In contrast to his willingness to play down the differences with his Prābhākara opponents, Śālikanātha is quite straightforward in denying the understanding of arthāpatti, which he attributes to an anonymous opponent, and is clearly influenced by the Ślokavārttika’s treatment of the issue.
According to this opponent, the absence from home is the trigger insofar as it is itself thrown into doubt. Śālikanātha starts by asking how could this impossibility be conceived and comes with two possible options:

1. It is impossible insofar as the absence of the one is invariably connected with the absence of the other.

2. It is impossible insofar as the absence from home is impossible as long as one does not postulate the presence of Caitra outside.

The second option is easy to defeat, since it is not the absence from home which does not make sense, but rather only the being alive of Caitra. Why should one in fact doubt the absence from home once one has seen that Caitra is not there?

The first option deserves, by contrast, a longer treatment. Śālikanātha argues that it is tantamount to an inference based on negative concomitance only (kevalavyatirekin anumāna). This requires a short explanation: According to the Indian theory of inference, the inference is valid if sādhya and hetu don’t just happen to co-occur by chance, but are rather linked by an invariable concomitance. This is checked through the co-occurrence of the same inferential reason in similar instances (called sapakṣa) and its absence in dissimilar instances (called vipakṣa).

A valid inference should have both a positive concomitance (called anvaya) and a negative one (called vyatireka). However, epistemologists have discussed also the deviant case of inferences which seem to have only an anvaya, because there is no vipakṣa (e.g. “Everything is a product” for the Diṅnāga-Dharmakīrti school) or only a vyatireka, because there is no sapakṣa (e.g., “Nothing is eternal, because permanence is nowhere to be found”, again for the Diṅnāga-Dharmakīrti school).

Śālikanātha contends that the latter type does not work, because in order to establish the absence of the inferential reasons from all the dissimilar instances, one should be able to check them one by one, which is impossible. By contrast, the negative concomitance can be established only on the basis of a previously established positive concomitance, just as it happens in the case of the concomitance of fire and smoke.

The next step is even more interesting, since Śālikanātha suggests that the negative concomitance is established on the basis of the positive one exactly through arthāpatti. In fact, it is through arthāpatti that we know that, given that whenever there is the inferential reason there is also the thing to be inferred. Then, given that the absence of the thing to be inferred could not be possible otherwise, one concludes that also the inferential reason must be absent.

Therefore, the solution proposed by the opponent does not work since it leads to a kevalavyatirekin inference which is, in turn, parasitical on arthāpatti, since one first needs to ascertain the positive concomitance and then use arthāpatti to come to the negative concomitance. Once one has known the negative concomitance, as observed by Kumārila, one might well perform an inference on the basis of the established concomitance, but one would only end up knowing something already known, namely that Caitra is out (see ŚV arthāpatti, especially v. 67 with Uṃveka’s and Pārthasārathi’s commentaries thereon and Sucarita’s commentary on v. 19).

As for the “connection with an outer place” (bahirdeśasambandha), this is not further specified, so that we don’t know whether it just means “connection with any place other than his house” or “connection with a specific place outside his house”.

In favour of the latter option come two considerations:

1. Uṃveka discusses once the type of invariable concomitance one would need to be able to establish in order to make the arthāpatti a case of inference and refers to the fact that one should be on the door’s threshold and see at the same time Caitra’s absence from home and his presence in the garden (see the translation and discussion of Uṃveka’s crucial commentary on ŚV arthāpatti 34 in Freschi and Ollett’s translation).
2. If “outside of house” just meant “not in the house”, then Śālikanātha’s point about having to check all dissimilar instances would not make sense, since one would just need to check the single dissimilar instance, namely Caitra’s home. Therefore, it must mean “connected with a specific place outside of home”.

The section on arthāpatti in Kumārila’s Ślokavārttika (henceforth ŚV) is shorter than the ones dedicated to language, but longer than the one dedicated to upamāna ‘analogy as an instrument of knowledge’ (which is not surprising, giving its residual role in both Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā) and to abhāva ‘absence as an instrument of knowledge’. The latter fact is perhaps more surprising and may attest to the importance of arthāpatti in the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā epistemology.

