, Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta) (2.05–3.05)
—Zihao Wu (PhD student, Philosophy, Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta) (3.10–4.10)

December 6

breakfast: 8.30–9

Morning session: Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta theology (chaired by Elisa Freschi)

—Nirali Patel (PhD student, Philosophy, Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta) (9–10)
—Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad (via zoom), “On the methodological challenges of cross-cultural theology” (10:05–11:05 am)
—Vivek Shah (PhD student, Religion, “Rāmānuja and others on the uninhibited apprehension of space” (11.10–12.10)

The 60′ slots are conceived to be up to 30′ speaking time (if one wants to speak for only 20′, no worries, but the 30′ should give one enough time to unpack ideas, read texts together and suggest areas where one wants to receive feedback) and then discussion. The discussion is meant to be supportive and aimed at helping the speaker in the next steps of developing their arguments. In the unlikely event that we run out of things to say, we’ll just add a short coffee break.

ivory statue of the good shepherd from Goa (India), 17th c., displayed at the KHM Vienna.
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The Philosophical Rasika Report: Listings of Ph.D. Programs in Indian Philosophy (2024 Edition; Part II: Europe)

This post is the European continuation of Andrew Nicholson’s one (see here).

Sanskrit philosophy is taught in at least two different places in Europe: (South) Asian (or Oriental or Indological) Studies and —less often— Philosophy departments. The dominant trend of US universities, where Sanskrit philosophy is taught predominantly in Religious Studies departments is only evident in the UK. Departments of Asian Studies, of Oriental Studies or of Indology, often have a philological focus (so that knowing Sanskrit or other relevant languages is strongly recommended, although not always compulsory), whereas studying Sanskrit Philosophy in a Philosophy department may imply having to avoid Sanskrit.

Further elements for non-European students and scholars:
1) university fees are by and large very low in Europe (between nothing and 1,500 E per year for full-time students) and in many countries funding is available, so that one gets paid for being a PhD student —very often being a PhD student is much easier than being a post-Doc!
2) the main point of a PhD course in Europe is the final output, i.e., your dissertation. You might have to attend classes (or not), but the main focus should remain the fact of becoming an independent researcher, and this is proved by your ability to write a book on your own.
3) in countries such as Germany, Austria, Poland, France…, you can only choose as your supervisor someone who has a Habilitation. Think about who has it before applying to an institution in the hope to be working with Prof. X or Dr. Y.
4) do not choose a certain department on the basis of your expectations to have a career in Sanskrit Philosophy. Write a PhD in Sanskrit Philosophy (only) because you are interested in it. There are little or no SLACs in Europe and in this sense you cannot really plan a career as a university teacher of Sanskrit Philosophy in Europe (you might have a few more chances as a researcher within larger projects, but this involves being willing and able to do research with others, or alone and to apply for fundings).

Now, a disclaimer: the European landscape of research related to Sanskrit philosophy is variegated. I have surely forgotten many institutions (for instance, as far as I know, there is no one working on Sanskrit philosophy in Spain, Portugal, Greece, Malta…is this really the case?) and have not been exhaustive in the case of others. I rely on readers for emendations and supplements.

The elements which will be listed, beside the universities, are: AOS, whether funding is possible and whether it is possible to write one’s PhD thesis in English. In all cases, no information does not mean that it is impossible, it only means that I have no information about it.

I have omitted Russia from the list because I would not advise international students to move to Russia at this moment. For different reasons, I have omitted Ukraine.

AUSTRIA
University of Vienna (Institute of South Asian, Tibetology and Buddhist Studies): The Institute has a matchless paramparā of scholars in the history of Sanskrit philosophy. However, at the moment (I will update this post if a successor of Karin Preisendanz will be designated and if they work on Philosophy, but at the moment this looks very unlikely) there is NO supervisor for Sanskrit Philosophy at the University. You may want to contact the 1–2 people at the IKGA (Institute for the Cultural and Intellectual History of Asia, Austrian Academy of Sciences) who have a habilitation (see point (3) above) and might want to supervise you (especially in Buddhist epistemology), but the classes you will have to attend at the university will not be taught by them. Only the university can bestow doctoral degrees.

