I am again pleasantly stuck in a passage of Uttamur T. Vīrarāghavācārya’s learned commentary on the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā Sūtra. This time he is discussing PMS 1.1.26, which is an important sūtra for philosophy of language, but one whose wordings was unclear even within Mīmāṃsā:

loke sanniyamāt prayogasannikarṣaḥ syāt

In an article (forthcoming on The Memoirs of the Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia, 177, 2020) Kei Kataoka suggests therefore an emendation to the PMS itself.

Within the history of Mīmāṃsā, Sucarita also suggested an emendation and read the sūtra as follows:

loke sanniyamāt prayogaḥ sannikarṣaḥ syāt

Moreover, Sucarita explains the sūtra as follows:

This aphorism aims at showing the difference of the Vedas [from worldly texts], since some people think that the Vedas consist of a collection of words, and the collections of words are commonly seen to have been made by people, for instance, the ones regarding objects (artha) such as groups of blue lotuses, and that therefore also these (Vedic collection of words) have been authored.

padasaṅghātātmāno vedāḥ. padasaṅghātāś ca puruṣakṛtā dṛṣṭāḥ, yathā nīlotpalavanādyarthaviṣayāḥ. ata ete ’pi kṛtrimā iti. tadviśeṣapradarśanārthaṃ cedaṃ sūtram. (Kāśikā ad ŚV pratijñā 55 ad PMS 1.1.1).

Veṅkaṭanātha and Uttamur T. Vīrarāghavācārya agree that this is not a suitable explanation, since it would be out of place. Moreover, says, Veṅkaṭanātha

And the insertion (niveśa) [of the aphorism] within that finality (i.e., showing the difference between ordinary and Vedic language) is not clear.

tādarthye niveśaś ca na spaṣṭaḥ. (SM ad PMS 1.1.26, 1971 p. 116)

The sentence is so short that it demands some explanation, and here follows Uttamur T. Vīrarāghavācārya’s one:

And the insertion [of the aphorism] within that finality means ‘And [the aphorism would] be included in the reflection on that purpose (i.e., showing the difference between ordinary and Vedic language)’, through the postulation that they (general purpose and aphorism) are linked as result and thing leading to the result (phalin) [respectively] insofar as it (aphorism) supplements the principal purpose.

tādarthye niveśaś ceti. pradhānārthaśeṣatayā phalaphalibhāvakalpanayā tadarthavicārāntarbhāvaś cetyarthaḥ.
(SĀṬ ad SM ad PMS 1.1.26, 1971 p. 116)

(I am not completely sure about my understanding of the commentary. Suggestions are welcome!)

In short, Veṅkaṭanātha and Uttamur T. Vīrarāghavācārya enter the debate with Mīmāṃsā authors on their very arena. The disagreement here does not regard a topic which would have a relevance for Vedānta, they just think Sucarita has not respected the sambandha requirement while interpreting the aphorism.

Vīrarāghavācārya was a 20th c. Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedāntin whose editorial and commentarial contribution to his school will remain impressive for many generations to come. Personally, I am particularly pleased by his attempts to think along the tradition in a creative way.

Within his subcommentary on Vedānta Deśika’s Seśvaramīmāṃsā, Vīrarāghavācārya is at times closer to Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta than Vedānta Deśika’s pro-Mīmāṃsā attitudes. At other times, he just elaborates further on Vedānta Deśika’s hints. In one of such cases, he describes how the choice of words in Pūrva Mīmāṃsā Sūtra 1.1.2 (codanālakṣaṇo ‘rtho dharmaḥ ‘Dharma is that goal which is known through Vedic injunctions’) was not at all casual. Rather, each word had a direct meaning and also further suggested something more. For instance, codanālakṣaṇa is not just the same as codanāpramāṇa, but rather suggests that the Vedic injunction also defines what dharma is. dharma is also to be interpreted etymologically as ‘instrument of dhṛti‘, where dhṛti means prīti ‘happiness’. Similarly, artha indicates that bhakti is the result to be achieved, consisting in pleasing God. Then he sums up:

Through the word dharma, which means instrument for dhṛti, Jaimini also suggests that this ritual action devoid of desire which is a purpose in itself (svayamprayojana) is different than the instruments for the results consisting in the four human aims, which are expressed with reference to their own contents (svaviṣaya) [only]. [He suggests it] because through this [word dharma] also pleasing the Revered one (bhagavat) is communicated (uddeśya).

dharmapadena dhṛtisādhanavācinā caturvargaphalopāyāḥ ye svaviṣayāḥ vācyāḥ tais saha anlat svayaṃprayojanaṃ niṣkāmakarmāpy asūcayat bhagavatprītes tatroddeśyatvāt.

