Re. the nature of ahampratyaya: It is clear that scholars after Kumārila have been having the same debates we are having and have concluded that ahampratyaya must be a form of mānasapratyakṣa. They are much more explicit than Kumārila about it, which seems to show that they sensed the problem and addressed it.

In the 2010 article (the one on Rāmakaṇṭha), Watson wonders whether the ahampratyayas of everyone among us would be the same. He mentions (and excludes) the cases of “I am thin”, which Kumārila explicitly refutes. I think that Kumārila favours a “thick” view of the subject, so that ahampratyayas would be distinguishable, even though not through the characteristics of the bodies attached to them.

In the same article Watson also states that in ahampratyaya the self figures as the object, quoting sources later than Kumārila (this might be relevant, because it seems that Kumārila’s commentators have more definite opinions on ahampratyaya being a form of manas-pratyakṣa, see also here). 

In the 2010 article (pp. 307–308, point 5) Watson imagines ahampratyaya to work like the Naiyāyika anuvyavasāya, namely as a temporally subsequent moment, e.g.:
I know a pot—>I know that *I* knew a pot (=>I know that I must have *known* the pot).
The last step is clearly not needed, Kumārila says that we only occasionally perform the last arthāpatti. I am also not sure about its specific chronology, especially because I am not sure about the chronological separation of ahampratyaya. Do we have any evidence that Kumārila thought of it as occurring later? I have to admit that so far I thought that ahampratyaya was the I’s recognition of itself qua knower while it knows. If it were to occur after the cognition, it would have a viṣaya which is no longer available and thus violate the satsamprayoga ‘connection with something present’ requirement of PMS 1.1.4, which is meant to exclude yogic perception, but also Buddhist types of mānasapratyakṣa. Or at least so I thought. (Buddhists allow for that, given that they believe in momentariness and hence stricto sensu for them every cognition is always about a previous moment; Naiyāyikas don’t have this problem because cognitions are qualities of the self, and hence they are perceptible like other qualities) But how could “my” version work? I can imagine two possibilities:

1. We would need to have two cognitions happening simultaneously, namely that of the pot and that of the aham. This would be impossible for Naiyāyikas, since the manas cannot work simultaneously for both cognitions. Mīmāṃsā authors are divided among the ones who claim that manas is atomic and can therefore only join the ātman to one sense-faculty at a time and the ones who claim that it is vibhu and thus allow for simultaneous perceptions (yugapajjnānutpattir iṣṭaiva, Gāgābhaṭṭa p. 16). I wonder whether this would be similar to the case of apprehending at the same time the piṇḍa, its jāti, its qualities etc. I also need more homework to understand which of the two views is Kumārila’s.
2. Alternatively, we could imagine that perception is a temporally extended process for Kumārila (see his discussion of the move from nirvikalpa to savikalpa pratyakṣa). If this is the case, while I look at the pot I could first know it indistinctly (nirvikalpa stage), then as a pot etc. (savikalpa stage). Perhaps the acknowledgement that it’s me knowing it could take place within this temporal extension? The only difference with the Naiyāyika-anuvyavasāya-like hypothesis would be that the object would not be a preceding cognition (which violates PMS 1.1.4) but still the same I that is currently cognising the pot.

Sucarita’s commentary in Watson 2020, fn. 28 suggests that the ātman grasps itself through a dharma of itself, being cognition, hence there is not the same fault of double use of the same thing as in the Buddhists’ svasaṃvedana, because the grasper is only the cognition and the grasped is only the self (whereas for the Buddhists the same awareness is grasper and grasped). It is also noteworthy here that Kumārila explicitly denies any form of self-illumination by the cognition.

By the way, one may wonder whether this temporal synchronicity between perception and its object would not be violated also in the case of recognition. Mīmāṃsā authors explicitly say that recognition (e.g. “This person is Devadatta!”) is made of perception (“This” person I am seeing) and memory (the “Devadatta” I saw in the past and am now remembering). But I have already discussed that ahampratyaya is not always a case of recognition.