The basic definition, of great influence in the successive literature, is found already in the first verse (unlike in the case of śabda in the śabdapariccheda of the ŚV):

When a thing, which has been known through the six instruments of knowledge cannot be otherwise |

[and] it postulates something else, which cannot be experienced, that case is exemplified as [an instance of] arthāpatti || 1 ||

Śabara’s definition of arthāpatti, by contrast, read as follows:

There is also arthāpatti, which is the postulation of a[nother] thing, when a seen or heard thing is not logically possible

Thus, Kumārila agrees on the presence of a postulation-moment in arthāpatti and, like Śabara, does not (yet) clarify whether this postulation is performed by the cognising subject or occurs automatically. He uses na anyathā bhavet `cannot be otherwise’ as a gloss of na upapadyate `is not logically possible’. He neglects, in this first definition, the difference between śruta– and dṛṣṭārthāpatti, something which might have to do with the fact that some Mīmāṃsakas disagreed with it (the ones who were later known as Prābhākaras). Anyway, Kumārila comes to this distinction in the immediately following verse:

“Seen” [in the ŚBh, means experienced] by all five instruments of knowledge (apart from Linguistic Communication), [because] the [arthāpatti] arisen (udbhava) from the “heard” [in the ŚBh] has been said to be different from that |

Because this [śrutārthāpatti] is different from the previous one insofar as it [alone] includes the instrument of knowledge || 2 ||

Here the distinction goes one step beyond Śabara, insofar as Kumārila explains that in the case of śrutārthāpatti what is postulated is the sentence which leads to the valid piece of information, and not the latter alone.

Next, Kumārila further distinguishes subtypes of dṛṣṭa– and śrutārthapātti according to the pramāṇa upon which they are based. The verses follow the traditional sequence in the enumeration of pramāṇas (pratyakṣa, anumāna, śabda, upamāna, arthāpatti and abhāva).

Among the two, the [postulation] of the ability to burn of fire, based on [its] burning is due to a sense cognition, [whereas] in the case of the sun the [postulation] of its being connected with that ability (that of moving) is due to the motion, which is inferred (out of the fact that one always sees the sun in a different place, but never sees it moving) || 3 ||

The śrutārthapatti will be spoken of later |
When a cow is known as analogous to a gayal, the fact that this (cow) is cognisable is considered [an instance of arthāpatti based on an analogy] || 4 ||

The postulation of the fixity of [linguistic expressions] is due to the ability to communicate knowledge, which has been understood in the case of language because of arthāpatti, in order to establish the denotative power [of linguistic expressions] || 5 ||

In other words, through arthāpatti one understands that linguistic expressions, which communicate meanings, must have the corresponding power. And through a further arthāpatti one derives that in order to make sense of this power they must be fixed:

The denotation would not succesfully occur otherwise (i.e., if linguistic expressions did not have the power to convey meanings). Having understood that, again, with a new arthāpatti one ascertains that the linguistic expressions, which have the power to express are fixed || 6–7 ||

This will be said in the [commentary on] PMS 1.1.18 `because [linguistic expressions] are employed for the sake of others’ (i.e., to communicate with other people) |

The list is concluded by the mention of arthāpatti based on absence as an instrument of knowledge and by the promise of further details in the ŚV chapter on inference:

Here (in this chapter) we show the establishment of the fact that Caitra is out of the home specified by his absence, which is ascertained thorugh absence as an instrument of knowledge || 8 ||
This can exemplify another arthāpatti, arisen out of absence as an instrument of knowledge |
An elaboration of examples of other (arthāpattis) [can be found] in the [treatment of] flaws of the inferential locus || 9 ||