University of Vienna (Institute of Philosophy) They have recently advertised a position in “Eastern philosophy”. It remains to be seen whether they will hire someone who is competent and willing to supervise theses in Sanskrit philosophy.

Limited funding possibilities: through the FWF, the Academy of Sciences or the University itself (in all cases you need the approval of a supervisor and they might need to apply for a project within which you will be able to finance your position)

BELGIUM (possibility to write a PhD thesis in English)
Ghent (dept. of languages and cultures of South and East Asia) (Jainism, Buddhism, Indian Philosophy); funding possibilities: FWO (regional) and BOF (university) (Eva De Clerq, Lucas den Boer, Agnieszka Rostalska)

Louvain, Université catholique de Louvain (Catholic University of Louvain in Louvain-la-Neuve):
—(Faculty of Letters, Oriental Institute, with Christophe Vielle)
—(Faculty of Theology, Religious sciences). Please notice that the successor of Prof. Cornu, who will probably be a specialist of Buddhism, will only be designated in 2027. Meanwhile, theses are possible with Prof. Vielle and other profs.
Funding possibilities: FRS-FNRS (regional) and FSR (university)

CROATIA
Zagreb (Humanities) (Upaniṣads, Vedānta) (Ivan Andrijanić)

CZECH REPUBLIC
Charles University of Prague (Institute of Asian Studies); (Institute of Philosophy & Religious Studies) (but note that in 2024–2025 Prof. Lubomir Ondracka will not be available and hence no one will supervise theses for students starting at that point)

FRANCE (possibility to write a PhD in English)
Paris, EPHE (4th section and especially 5th section, “Sciences Religieuses”) (Brahmanical systems, Buddhist philosophy (including Tibetan), Śaiva philosophy, philosophy of language (Sanskrit and, in case, Tibetan), Vyākaraṇa; funding available through a competitive scholarship contest (Vincent Eltschinger, Jan Houben)

Sorbonne Nouvelle (Department of Indian Studies) (Buddhist and Brahmanical philosophy, special focus on Śaiva philosophy); funding available through a competitive scholarship contest (Isabelle Ratié, Daniele Cuneo [now on leave])

NB: some directors of studies affiliated to the EFEO (Ecole française d’Extrême-Orient, mostly based in Paris and Pondicherry) (like Hugo David) or to the CNRS (Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris) may also accept PhD students, although those institutions do not directly deliver diplomas.

GERMANY (possibility to write a PhD in English, very low fees, special emphasis on Sanskrit texts, so that critical editions (also) of philosophical texts are possible also at other locations) (in all cases below, the universities have an “institute of Indology” or something similar)
Hamburg (Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Tantrism, Kaśmīrī Śaiva Philosophy, Mahāyāna, Tibetan Buddhism) (Harunaga Isaacson)

Heidelberg (Ritual studies, Śrīvaiṣṇavism) (Ute Hüsken)

Leipzig (Buddhist Philosophy (Jowita Kramer); Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Nyāya, Āyurveda, Upaniṣads, Epics (Philipp Maas, who however does not have a permanent position, hence check again if he is still affiliated before applying if you are checking this list after 2024))

Marburg (Śaiva and Kashmirī philosophy, Mokṣopāya, Buddhist Philosophy) (Jürgen Hanneder, Dimitrov Dragomir, Roland Steiner)

Munich (Buddhism, Indo-Tibetan Buddhist philosophy) (Vincent Tournier)

HUNGARY
Budapest, Eötvös Loránd University (dept. of Indo-European Studies): Program in “Buddhist Philology”, led by Péter-Dániel Szántó (all classes in English and theses expected in English); school of philosophy with Ferenc Ruzsa (who has been working on Sāṅkhya, but also on Vasubandhu and much more). Funding possibilities: Stipendium Hungaricum.