In other words, bhakti points beyond oneself, to God, whereas all other purposes remain confined to oneself.

Various later Mīmāṃsā authors rethought this inherited background, in particular, on two connected issues:

1. How later Mīmāṃsā authors reconsidered the classification of obligations implemented in the early Mīmāṃsā
2. What later Mīmāṃsā authors considered to be the real trigger for obligations

They will implement in both cases reductionistic strategies which, however, were based on very different presuppositions. They introduced to the background Mīmāṃsā new assumptions, although these were —according to the ancient Indian étiquette— concealed as (re)interpretations of the ancient lore.

As for No. 1, the Mīmāṃsā school operates presupposing that prescriptions could enjoin:

• nitya-karman `fixed sacrifices’, to be performed throughout one’s life, such as the Agnihotra, which one needs to perform each single day
• naimittika-karman `occasional sacrifices’, to be performed only on given occasions, e.g., on the birth of a son
• kāmya-karman `elective sacrifices’, to be performed if one wishes to obtain their result, e.g., the citrā sacrifice if one desires cattle

Here one can see already how the scheme offers the chance for different interpretations, precisely according to one’s interpretation of No. 2, namely of the understanding of what is the real motivator of one’s action, as below:

At a certain point in the history of Mīmāṃsā (and, consequently, of Vedānta), the discussion of the reasons for undertaking the study of Mīmāṃsā becomes a primary topic of investigation. When did this exactly happen? The space dedicated to the topic increases gradually in the centuries, but Jaimini and Śabara don’t seem to be directly interested in it.

Nonetheless, Śabara needs to explain a related topic, namely when studying the Mīmāṃsā —before or after one’s study of the Veda. Kumārila and Prabhākara introduce the prescription to learn the Veda (svādhyāyo ‘dhyetavyaḥ, see Kataoka 2001b) and the one to teach the Veda, respectively, as the prescriptions prompting the study of the Veda and, indirectly, of its meaning. Kumārila explains that the prescription to study the Veda does not include a result which can be independently desired and that one therefore needs to insert the knowledge of its meaning as the result. Prabhākara explains that a teacher needs to know the meaning of the Veda in order to teach the Veda and that the dignity of being a teacher is something independently desirable.

The space to the topic of why studying Mīmāṃsā and which prescription promotes it increases drastically —I would say— after Śālikanātha (8th c.?). Why did this question become relevant? Perhaps because its answer was less obvious and one needed to persuade a different kind of public. A public who knew of the importance of studying the Veda, but was not immediately convinced of the importance of undertaking also a detailed study of the Mīmāṃsā exegesis. I wonder whether part of the problem is due to also to a) Śaṅkara’s statement that the Vedāntins do not need to study Mīmāṃsā and b) the fact that the Mīmāṃsā presents itself as a Vedic exegesis, but in fact looks at the Vedas from the vantage point of the Brāhmaṇas, so that an audience more interested in other parts of the Vedas might be less convinced of the usefulness of Mīmāṃsā.

Veṅkaṭanātha, though primarily a Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedāntin, dedicates the first 28 pages of his commentary on the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā Sūtra to this topic. He refutes both the Bhāṭṭa and the Prābhākara points of view. The Bhāṭṭas are wrong because the knowledge of the meaning of the Veda is not something independently desirable. The Prābhākaras are wrong because the prescription to teach is not sufficiently established and, even if it were, it would not include the knowledge of the meaning of the Veda.
Veṅkaṭanātha analyses at length all position and then concludes briskly that the study of Mīmāṃsā needs to be undertaken out of one’s desire (hence the desiderative ending in PMS 1.1.1). In order to legitimate this desire, Veṅkaṭanātha is able to show that PMS 1.1.1 (through the linguistic expression atha) shows that taking time to undertake the study of Mīmāṃsā does not violate other prescriptions and that there is a suitable time for it.

European readers may feel some sympathy with Mīmāṃsā authors, who were possibly just intellectually interested in Mīmāṃsā exegesis, but had to face external challenges and to structure their intuitions about the Mīmāṃsā being “interesting” into a consistent research project.

bādarāyaṇasya mīmāṃsāpradhānāṃśabhūtaśārīrakasūtrakṛtatvena nyāyasiddhārthe ‘nuvidheyavacanatvañ ca mahābhāratādiprasiddham.