Watson 2020 is also very relevant for the identification of the forth view, attributed to Prabhākara, and its phenomenological character (with the ātman being neither pratyakṣa nor parokṣa, fn. 44) and has helpful footnotes on Śālikanātha’s understanding of Kumārila’s view.

Watson 2010, pp. 303—310, is key on ahampratyaya vs. svasaṃvedana, and how we might be aware of the ‘I’ without being aware of the cognition it is undertaking when we are aware that “*I* know”.

(Corrections on March 25 and April 10 2026, thanks to Alex Watson!)

Mark Siderits, in his Nyāya Realism, Buddhist Critique (in The Empirical and the Transcendental, edited by Bina Gupta), mentions without further elaboration that Nyāya philosophers were “innocent of the notion of necessity” (p. 223). I think he is making or hinting at a valid point, in the sense that realist schools like Nyāya are much less inclined than Buddhist Pramāṇavāda to stress the need of logical necessity. In other words, Buddhist Pramāṇavādins will stress points such as the fact that the coexistence of (seemingly) conflicting characteristics in the same entity is logically impossible and that, consequently, the existence of atoms (which should be basic units but also extended in space) is impossible and that the non-existence of atoms is therefore a logical necessity.
By contrast, realist authors are much more committed to the existence of what sense perception attests to and would thus not subscribe to the idea that the lack of logical consistency can cause one to deny the existence of what we experience in the world. This is even more true in the case of Mīmāṃsā, since Mīmāṃsā authors are programmatically committed to worldly experience (lokavyavahāra). Thus, it is hardly the case that Mīmāṃsā authors will ever speak of logical necessity as contradicting worldly experience. Worldly experience is the primary instrument of knowledge (pramāṇa) and it cannot be contradicted because of purely logical reasons. By contrast, if there seems to be logical reasons contradicting our sense perception, it is our logical reasons which need reconsidering since they have probably led to a fallacy.
Moreover, the principle of self validity (svataḥ prāmāṇya) basically makes data count as if they were necessarily true, unless and until they are contradicted by a later, more precise, cognition.

The latter is interpreted as a paryudāsa-negation (i.e., one which enjoins something, through negating a specific aspect of it, like in the case of “Bring a non-Brahmaṇa, which entails that one has to bring some other human being), whereas the former is interpreted as a prasajya-negation (i.e., a sheer prohibition, which does not enjoin anything positive, like “Do not go out!”). This difference entails also a different relation with possible results, insofar as the prohibition to look at the rising sun, since it is interpreted as a prescription, entails a result, whereas the prohibition to eat kalañja is a sheer prohibition and as such cannot entail any result at all.

The more general problem regards the mental aspect of actions, and it is dealt with in Kumārila’s Tantravārttika ad 6.2.19–20:

Pūrvapakṣin: The negation involved in na kalañjaṃ bhakṣayet is a paryudāsa-type of negation. Thus, it means that one should not eat kalañja, but one should eat [something else].

Uttarapakṣin No. It is  a prasajya-type of negation. What is enjoined is the prohibition to eat, specified by kalañja (nothing positive is enjoined).

Pūrvapakṣin: No, this non-eating specified by kalañja should be performed by whoever wishes to achieve a result. (thus, something positive is in fact enjoined).

Uttarapakṣin: How can one perform “non-eating”?

Pūrvapakṣin: The non-eating is the mental (mānasa) activity consisting in the non-eating,  In fact, when one does something, one needs first to decide (saṅkalpa) to undertake it. Also in the case of non-activities. one first decides and then avoids [doing something].
Moreover, the mental activities are more internal (antaraṅga) [to the action], and thus they are the first thing to be enjoined (I identify this principle regarding antaraṅgatva as a separate nyāya).
It is like in the case of “One should not look at the rising sun”, the only difference being that in the case of the sun a condition is mentioned (one should not look at the rising sun, but one is allowed to look at the sun in any other case), whereas in the case of the kalañja the prohibition is permanent.