ITALY (possibility to write a PhD thesis in English)
Cagliari University (faculty of Humanities) (Sanskrit philosophy, Vyākaraṇa, Dharmaśāstra, Mīmāṃsā, contemporary Sanskrit) (Tiziana Pontillo, Maria Piera Candotti, Lidia Sudyka and Elisa Freschi (affiliated), full funding for 3 years possible (applications usually open in the summer)

Naples University (Oriental Studies) (Sanskrit philosophy, especially Śaivism, Buddhism and Tantrism in general, Sanskrit philology) (Francesco Sferra, Serena Saccone), full funding for 3 years possible (applications usually open in the summer)

Rome, Sapienza University (Oriental Studies) (Mokṣopāya) (Bruno Lo Turco), full funding for 3 years possible (2–3 funded position per year, some of them are reserved for international students) (applications usually open in the summer)

Turin University (Asian and African Studies) (Indian religions and philosophy, especially Advaita Vedānta and Buddhism), (Gianni Pellegrini, A. Pellissero) full funding for 3 years possible (1 new funded position every second year) (one can write a PhD thesis in any language of the EU) (applications usually open in the summer)

Venice University (Asian Studies) (Indian religions and philosophy, especially Vedānta, Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Dharmaśāstra, Sociology of Indian religions), (Federico Squarcini, Antonio Rigopoulos) full funding for 3 years possible (1 new funded position every year, but there are often not enough candidates). This PhD program is connected with the Heidelberg university. It might be worth noting that they also have an MA in Yoga studies. (applications usually open in the summer)

NETHERLANDS (possibility to write a PhD thesis in English, all classes are in English)
Amsterdam (Vrije Univerisiteit, Philosophy) (Comparative philosophy, contemporary Indian philosophy, Indian philosophy in vernacular languages) (Monika Kirloskar-Steinbach)
Amsterdam (Vrije Univerisiteit, Religion and Theology) (Avni Chag)

Leiden (Institute for Area Studies) (Buddhist Philosophy), no fees and full funding for 4 or 5 years possible (Jonathan Silk)

Leiden (Philosophy Department), Chinese, Indian and comparative philosophy. Possibility of funding through the NWO (deadline around February, further information here: https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/en/education/study-programmes/master/philosophy-120ec/philosophy-in-world-traditions) (Douglas L. Berger, Stephen Harris)

POLAND
Krakow (Jagiellonian University, faculty of Management and Social Communication (Indian Philosophy, especially Buddhism, Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Advaita Vedānta, Comparative Philosophy, contemporary Indian philosophy) (Marzenna Jakubczak)

Krakow (Jagiellonian University, dept. of Oriental Studies) (Indian Philosophy, especially early Advaita Vedānta and Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta, Vaiṣṇavism) (Lidia Sudyka, Halina Marlewicz, Cezary Galewicz)

Poznan (Languages and Literature) (Indian Philosophy, especially ethics) (Sven Sellmer)

Warsaw (dept. of South Asian Studies) (Indian Philosophy, especially Jainism, Mīmāṃsā) (Monika Nowakowska)

SWEDEN
Currently no option possible, but keep in touch with Anna-Pya Sjödin, who is teaching at Umeå and might be willing to accept students of Sanskrit philosophy again there.

SWITZERLAND (possibility to write a PhD thesis in English)
Zürich (Hinduism, contemporary Hinduism, Ethics) (Angelika Malinar, who however will be retiring in 2025, so check who is going to replace her!) (possibility to apply for a six-month grant to write your PhD proposal before starting your PhD)

UK (higher fees, up to 9,000 pounds per year for British students and much more (perhaps 25k pounds) for foreign students —which now means also EU citizens) (some possibilities of fundings through the University, the Colleges and private institutions). In most cases, no Sanskrit is required nor taught (exceptions: Cambridge, Oxford, Lancaster)
Cambridge (Asian and Middle Eastern Studies) (Sanskrit Philology, Vyākaraṇa, Śaivādvaita) (Vincenzo Vergiani, Jonathan Duquette)

Cambridge (Divinity) (Vedānta, contemporary Indian Philosophy) (Ankur Barua)

Cardiff (Religious and Theological Studies) (Buddhist studies and philosophy) (James Hegarthy)

Durham (Philosophy) (Environmental Ethics in Buddhism, Graeco-Roman and Indian Philosophy) (Simon James, Nathan Gilbert)

Edinburgh (Paul Schweizer)