pramāṇaṣaṭkavijñāto yatrārtho nānyathā bhavet | adṛṣṭaṃ kalpayed anyaṃ sārthāpattir udāhṛtā || 1 || dṛṣṭaḥ pañcabhir api asmād bhedenoktā śrutodbhavā | pramāṇagrāhiṇītvena yasmāt pūrvavilakṣaṇā || 2 || tatra pratyakṣato jñānād dāhād dahanaśaktatā | vahner anumitāt sūrye yānāt tacchaktiyogyatā || śrutārthāpattir atraiva parastād abhidhāsyate | gavayopamitā yā gaus tajjnānagrāhyatā matā || 4 || abhidhānaprasiddhyartham arthāpattyāvabodhitāt | śabde bodhakasāmarthyāt tannityatvaprakalpanam || 5 || abhidhā nānyathā sidhyed iti vācakaśaktatām | arthāpattyāvagamyaivaṃ tadananyagateḥ punaḥ || 6 || arthāpattyantareṇaiva śabdanityatvaniścayaḥ | darśanasya parārthatvād ity asminn abhidhāsyate || 7 || pramāṇābhāvanirṇītacaitrābhāvaviśeṣitāt | gehāc caitrabahirbhāvasiddhir yā tv iha darśitā || 8 || tām abhāvotthitām anyām arthāpattim udāharet | pakṣadoṣeṣu cānyāsām udāharaṇavistaraḥ || 9 ||
This is only a preliminary translation and commentaries and suggestions are more than welcome!

At first sight, the text passage does not seem particularly difficult, but entangling its intricacies has kept me busy for a long time —and the results are still not satisfying. The main problems are:

1. How exactly can one formalise a case of arthāpatti as a kevalavyatirekin anumāna? What are the two absences at stake?
2. Does Śālikanātha accept or reject the kevalavyatirekin anumāna in general?
3. If he does not reject it, what is the problem in the formalisation of arthāpatti as kevalavyatirekin anumāna?

The standard case of arthāpatti being discussed is the following one:

Devadatta, who is known to be alive, is not home. Thus, he is outside.

The text passage starts by presenting an opponent, who maintains that gṛhābhāva `the absence from home’ is the trigger for the bahirbhāva `being outside’, because it is not otherwise possible (anyathānupapadyamāna). Here the problem seems to be just that the absence from home alone (i.e., without causing one to doubt about whether Devadatta is alive) is not enough to be a trigger. There is still no mention of the kevalavyatirekin anumāna.

The siddhāntin answers that this analysis does not apply, because it is not true that the gṛhābhāva is not otherwise possible (if this were an inference, we would say that the hetu is asiddha `not established’). Why not? Here the discussion turns into a discussion of whether the arthāpatti can be read as a kevalavyatirekin anumāna since the siddhāntin assumes that gṛhābhāva could be a trigger only if it could be verified that it is otherwise impossible and this could only be verified through a kevalavyatirekin anumāna. The siddhāntin thus states that gṛhābhāva is not otherwise impossible because it is impossible to verify an absence in all possible loci of concomitant absence (vipakṣa) of hetu and sādhya and the fixed relation between hetu and sādhya needs to be first ascertained through their concomitant presence (anvaya). This seems to be a critique of the kevalavyatirekin anumāna, insofar as the vipakṣas are endless, and I would be happy with the idea that the arthāpatti cannot be described as a kevalavyatirekin, because a kevalavyatirekin is not a valid anumāna, since one never achieves certainty and at most high probability. But the problem remains, that is, what are the absences at stake? Does this amount to say that we cannot check whether the absence from home lacks consistency in all possible cases but the one of being outside? Or that we cannot check whether the absence from home is always concomitant with the absence of something else? If the latter, what could be this something else?

However, Śālikanātha then goes on explaining that, if the fixed relationship has been ascertained, then the fixed absence of the hetu is ascertained in relation to the sādhya‘s absence (i.e., it has been ascertained that the absence of the hetu necessarily leads to the absence of the sādhya):

avadhārite hi tasminn arthāpattyā sādhyābhāve hetvabhāvaniyamo ‘vasīyate.

This would not make sense if we were to conceive the ascertainment mentioned at the beginning of the sentence as something deemed to occur through anvaya. In fact, once the niyama has been established through anvaya, we just have a normal anumāna and do not need arthāpatti at all. Thus, the sentence must rather mean “In fact, if the relation has been ascertained, then it is through arthāpatti that the fixed absence of the hetu is ascertained in reference to the absence of the sādhya. Going back to our example, what are the two absences at stake? The absence of gṛhābhāvopapatti leads to the absence from home, i.e., to the being outside? Or is the first absence the gṛhābhāva itself? Or is Śālikanātha not really concerned with that since his main concern is instead to say that arthāpatti is not an anumāna, because kevalavyatirekin anumānas are not valid (since ultimately they only work if the connection between sādhya and hetu has already been established through an anvaya) and arthāpatti is not identical with the straight anvaya-based anumāna?