Siddhāntin: The case of “One should not look at the rising sun” is different, since in that case what is at stake is a distinct vow (the Prajāpati-vow), the observance of which is positively enjoined.

Pūrvapakṣin: How could one distinguish the two cases?

Siddhānta: The case of “One should not look at the rising sun” is a vow, and vows obviously involve the mental decision (to keep them), so that something positive is enjoined in that case.

The kalañja-prohibition, by contrast, is not introduced as a vow, thus the negation is directly connected with the fact of being to be done.

Long story short, keep on avoiding to eat onion (or drink wine, or eat pork…), since this is prohibited in the Sacred Texts, but you will not get any reward through that.

On the Mīmāṃsā way of structuring arguments, see here. On the hermeneutic principles in Mīmāṃsā, see here On the problem of the Śyena and of violence in the Veda, see here.

[Obj.:] Because [the prohibition of violence] is unrestricted, because [violence] is prohibited, violence which is repeated as the result [of a ritual, and not as its instrument] is a sin.
[R.: No, because] the prescription about a subsidiary (aṅga) blocks the general [prohibition of violence]. Also the inference is in this case wrong because it is invalidated, etc. |
Those who belong to Sāṅkhya say that there is a small flaw easy to be avoided if one favours this rite (the Agnīṣomīya). It is said in the Śārīraka that it is not so, because of the mention of what is beneficial for the animal || 78 ||

With the words Because it is unrestricted the [author of the verses (who happens to be the same as the author of the commentary, i.e., Veṅkaṭanātha)] said that the Śyena and the Agnīṣomīya are different, through the purification of the [violent] activity by means of the prescriptions and the prohibitions [regarding it], since it is established that the adṛṣṭa is reached at only through the Āgamas. The meaning is: Both in the Śyena and in the killing of the animal victim within the Agnīṣomīya one sees violence. An activity which has as result the detachment from the vital breaths is denoted with the word “violence” and this is common to both cases.

However, in the Śyena the violence is not prescribed, but rather obtained out of one’s desire. In fact in its case the sequence of prescriptions is “If one would inflict violence, he shall do it through the Śyena”, and not just “One should inflict violence”. And in the same way in the case of the [Śyena] the violence is obtained out of desire, therefore the prohibition “One should not perform any violence” is in its regard unrestricted. Therefore, the violence which has been repeated as the result [of the Śyena] is prohibited in this case, not the Śyena [itself], because [the Śyena] has been said to be something different, with [Kumārila’s] words “The Śyena is different [than violence], like a sword [is not the same as a slaughter]” (ŚV codanā 205cd) and because it has been prescribed. That he said with By contrast, violence is a sin. This means that this violence which is obtained because of one’s desire is an evil, because it is prohibited by the Sacred Texts. By contrast in case of the killing of the animal victim in the Agnīṣomīya, although there is violence, since [the killing] has the form of an activity resulting in separating [the animal’s self] from the vital breaths, the general rule “One should not perform any violence” is blocked throughout he specific prescription “One should kill [the animal victim]”. Since, when there is a specific prescription, the general prohibition is weaker, as it has its scope of application only when it regards something obtained through desire only.

Therefore (athāpi), the inference “The violence in the case of the Agnīṣomīya is not dharmic, because it is violence, like the violence inflicted on a Brahmin” is wrong, because it is invalidated by the Sacred Texts (āgama) and because it has limiting conditions (upādhi), this he said with the words The inference.