Lancaster (Religious Studies; Philosophy) (Indian Philosophy, especially Vedānta, Early Buddhist Philosophy, Upaniṣads) (Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad, Brian Black)

Leeds (Theology and Religious Studies) (Sāṅkhya, Pātañjala Yoga) (Mikel Burley)

Liverpool (Philosophy) (Vedānta, contemporary Indian philosophy) (C.J. Bartley)

London, King’s College (Philosophy) (logic, epistemology, metaphysics and philosophy of language in India, Greek and modern Western philosophy) NO SANSKRIT (Will Rasmussen)
London, King’s College (Theology) (Yoga) (Karen O’Brien-Kop)

Manchester University (Arts, Languages, and Cultures) (Indian philosophy, especially Vedānta) (Gary Donnelly)

Oxford (Oriental Studies) (Indian philosophy, especially Vyākaraṇa and Mīmāṃsā, Sanskrit philology, Yoga, Buddhist Philosophy) (Diwakar Acharya, Bogdan Diaconescu, Jim Mallinson, Ulrike Rösler)

Oxford (Theology and Religion) (Hindu philosophy, metaphysics) (Jessica Frazier, Jan Westerhoff)

Oxford (Philosophy) (Buddhist philosophy) (Monima Chadha)

Oxford (one might also want to get in touch with the Oxford Center of Buddhist Studies and the Oxford Center of Hindu studies for external tuition)

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: I am really obliged to the following people for their help: Robert Leach, Philipp Maas, Monika Nowakoskwa, Nirali Patel.

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Debates on adhikāra (again)

Within the Śābarabhāṣya commentary on the Mīmāṃsāsūtra (the foundational text of the Mīmāṃsā school), chapter 1 of book 6 is dedicated to adhikāra. The chapter deals with several cases in a manner which might surprise some readers, because the text does not distinguish a priori between “good” and “bad” cases and rather applies Mīmāṃsā-based reasoning throughout. For instance, an opponent suggests understanding adhikāra as only or primarily grounded on desire and is therefore willing to accept as a consequence that women, śūdras (members of the lower class) and animals have the same adhikāra as male Brahmans to perform Vedic sacrifices. Even more surprising, perhaps, is that the reply by the upholder of the final opinion is not that animals are impure, women are inferior and śūdras are inherently flawed. Rather, they discuss about the other requirements of adhikāra and show why they exclude some of the above categories from the performance of Vedic sacrifices.

To begin with, animals lack the adhikāra to perform sacrifices not because they lack desire (they do have plans), but because 1. they lack the ability to perform them, insofar as they don’t have hands. Moreover, 2. they lack desires regarding the next life, because these desires depend on our being cultivated into desiring something beyond the present life. Thus, wolves etc. can decide to fast, but only because they want health, and not for purposes relative to a next life, because they don’t know about it.

There is then an interesting discussion about poor people and people having some physical disability. It’s easy to see that the latter lack ability and are therefore excluded from having the adhikāra to perform Vedic sacrifices. However, how can one distinguish the case of disabled people who cannot, for instance, look at the clarified butter (because they are blind) and poor people who cannot look at the clarified butter because they lack the substances to buy it? Śabara speaks therefore of a distinction between śakti and sāmarthya. Both terms can be translated as “ability”, but Śabara seems to make them into technical terms in order to distinguish the two cases. Accordingly, poor people temporarily lack the sāmarthya to perform a sacrifice, but this temporary lack of sāmarthya is remediable, because they could acquire the relevant substances later on in their life, whereas they never lost the śakti to perform sacrifice. I will conventionally call the temporary thing being lost (or sāmarthya) ‘capacity’, whereas the thing that poor people don’t loose (i.e., their śakti) ‘ability’. Śabara distinguishes them insofar as the former is bahirbhūta ‘external’, whereas the latter is ātmavṛtti ‘belonging to one’s soul, intrinsic’.

Unfortunately, Kumārila does not keep this opposition and just generically speaks of sāmarthya.