For further posts on arthāpatti, see here.

1. The verse said to be extracted from the Bṛhaṭṭīkā in the Mānameyoda‘s section on arthāpatti (discussed here)
2. Four verses on arthāpatti attributed by Śālikanātha* to the Vārttikakāra (i.e., Kumārila) but not found in his Ślokavārttika

All these texts agree, among other things, on a major distinction between inference and arthāpatti, namely the fact that the vyāpti, the ‘invariable concomitance’ between what will be known and its logical reason, is already at the epistemic disposal of the knower before the anumāna, whereas in the case of the arthāpatti the knower, so to say, discovers it “on the go”, at the time of reaching the result of the arthāpatti. In other words, one would not have been able to say beforehand that there is an invariable concomitance between the set of people who, being alive, are not at home, and the set of people who are out of their home, until one had reached the conclusion that Devadatta must be outside.

For further details, see Yoshimizu 2007 (in Preisendanz (ed.) Expanding and Merging Horizons).

*I am obliged to Kiyotaka Yoshimizu who kindly alerted me to these verses.

Within the weekly reading group facilitated by Malcolm Keating, we are reading the section on arthāpatti of the Mānameyodaya by the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa. This week, we read the part on the difference between inference and postulation according to the Prābhākaras.

It is often the case that neighbours hate each other, and Nārāyaṇa does in fact attack the members of the rival school of Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā much more violently than the Naiyāyikas. The Prābhākaras agree with the Bhāṭṭas against the Naiyāyikas that the arthāpatti is distinguished from inference, but they disagree as for why this is the case.
Nārāyaṇa uses various arguments, the last of which is that the invariable concomitance between what one knew before and what one discovers during that cognitive process is already available only in the case of inference. In other words:

1. inference: one knows already that smoke is invariably concomitant with fire
2. postulation: one knows only at the end of the process from “Devadatta is alive and not home” to “Devadatta is out” that “being alive while not being home” is invariably conomitant with “being out”

By contrast, the Prābhākaras use a different argument to distinguish the two, namely that the hetu ‘logical reason’ in the case of inference is firmly established, whereas it is doubted in the case of postulation. In other words:

1. inference: one infers that there is fire on the mountain because of smoke (firmly established)
2. postulation: one ascertains that Devadatta is out because he is possibly alive (doubted reason)

This being said, please enjoy the depiction of these positions and most of all the witty refutation of the Prābhākara one by Nārāyaṇa:

Before having ascertained that [Devadatta] is outside [his] home, the conjunction of being alive and not being home could not be known. […]

This has been said in [Kumārila’s] Bṛhaṭṭīkā*:

Therefore, the absence from home which is understood in regard to one who is present (i.e., alive) |

this [would be] the probans (if the postulation were a case of inference), but this is not seized before seizing that [the alive person] is out of his home || 143 ||

(tasmād yo vidyamānasya gṛhābhāvo ‘vagamyate | sa hetuḥ sa bahirbhāvaṃ nāgṛhītvā ca gṛhyate)

Therefore the postulation is indeed distinguished [from the inference].

By contrast the Guru (Prabhākara), who does not known this (mentioned above) tool to destroy the Naiyāyikas, has prattled on the doubt about the being alive in this case [as the trigger of postulation]: || 144 ||

“The being alive indeed has been known before as being home |

Thereafter, there must be doubt about his being alive due to the fact that one has not seen [Devadatta] in his home || 145 ||

But the doubted fact of being alive can convey the fact that he (Devadatta) is out of his home |

This is the advantage [over inference] of the postulation, that although it is doubted it conveys [something] || 146 ||

In this way, if there is a doubt regarding the fact of being alive the probans would have a doubted qualification. In this way the refutation of the status of inference is very easy for us! || 147 ||”

[Bhāṭṭa:] That is ridiculous! To elaborate:

If the fact of being alive were doubted because one has noticed that one is not home |

then the ascertainment of that (being alive) would be done, on the basis of assertions of reliable speakers and so on || 148 ||

or by means of considering signs such as the auspicious necklace (worn by married women who are not widows, so that its presence on the neck of Devadatta’s wife would be a clear sign of his being alive) of his beloved one |