In this regard the Sāṅkhyas think so: “The prescription about the killing of the animal victim in the Agnīṣomīya says that the killing is a subsidiary to the ritual. But the sentence ‘One should not perform any violence’ encompasses also the violence within the Agnīṣomīya because the word ‘violence’ works without any restriction. And in this way  this violence is the cause of something evil but this is easy to be atoned (parihṛ-), since it is Vedic”. In this regard the confutation has  been said in the Śārīrakaśāstra: “Although the killing of the animal victim within the Agnīṣomīya causes a major sufferance, it cannot be said to be ‘violence’. In fact, there is [also] not violence when a physician, etc., cut or cauterise, etc., for the sake of heal a tumour, etc. Nor is the  scolding of one’s child or pupil by the parents, [teachers], etc. a form of violence. Only a violent act not conformable to the Śāstras and performed by someone causing much sufferance is violence. In this regard, by contrast, although there is separation from the vital breaths, there is no violence, because of the compliance to the Śāstra. Instead, there is protection (rakṣā), because through the interruption of the body of the animal victim, which results in evil, [the sacrifice] causes for that very animal the attainment of a a special body which is conform to the enjoyment of upmost pleasure”. Having in mind this all he said Because of the mention of what is beneficial for the animal. With the mention of the mantra ”You do not indeed die, nor are you injured, you go in the divine with easy paths” (na vā u etan mriyase na riṣyasi devāṃ ideṣi pathibhis sugebhis, ṚV 1.162.21, found also in Rāmānuja’s Gītābhāṣya).  it is said that the animal obtains a specific place.
This is here the different [view]: Some say that once one has accepted that the slaughter of the animal in the Agnīṣomīya is violence, the prescription “One should slaughter [the sacrificial animal]” blocks the prohibition “One should not perform any violence. Others, by contrast, do not accept that there is violence out of the Sacred Texts or the Recollected ones, because it is not violence, given that [the slaughter] is the cause of the fact that through a little sufferance a bigger happiness is obtained and given that it is said in the Sacred Texts that “You do not die, nor are you injured…”.

(Tattvamuktākalāpa, 5.78, my (preliminary) translation)
Thus, there are basically two options:

• the Śyena is prohibited, because violence in it is not prescribed and it is performed only because of one’s desire (whereas no one desires to kill a sacrificial animal, it is slaughtered only because of a prescription to do it)
• all violence is prohibited. This prohibition is superseded in the case of the Agnīṣomīya by a more precise prescription to the contrary.

The first solution seems to me suitable to be applied more in general to the universal problem of violence in religious texts (Don’t do it if you can detect self-interest in it).

The sūtras PMS 2.1.1–2.1.4 constitute the bhāvārthādhikaraṇa, the one commenting upon which Kumārila elaborates his theory of bhāvanā (efficience force) as the meaning of verbal endings*. But what did Jaimini mean through them? The first one (PMS 2.1.1) states that verbs denote bhāva (interpreted by Kumārila as meaning bhāvanā).

In 2.1.2 an objector proposes that all linguistic expressions could mean bhāva and the next two sūtras discuss the difference between nouns and verbs. What is this difference? The opinion of ancient and contemporary scholars here diverge. Let me therefore first present the sūtras:

2.1.3 yeṣām tūtpattau sve prayoge rūpopalabdhis tāni nāmāni, tasmāt tebhyaḥ parākāṅkṣā bhūtatvāt sve prayoge

2.1.4 yeṣāṃ tūtpattāv arthe sve prayogo na vidyate tāny ākhyātāni tasmāt tebhyaḥ pratīyetāśritatvāt prayogasya

It seems (relatively) clear that nouns are linked to something already there (bhūta), whereas verbs express something which is not (yet) there (na vidyate). What is instead debated upon is the meaning of parākāṅkṣā “dependence on something else”. Śabara wants this expression to say that nouns do not depend on anything else, exactly since they signify something already existing. Thus, he just suggests to add na vidyate “there is no” (na vidyata ity adhyāhāraḥ). Kumārila, who wants the same meaning to hold proposes in addition the interpretation parā ākāṅkṣā “The dependence on something else [of the nouns] is far away (i.e., non existent”).

Now, if you readers think that adding a negation to a sūtra is a too far-fetched interpretation, you are not alone.

F.X. Clooney, who tried to understand the PMS independently of its later interpreters (in his Thinking ritually), suggests instead to take parākāṅkṣā at face value, and explains that Jaimini’s focus is constantly on action and that nouns depend on something else in order to express an action.