It is also interesting that the debate about disabled people continued through the centuries. Kumārila (a commentator of Śabara and possibly the main author of the Mīmāṃsā school) explains that disabled people lack the sāmarthya (and hence the adhikāra) to perform Vedic sacrifices, but that this does not mean that they cannot reach the same goal, namely happiness in a future life (a.k.a. ‘heaven’). He clarifies that they have a different path open to them, namely that of remaining a chaste student of the Veda and reciting it. This is considered by him to be an easier option and Kumārila needs therefore to explain that it is only open to the ones who lack the ability to perform the more difficult alternative, whereas those who are able to work, get married and perform Vedic sacrifices should certainly do so. Incidentally, the same device will be used by an even later author, Veṅkaṭanātha, to justify the adoption of an easier soteriological path, namely prapatti, instead of bhakti. This path is only open, he points out, to those who are unable to follow the path of bhakti, hence there is no contradiction between the command about a difficult path and an easier one.

Later Mīmāṃsā texts, possibly after Khaṇḍadeva, go back to the duties of disabled people and offer a slightly different solution. They say that disabled people cannot perform elective rituals, because they lack the relevant ability, but they still retain the adhikāra (insofar as they have learnt the Vedas by heart etc.) to perform fixed rituals. In fact, these rituals can be performed ‘as much as one can’, hence a blind person will just skip the command to look at clarified butter etc.

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Meghanadāri on adhikāra’s prerequisites and further differences from “rights”

Adhikāra presupposes 1. śakti (or sāmarthya), as discussed in previous posts. What else does it presuppose? Adhikāra for sacrifices presupposes a condition (nimitta) and/or the 2. desire for a goal. Both are necessary conditions, as it becomes obvious when animals are said to potentially have the adhikāra to sacrifice, since they are desirous (arthin), but to be excluded from it because of their lacking the relevant ability. The same discussion is found in the commentaries on UMS 1.3.34–38 in relation to śūdras’ adhikāra (e.g., Meghanadāri thereon: arthitvasāmarthyādisadbhāvāt [śūdreṣu] adhikāro ‘stu).

What else? Notice the ādi in Meghanadāri, which is repeated also elsewhere in his commentary (e.g.: atra saṃśayaḥ— kiṃ śūdrasya brahmavidyāsv adhikāro ‘sty uta neti. tadarthaṃ kiṃ tasyārthitvādīni santy uta neti). Meghanadāri lists also the 3. adhikāra for prerequisites, such as the fact of having set the fires (that is, having performed the initial ceremony that starts one’s life as a performer of sacrifices). Śūdras lack the adhikāra for sacrifices, he says, because they lack the adhikāra for the actions sacrificing presuppose (brahmavidyā and agni-setting) (vaidikakarmasu śūdrasya vidyāgnirahitatvenānadhikāraḥ samarthitaḥ).

Thus, adhikāra requires: 1. ability, 2. desire, 3. adhikāra for prerequisites.

Another interesting point is that adhikāra applies to a certain way to achieve a goal, not to the goal itself. You are disabled and cannot perform sacrifices to go to heaven? You can go to heaven through recitation of the Veda. You are a śūdra and cannot read the Upaniṣads? You can still learn about the paramātman (!) through itihāsas and purāṇas. An opponent says that veneration (upāsanā) still needs its auxiliaries (aṅga) and that these are sacrifices, to which the śūdras lack the adhikāra. Hence, due to the rule discussed above, they also cannot have the adhikāra for upāsanā. Meghanadāri replies that this is not the case, because, like in the case of fixed sacrifices, one does not need to perform all auxiliaries.

(Many thanks to Manasicha Akepiyapornchai for sharing the images of Meghanadāri’s commentary)

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Adhikāra and rights

As already observed, there is no straightforward equivalent to “rights” in Mīmāṃsā deontic (and this is normal and good, since the deontic townscape is not a given fact, but a human construct and is therefore differently articulated), but there are certainly functional equivalents covering parts of the semantic field of “rights”.