But this is not desired at all [by the Prābhākara] (who in fact does not undertake any of these things). Therefore [in reality] there is no doubt at all [even in the Prābhākara’s mind] || 149 ||

Moreover, one does not seize that [Devadatta] is out on the basis of a doubtful idea that he might be alive |

for, if one doubts that he might also be dead, how could the idea that he is out [originate]? || 150 ||

“Since he is alive or not, he is out” |

who else apart from the Guru (Prabhākara) would be able to postulate that? || 151 ||”

*By the way, do you happen to know this verse from some other source? (Or do we have to imagine that Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa still had access to the then lost Bṛhaṭṭīkā?)

For more on postulation, on Nārāyaṇa’s Mānameyodaya and on our reading sessions, please see this post.

Arthāpatti is the postulation of the only possible solution out of a seeming contradiction, e.g. “Devadatta is alive” and “Devadatta is not in the place where we usually see him” (this is expressed in Sanskrit epistemology by “Devadatta is not at home”, in contemporary terms we could think of something like “What happened of Jim? He is not in his office!”). Different contemporary scholars have tried to discuss the relation of arthāpatti with ‘presumption’ and ‘inference to the best explanation’.

The following is a translation of the beginning of the arthāpatti section in the Mānameyodaya:

1. DEFINITION OF ARTHĀPATTI

“Arthāpatti is the postulation of [something] producing [a solution] when there is a logical impossibility”: this is the definition explained in the Śābara Bhāṣya || 128 ||

As for this definition, the “logical impossibility” is said to be the contradiction between two [types* of] instruments of knowledge. Therefore, the following definition [of the arthāpatti] should be taught:

Arthāpatti is defined as the cognition of something non-contradictory caused by the contradiction between instruments of knowledge about general topics, and ones about a specific topic || 129 ||
For instance, the postulation of being outside of home due to the contradiction, which is instrumental [for the arousal of postulation], between the knowledge of his not being at home and the knowledge of his being alive || 130 ||

One understands in general that Devadatta is alive, either at home or outside, due to an inference based on astrology (i.e., because out of astrological calculations one knows that he will live a long life). There being a contradiction with the fact that he is not at home, one hypothesises —for the sake of the non-contradiction— that he must be out. And this is an arthāpatti-cognition whose instrument is the contradiction between the two [types] of instruments of knowledge.

2. NAIYĀYIKA POSITION: THE ARTHĀPATTI IS A FORM OF ANUMĀNA

However, the experts of logic (i.e., the Naiyāyikas), thinking that this (arthapatti) is a form of inference, say that |
“there is no contradiction between the two [types of] instruments of knowledge. And this (non-contradiction) is the same in the case of everything well-known” (NKu 3.11)|| 131 ||

[Nai:] To begin with, it is impossible that there is a contradiction between instruments of knowledge, since there would be the undesirable consequence that one of the two is not an instrument of knowledge, as in the case of “this is silver, this is not silver” (where one of the two ends up being recognised as not valid).

[Obj.] But nonetheless, one does see a contradiction between the two knowledges about which we spoke before (in the case of Devadatta)!

[Naiyāyika:] This is just a wish! In fact, in the case at hand, the room for doubt** regarding the specific place, namely ‘is he at home or outside?’ is blocked by the knowledge of his not being at home.

*dvaya must refer to two types of instrument of knowledge, and not just to two instruments of knowledge, given that the next verse explains that the contradiction may be between a specific knowledge and several general ones (sādharaṇapramāṇānām). Thanks to Andrew Ollett for having discussed this issue with me.
**The Naiyāyika is here speaking of doubt instead of logical inconsistency, probably because the former, unlike the latter, is among the padārthas his school accepts.

What is an apūrva? The term is attested already in the Śrautasūtras and it refers to the element of novelty introduced by each sacrifice. However, Prābhākaras tend to identify this novelty with dharma itself, i.e., with the fact of being “to be done” (kārya), which is what distinguishes a sacrifice from a sum of actions, substances, etc. Thus, the apūrva lies at the center of the Prābhākara system and it is identified with the real meaning of the Vedas and of the Vedic codanās ‘injunctions’. It is in fact called apūrva because it was “not [known] before [hearing the Vedic injunction prescribing it”. This fits well with the general idea that Prābhākaras focus on the sacrifice itself more than on its result.