B. Diaconescu in his Debating Verbal Cognition supports Śabara and Kumārila’s interpretation, especially insofar as otherwise there would be no distinction among nouns and verbs regarding their dependence on something else. Nouns would depend on something else in order to express an action and verbs would depend on something else since their denotandum is not yet there, ready to be used.

Thus, Diaconescu follows the tradition and Clooney is rather a fundamentalist (in the literal sense of going back to the foundational text). Both methods are interesting and legitimate and my only perplexity regarding Diaconescu is his claim that he is following Jaimini and that “Clooney’s stand does not seem to be supported by the text”. I would have preferred him to clearly state that he read Jaimini through Śabara etc.

*This point is oversimplified, since Kumārila oscillates between the idea that the bhāvanā is the meaning of the verbal endings only and that it is the meaning of the whole verb, including the root.

On bhāvanā, see these posts. For my view on Clooney, see this post.

The ŚV vākya chapter deals with the PMS [Pūrva Mīmāṃsā Sūtra] 1.1.24, which focuses on the signification of sentences. The chapter is thus prompted by the initial objection that although the innate meaning of words has been secured (in PMS 1.1.5–23), this still does not entail the validity of the Vedas, since these are made of sentences and sentences are human compositions (ŚV vākya 1). Just like the Jayanta’s Nyāyamañjarī (henceforth NM) 5, section on sentence meaning, the section then opens with a short summary of the possible theories concerning sentence and sentence meaning and then examines them in more detail (ŚV vākya 2–3). It is noteworthy, however, that the positions listed in NM 5, section on vākya, do not correspond to the ones highlighted by Kumārila. The reasons for this differences could be of key importance in order to understand how the debate about the sentence-meaning had shifted in the time between Kumārila and Jayanta. Kumārila mentions:

1. The words communicate the sentence meaning one by one
2. The words communicate the sentence meaning taken together
3. There is a distinct linguistic element apart from the words (i.e., the sphoṭa)
4. The word meanings communicate the sentence meaning one by one
5. The word meanings communicate the sentence meaning taken together
6. The instruments of knowledge [for the word meaning?] communicate the sentence meaning
7. The memories [of the word meanings?] communicate the sentence meaning one by one
8. The memories [of the word meanings?] communicate the sentence meaning collectively
9. The notions of a relation [among word meanings] communicate the sentence meaning one by one
10. The notions of a relation [among word meanings] communicate the sentence meaning collectively

Jayanta, instead, listed:

1. ‘ The sentence-meaning is constituted by cognition, since no external sentence meaning is possible (attributed to kecit)
2. ‘ The sentence meaning is an external state of affairs, constituted by the coordinated connection (saṃsarga) of word-meanings which correspond to external entities (attributed to anye)
3. ‘ The sentence meaning is the exclusion of anything else (attributed to apare)
4. ‘ The sentence meaning is an action, with the action factors subordinated to it, since no coordinated connection is possible (attributed to apare)
5. ‘ The sentence meaning is the arthabhāvanā and, in the case of exhortative verbal endings, the śabdabhāvanā is also added as a sentence meaning (attributed to anye)
6. ‘ Since it is cumbersome to postulate two different things to be denoted by the exhortative verbal endings, only the prescription is denoted by exhortative verbal endings (attributed to apare) —two sub theories are discussed
7. ‘ The sentence meaning is the effort

Why are Jayanta’s and Kumārila’s list so different? Kumārila focuses on which elements convey the sentence meaning, whereas Jayanta’s is a semantic analysis, focusing on the nature of the sentence meaning. Once this is established, it is interesting to see that the two lists still have little overlappings:

1. Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā (=K 5, J 5)
2. Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā (=K 2, J 6)
3. Vijñānavāda (=K 10, J 1)

Why so? Had the linguistic fashion changed between Kumārila and Jayanta? Or do they just focus on different things?

For another post on Jayanta and his sources in NM 5, see here.