One of them is adhikāra. Possible differences:

  1. adhikāra is generally a vox media (you have the adhikāra to do X, which does not necessarily mean that X is a good thing), unlike “right” (where generally having the right to do X is a good thing).
  2. adhikāra might imply duty, whereas rights don’t (you may have the right to remain silent, and this does not imply that you ought to remain silent). For instance, for Prabhākara if you have the adhikāra to perform a given sacrifice, you also have the responsibility to carry it out. However, it is not so in Kumārila or Maṇḍana, where the additional obligation to perform fixed rituals descends from their fixedness (nityatva), not from the adhikāra, as proven by the fact that no such obligation follows in the case of elective rituals (kāmya).
  3. adhikāra is connected to ability (sāmarthya), whereas this does not apply to rights, which can instead ground the need of ability being ensured. For instance, if you have the right to go to school but cannot physically move, (in an ideal case) your government will provide you with the devices needed to let you attend school etc. By contrast, adhikāra presuppose ability, in the sense that unless there is ability to do X, there is no adhikāra to do it. Since adhikāra is a vox media, this might be a good thing after all. For instance, if you don’t have the adhikāra to do something difficult to get A, you will be allowed to do something easier instead. Please notice also that Śabara helpfully distinguishes the lack of an external (bahirbhūta) ability (sāmarthya), which is temporary and does not affect the adhikāra (for instance, you don’t lose your adhikāra if you temporarily run out of ghee or are too poor to perform a given sacrifice), and intrinsic (ātmavṛtti) ability (śakti), in the absence of which there is no adhikāra. Much to my disappointment, this distinction is not kept by later authors.
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Reconstructing the Mīmāṃsā townscape

I have been working for years on reconstructing the deontic landscape of Mīmāṃsā, but at this point I realise that “landscape” might be a misleading metaphor.

In fact, Mīmāṃsā authors were not just describing a natural scenario. They engineered a highly sophisticated system, with bridges connecting different actions and sewage systems to get rid of unwanted left-overs.

That’s why even though new Mīmāṃsā authors might change the flag on the top of the hill (as Maṇḍana did) or some particular aspect here and there, they were cautious not to jeopardise such a carefully engineered system.

For instance, when it comes to subordination, the only real options are Kumārila’s viniyoga system and Prabhākara’s upādāna. Other authors substantially follow the one or the other.

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Permissions, rights and adhikāra

As discussed in previous blogposts and articles, it is established that in Mīmāṃsā and Mīmāṃsā-following Dharmaśāstra all commands are dyadic; prescriptions, prohibitions and permissions are not interdefinable; permissions are always exceptions to previous prohibitions or negative obligations, and they are better-not permissions.

Permissions in Medhātithi: Two examples

Case 1:

Manu:

etān dvijātayo deśān saṃśrayeran prayatnataḥ |
śūdras tu yasmiṃs tasmin vā nivased vṛttikarśitaḥ || 2.24 ||

Medhātithi thereon:
śūdrasya dvijātiśuśrūṣāyā vihitatvāt taddeśanivāse sarvadā prāpte tatrājīvato deśāntaranivāso ’bhyanujñāyate.

So, living in another place (deśāntaranivāsaḥ) for a śūdra is permitted, if he cannot get a living where the twice-born ones live, because a śūdra is prescribed (vihita) to obey the twice-born ones. What we see is:

—the permission is a better-not option

—a specific permission is always parasitical on a general (sarvadā prāpte) prohibition or negative obligation (in this case: it is prohibited to live elsewhere, in turn depending on the duty to serve).

Case 2:

Manu:

strīṇāṃ sukhodyam akrūraṃ vispaṣṭārthaṃ manoharam | maṅgalyaṃ dīrghavarṇāntam āśīrvādābhidhānavat || 2.33 ||

Medhātithi:
puṃsa ity adhikṛtatvāt strīṇām aprāptau niyamyate | sukhenodyate sukhodyam | strībālair api yat sukhenoccārayituṃ śakyate tat strīṇāṃ nāma kartavyam | bāhulyena strīṇāṃ strībhir bālaiś ca vyavahāras teṣāṃ ca svakaraṇasauṣṭavāb- hāvān na sarvaṃ saṃskṛtaṃ śabdam uccārayituṃ śaktir asti | ato viśeṣeṇopadiśy- ate | na tu puṃsām asukhodyam abhyanujñāyate |

So, girls lack the śakti to pronounce Sanskrit words, hence they need easy- to-pronounce names. This command is taught explicitly with regard to them because of their inability, but it does not mean that difficult names are permitted for men.