By contrast, for Bhāṭṭas the apūrva is the energy arisen through a sacrifice and lasting until the arousal of the sacrifice’s result. It is, thus, postulated through śrutārthāpatti ‘cogent evidence’ in order to justify the apparent inconsistence of the fact that most sacrifices end well before the arousal of the result and that, thus, it is hard to imagine how they could be the cause of such future results.

Now, what is Śabara’s position, given that Śabara is the author preceding both Prabhākara and Kumārila and given that both claim to be just subcommenting his commentary on the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā Sūtras? Authors, both in Classical India (see Yoshimizu 2000, fn. 27) and today tend to know Kumārila better than Prabhākara and, consequently, to read Śabara through Kumārila’s lenses. However, Kiyotaka Yoshimizu has started his career as a Mīmāṃsā-scholar with a focus on Prabhākara (see Yoshimizu 1997) and has always tried to show unexpected sides of Mīmāṃsā (see Yoshimizu 2007 and 2008 —and my discussion of them on this blog, here and here— for his surprising reading of Kumārila as upholding a paramātman in the Veda).

In his 2000 article he reconsiders the issue of apūrva in Śabara and notes that —against expectations— his concept of apūrva is not at all identical with Kumārila’s one. The crucial passage, in this sense, is Śabara’s commentary on PMS 2.1.5, which is where the theory of apūrva originates (the punctuation is significant and it is Yoshimizu’s, p. 153):

katham punar idam avagamyate “asti tad apūrvam” iti. ucyate: codanā punar ārambhaḥ. codanety apūrvam brūmaḥ. apūrvam punar asti, yata ārambhaḥ śiṣyate ‘svargakāmo yajeta’ iti. itarathā hi vidhānam anarthakaṃ syāt. bhaṅgitvād yāgasya. yady anyad anutpādya yāgo vinaśyet, phalam asati nimitte na syāt.

After the first lines of his commentary, Yoshimizu agrees that Śabara goes on explaining apūrva in a way similar to Kumārila’s one. However, here, according to Yoshimizu, he is doing something else. More in detail, ārambha (in yata ārambhaḥ śiṣyate) does not mean the same as vidhāna (in itarathā hi vidhānam anarthakaṃ syāt), where the additional explanation (the one resembling Kumārila’s one) begins. ārambhaḥ, as Yoshimizu demonstrates, refers “to undertaking the whole procedure of a sacrifice beginning from the first preparatory rite prescribed by a subsidiary injunction”, whereas vidhāna refers to the injunction to sacrifice common to many rituals. In order to justify this understanding of ārambha, Yoshimizu points out its use in the context of optional (kāmya) sacrifices. These sacrifices are undertaken by people who desire a certain result, i.e., a son or rain or cattle and are thus prompted by such desire. In their case, accordingly, the prescription does not prompt the performance of the sacrifice (which one has already undertaken because of one’s desire), but rather “to complete the sacrifice which he [the sacrificer] has already undertaken by his own choice” (fn. 22). And in this context, ārambha is used, which thus seems to refer to the whole sacrifice.

Long story short, “the term apūrva is not used here [in ŚBh ad 2.1.5] to mean a kind of potency left by the sacrifice” (p. 150).

Yoshimizu’s article then goes on describing how Kumārila refutes the idea of a substantial apūrva: apūrva (understood as the bridge between the sacrifice and its result) is only a śakti, or perhaps a saṃskāra inhering in the sacrificer. Interestingly, Yoshimizu shows that Śabara had refuted a theory comparing the apūrva to a progressive action, like ingesting ghee (and ending up with the result of being fatter only at a later time) (p. 151).

Is Yoshimizu right? Does Pūrva Mīmāṃsā turn to an ontology (with substances, etiologies presupposing that dharma and ātman are “things” and a soteriology akin to the Vedāntic one) only with Kumārila?

Kiyotaka Yoshimizu, Change of View on Apūrva from Śabarasvāmin to Kumārila. In: Sengaku Mayeda (ed.). The Way to Liberation. Manohar 2000, pp. 149–165.
For further posts on Yoshimizu’s articles, see , here and here.