That is:

It is also well known in the Mahābhārata and in other [works] that —insofar as Bādarāyaṇa authored the Śārīrakasūtra (i.e., the Vedāntasūtra or UMS), which is the main part of the (unitary) Mīmāṃsā [system]— [in these sūtras] he expresses [in the UMS] what has to be conformed to (anuvidheya) in regard to [each] content established through rules (nyāya) (in the PMS).

In other words, Bādarāyaṇa set the interpretive principles in the UMS. The interpretation of the PMS needs to follow them. nyāya should refer to the Mīmāṃsā rules. Yet, I am not sure of my translation nyāyasiddhārthe ‘nuvidheyavacanatvam. Do readers have any suggestion?

Different Perspectives in Indian Philosophy of Language

The reflection on language and its structures was a major component of the Sanskritic intellectual horizon, intimately connected with the broader epistemological and soteriological concerns of different schools. This led to the emergence of various conflicting philosophical views on the nature of the cognition obtained from language (śābdabodha). In this respect, a pivotal issue is how padārthas (the meanings/referents of words) relate to vākyārtha (the meaning/referent of the sentence). During this one-day colloquium, the focus will especially be on the views set forth by the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā philosophers (Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara), the Buddhists, the Grammarians, and the theoreticians of Alaṃkāraśāstra, and on the reconstruction of the debate as it developed in the course of the first millennium CE.

Date: November 11, 2016

Time: 9:30 am – 6:00 pm

Venue: Room 213, Faculty of Asian & Middle Eastern Studies, University of Cambridge

Convenors: Vincenzo Vergiani and Shishir Saxena

9:45-10:30 am: Maria Piera Candotti, Université de Lausanne/Università di Cagliari (Visiting Scholar)

Bhartṛhari and the basic meaning unit: innovation or restauration

10:30-11:15 am: Daniele Cuneo, Universiteit Leiden

When words do not suffice: the polymorphic concept of bādha

11:15-11:30 am: Tea / Coffee Break

11:30-12:15 pm: Hugo David, École française d’Extrême-Orient

‘vākyārtha eva padārthaḥ‘: On the reappropriation of an old Mīmāṃsā principle in a Vedāntic framework

12:15-1:00 pm: Elisa Freschi, Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften

From authorless words to Vedic prescriptions: The Mīmāṃsaka journey from the subject-independent nature of language to the prescriptive nature of language

1:00-2:00 pm: Lunch

2:00-2:45 pm: Kei Kataoka, Kyushu University

How to paraphrase a sentence? Bādari vs Jaimini

2:45-3:30 pm: Tiziana Pontillo, Università di Cagliari

The general samartha-constraint of word-formation rules in the Pāṇinian tradition

3:30-4:15 pm: Akane Saito, Kyushu University

Phonemes as the Conveyors of Sentence Meaning for Kumārila, Śālikanātha, Vācaspati, and Jayanta

4:15-4:30 pm: Tea / Coffee Break

4:30-5:15 pm: Shishir Saxena, University of Cambridge

Kumārila on why śabda cannot be classified as anumāna on the basis of āptavādāvisaṃvāda, as argued in the Śabdapariccheda & Vākyādhikaraṇa of the Ślokavārttika

5:15-6:00 pm: Vincenzo Vergiani, University of Cambridge

Of the unitary nature of complex sentences: Bhartṛhari’s remarks in the second kāṇḍa of the Vākyapadīya

The only way to counter this objection would be by showing that, just like there is a natural connection between word and meaning, so the sentence-meaning can arise naturally out of the word-meanings, without the need of an authorial intention.

Accordingly, the opponent goes on by showing that the sentence meaning is something altogether different from the word meanings, and thus cannot arise out of them.

Śabara’s answer is of key importance for the development of Indian linguistics and epistemology, since he claims that words denote their meanings and these denote the sentence-meaning. This occurs naturally, so to say, since the denoted word-meanings automatically connect. This is possible insofar as word-meanings have a hierarchical relationship among each other and word-meanings denoting qualities automatically point to a substrate (a word-meaning denoting a substance). The same occurs within words, where the meaning of the case ending specifies the meaning of the theme (prātipādika).

Although Prabhākara lived long time after Śabara, Śabara seems also to address Prābhākaras ante litteram where he explains that it is not possible that (as later Prabhākara will claim) words denote the sentence-meaning. Rather, only word-meanings can connect into the sentence-meaning, as proved through anvaya and vyatireka insofar as

1. A sentence-meaning can be understood also out of arthas which have not been conveyed by words
2. The sentence-meaning is not understood out of words which are heard but whose meaning has not been understood (perhaps because the listener had head-ache)

Concerning the first point, Kumārila will mention the example of one who sees a patch of white and hears the sound of hooves and of neighing and achieves the unitary cognition “A white horse is running” —though not having heard any of the words composing this sentence.