Noteworthy here:

—The opponent is suggesting that F(x/y)—>P(x/¬y) —Medhātithi explains that this is wrong. It is true that P(x/¬y)—>F(x/(y∧¬y)) but the opposite is not true.

Rights and adhikāra


Having permissions just as exceptions means that they cannot be used to ground the notion of right (as in Hansson 2013). What else can correspond to “rights”?

• 1. There does not need to be a corresponding term. The deontic horizon is, like any other partition of the cognitive world, arbitrary.

• 2. There can be functional equivalents, one of which is adhikāra, I think.

adhikāra is connected to ability (sāmarthya and śakti), in the sense that unless there is ability, there is no adhikāra. Differences: adhikāra also implies duty. Contexts in which adhikāra is discussed: poor people having adhikāra, because they still have the śakti, although they momentarily lack the sāmarthya (all in ŚBh ad 6.1.1–3); disabled people lacking adhikāra for sacrifices but having adhikāra for svādhyāya (TV ad 1.3.4).

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Rights in Mīmāṃsā and further steps in mapping the deontic horizon—Updated

I have been working for years on mapping the deontic space of Mīmāṃsā authors. In order to do that, I tried to find a balance between systematicity, for the purpose of which I need as many information as possible and I often take whatever I can from whatever source, including many different authors, and historical attention to individual authors.

In order to strike this balance, I tend to assume that by default the same deontic concepts are shared by all authors, unless and until the opposite is proven, either because someone has an explicitly competing theory (e.g., Maṇḍana’s iṣṭasādhanatā) or because they de facto do something different (like Medhātithi’s approach to permissions if compared to Kumārila’s).

This ongoing attempt has led my coauthors and myself to understand some basic elements applying to all deontic concepts, such as their dyadic nature (each command is always of the form O(x/y) and not just O(x) or F(x)). We also examined the non-identity relation between prohibitions and obligations (in short: F(x/y) is not tantamount to O(~x/y), but an ideal system will not have F(x/y) and O(~x/y) ceteris paribus) and that between permissions and other commands (again P(x/y) is not tantamount to ~F(x/y), but P(x/y) presupposes a previous either O(~x/T) or F(x/T), with T being more general than y). In other words, if something is permitted it means that one would naturally be inclined to do it, but that its performance had been prohibited (or that refraining from it has been prescribed). The state of affairs of something being already available to one as something one is inclined to do is generally captured by the expression “prāpti“. So, there is a permission only with regard to something prāpta and niṣiddha (or the opposite of which has been vihita). Furthermore, the analysis of permissions as being always “better-not” permissions has also made us able to discuss supererogations, which occur when, although a permission to do x is present, one still avoids doing it.

Now, some authors have suggested that P(x) with no prior negative obligations or prohibitions is needed because of making sense of rights. This led me to think about rights and their seeming absence in the deontic landscape of Mīmāṃsā and Dharmaśāstra authors. The starting point is that we should not expect the same concepts to be present in each deontic landscape. Hence, we shouldn’t be looking for an equivalent of a given concept in a different setting. Rather, we should be looking at the different systems that each deontic author construes. In Mīmāṃsā, there are no “rights” as Euro-American authors know them (and, after all, this might be a good idea and we may suggest that the category of “rights” is muddy and unclear!), but there are other concepts that are times overlapping. One of them is the idea of adhikāra.

This is discussed at length in relation to rituals in the context of PMS 6.1 and its commentaries and sub-commentaries. Basically, Śabara etc. observe that adhikāra presupposes ability, but have then to explain that temporary inability does not infringe on adhikāra. In this context, they speak of an external (bahirbhūta) inability (like, being poor or having a sprained ankle) and an intrinsic (ātmavarttin) one, which blocks the adhikāra (like an inborn disability). They seem to oppose therefore śakti (for the intrinsic ability) and sāmarthya (that can be temporary).

UPDATE (thanks to MS for raising the issue): Another thing that we have not looked into yet are the various types of prescriptions (utpatti-, viniyoga-, adhikāra– and prayogavidhi) and how they behave deontically.