Many thanks are due to S.S. for reading the relevant text passages with me.

The Lord, the best, the benefactor, taught the Vedas, of which the Mahābhārata is the fifth, to Sumantu, Jaimini, Bailva and Śuka, his own son and to Vaiśampāyana.
They (the students) recited separately [parts] of the Mahābhārata, which had been put together [by Vyāsa] (vedān adhyāpayām āsa mahābhāratapañcamān | sumantuṁ jaiminiṁ pailaṁ śukaṁ caiva svam ātmajam || prabhur variṣṭho varado vaiśaṁpāyanam eva ca | saṁhitās taiḥ pr̥thaktvena bhāratasya prakāśitāḥ || MBh 10.57.74–5)

What remains to be done, at this point, is to establish the identity of Vyāsa and Bādarāyaṇa. This is also a wide-spread idea, but Vedānta Deśika wants to establish through a motivation of this double name:

In the island mixed with (i.e., endowed with) Badarika (jujube) tress, out of Parāśara, Satyavatī (the mother of Vyāsa) begot a child, a destroyer of foes (parantapa), Bādarāyana, the imperishable.

dvīpe badarikāmiśre bādarāyaṇam acyutam |
parāśarāt satyavatī putraṃ lebhe parantapam ||

Unfortunately, however, I could not locate the source of the latter verse. Do you know it?

I am surprised to notice that I never discussed aikaśāstrya on this blog. You can, however, read about it in my forthcoming article on the volume I will edit with Philipp Maas, a preliminary version of which can be read here.

The sūtras PMS 2.1.1–2.1.4 constitute the bhāvārthādhikaraṇa, the one commenting upon which Kumārila elaborates his theory of bhāvanā (efficience force) as the meaning of verbal endings*. But what did Jaimini mean through them? The first one (PMS 2.1.1) states that verbs denote bhāva (interpreted by Kumārila as meaning bhāvanā).

In 2.1.2 an objector proposes that all linguistic expressions could mean bhāva and the next two sūtras discuss the difference between nouns and verbs. What is this difference? The opinion of ancient and contemporary scholars here diverge. Let me therefore first present the sūtras:

2.1.3 yeṣām tūtpattau sve prayoge rūpopalabdhis tāni nāmāni, tasmāt tebhyaḥ parākāṅkṣā bhūtatvāt sve prayoge

2.1.4 yeṣāṃ tūtpattāv arthe sve prayogo na vidyate tāny ākhyātāni tasmāt tebhyaḥ pratīyetāśritatvāt prayogasya

It seems (relatively) clear that nouns are linked to something already there (bhūta), whereas verbs express something which is not (yet) there (na vidyate). What is instead debated upon is the meaning of parākāṅkṣā “dependence on something else”. Śabara wants this expression to say that nouns do not depend on anything else, exactly since they signify something already existing. Thus, he just suggests to add na vidyate “there is no” (na vidyata ity adhyāhāraḥ). Kumārila, who wants the same meaning to hold proposes in addition the interpretation parā ākāṅkṣā “The dependence on something else [of the nouns] is far away (i.e., non existent”).

Now, if you readers think that adding a negation to a sūtra is a too far-fetched interpretation, you are not alone.

F.X. Clooney, who tried to understand the PMS independently of its later interpreters (in his Thinking ritually), suggests instead to take parākāṅkṣā at face value, and explains that Jaimini’s focus is constantly on action and that nouns depend on something else in order to express an action.

B. Diaconescu in his Debating Verbal Cognition supports Śabara and Kumārila’s interpretation, especially insofar as otherwise there would be no distinction among nouns and verbs regarding their dependence on something else. Nouns would depend on something else in order to express an action and verbs would depend on something else since their denotandum is not yet there, ready to be used.

Thus, Diaconescu follows the tradition and Clooney is rather a fundamentalist (in the literal sense of going back to the foundational text). Both methods are interesting and legitimate and my only perplexity regarding Diaconescu is his claim that he is following Jaimini and that “Clooney’s stand does not seem to be supported by the text”. I would have preferred him to clearly state that he read Jaimini through Śabara etc.

*This point is oversimplified, since Kumārila oscillates between the idea that the bhāvanā is the meaning of the verbal endings only and that it is the meaning of the whole verb, including the root.

On bhāvanā, see these posts. For my view on Clooney, see this post.

किम् मन्यन्ते तत्रभवन्तः, कः कः हेतुः युक्ततमः?

शब्दस्वरूप एतत् “पोस्ट्” अपि पठितव्यम्