Now, I am not sure that an active knowledge of Sanskrit would help all kinds of people. I am sure there are great scholars who have no active knowledge of the language they work on. There are analytic learners, who have problems with the listening comprehension of a language even when they master its grammar. For all of them, acquiring an active command of Sanskrit might take a long time and not yield enough benefits. Yet, I am inclined to think that for some kinds of learners, an active usage of the language, as can be expressed by the idea of “thinking in Sanskrit”, would be of great help even if one does not want to speak Sanskrit about daily topics and just wants to better understand Sanskrit śāstra.

But how to acquire such a skill?

1. Read a lot, especially texts based on a dialectic structure (two or more speakers arguing on the basis of arguments)
2. Try to phrase basic questions in Sanskrit (say, you read in the maṅgala caraṇāravindaṃ vande and ask kasya caraṇau?)
3. Try writing simple summaries of what you read in Sanskrit (using the same words you just read, it does not need to be original)
4. If you have the chance, take classes in spoken Sanskrit, especially if you can find a teacher who will also introduce you to some extent to śāstric Sanskrit

What do readers think? Can you “think in Sanskrit”? Does it help you? How did you learn it?

Incidentally, I discussed the pros and cons of spoken Sanskrit in a post on my first blog, here.

I am trying to figure out how to best translate one of my projects into Sanskrit. What would you understand if I were to tell you any of the following?

१ तर्कयुक्तयो वेदमीमांसायां तद्विनियोगश्च ।
२ कार्यविषयान्विक्षिकी वेदमीमांसायां तद्विनियोगश्च ।
३ कार्यविषययुक्तिर्वेदमीमांसायां तद्विनियोगश्च ।

NEW SUGGESTIONS:

४ कार्यविषयकर्ममीमांसोपकारकाः न्यायाः वेदनिर्णयार्थं तद्विनियोगश्च । (adapted from a suggestion by Sudipta Munsi)

५ कार्यार्थविषये युक्तिन्यायाः वेदमीमांसायां तद्विनियोगश्च ।
६ कर्त्तव्यविषयान्विक्षिकी वेदमीमांसायां तद्विनियोगश्च । (adapted from a suggestion by Robert Zydenbos)
३ कर्त्तव्यविषययुक्तिर्वेदमीमांसायां च तद्विनियोग: । (adapted from a suggestion by Robert Zydenbos)

Many thanks for your help!

वेदान्तिनां नये तुच्छस्याध्यारोपाविषयत्वात् कथञ्चिच्छब्दमहिम्ना शशशृङ्गपदेन विकल्पात्मकमनोवृत्तौ जातायामलीकत्वस्य विषयत्वमङ्गीक्रियते । तथापि विकल्पस्य ज्ञानत्वानङ्गीकारात् ज्ञानाविषयत्वमलीकस्य सम्भवति । अथापि विकल्पस्य ज्ञानाद्विविच्य प्रदर्शनाय तैः सत्त्वेन प्रतीत्यनर्हम् अलीकम् इत्युच्यते । उक्तानर्हताया अवच्छेदकञ्च किञ्चिद्वक्तव्यम् इति अत एव तन्नये तदेवावच्छेदकं तल्लक्षणं – सर्व्वदेशकालवृत्त्यत्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वे सत्युत्पत्त्यादिशून्यत्वम् – इति सम्भवति ।
अथवा – उक्तप्रतियोगित्वे सति कालासम्बन्धित्वमेवालीकत्वं तदस्तु ।

तार्किकनये तु अलीकस्य ज्ञानसामान्याविषयत्वम् इति तन्नये न विकल्पवृत्तिरङ्गीक्रियते इति प्राप्तम् । अत एव ज्ञानाविषयत्वमेवालीकलक्षणम् । कालासम्बन्धित्वं वा ।

एतेषु सर्व्वेषु पक्षेषु इदं चिन्त्यं यत् –
तत्तन्मते तुच्छस्य यल्लक्षणं ज्ञानाविषयत्वदि तत् किं तुच्छे वर्त्तते न वा । वर्त्तते चेत् तस्यापि स्वरूपं प्राप्तं , नास्ति चेत् कथं तस्य तुच्छत्वम् ।
– इति ;
तुच्छस्यापदार्थत्वेनैव भेदप्रतियोगित्वादिभावधर्म्मानाश्रयत्वे सति पदार्थेषु तद्व्यावृत्तिः कथं सिद्ध्येत । तदसिद्धौ पदार्थानां तुच्छाभेदेनालीकत्वमापतेत् , तत्सिद्धौ च तुच्छे प्रतियोगित्वादिकमङ्गीकर्त्तव्यमापतेत् ।

– इति च ।

(My friend, Sudipta Munsi brought this post from the Bharatiya Vidvat Parisat to my notice and obtained permission from the author to cross-post it on this blog. Except for his name, the learned author, Srimallalitalalita, prefers to remain anonymous.)

Vidyā Jayaraman discusses the issue at her blog, here. Among the many points she hints at, there are the following ones:

1. How can we rely on a PhD student? Possible answer: We do not rely on her, we in fact rely on her supervisor (sad, perhaps, but true).
2. How can we rely on someone who has no active knowledge of Sanskrit? Possible answer: Personally, I am very much in favour of spoken Sanskrit, but I also realise that different people may need different upāyas to be able to think along a text. Some seem to be perfectly fine with their work with written signs and need no active command of the language they study. This phenomenon is apparent in the case of lost languages, such as the ones encoded in cuneiform writing systems, and I am by no means ready to say that experts in cuneiform are not able to master the languages they study.
3. How can we rely on someone who has no knowledge of the full wealth of Sanskrit? Possible answer (with a special focus on philosophical śāstra): Good question. One surely needs to be aware of the whole philosophical arena in order to translate or critically edit one perspective on it (in other words, in order to translate a Mīmāṃsā text, you must be almost a specialist also in Nyāya and so on). If, however, Vidyā thinks also of being familiar with non-philosophical texts, then, in fact, I identify very much with Vidyā’s target, since I hardly read any kāvya and I only read philosophical texts. This polemics has been dealt with already in the past (I remember for instance, in an article by Stephen Phillips) and I can only add that reading kāvya, etc. might enhance a lot one’s understanding of Sanskrit philosophy. But would not reading non-Sanskrit philosophy enhance one’s philosophical acumen and, thus one’s ability to understand also Sanskrit philosophy? Are not scholars of Indian philosophy expected to engage with thinkers who were first and foremost philosophers and only after that speakers or writers of Sanskrit? I might be wrong, and I would be happy to read your opinion about that.

What would be your answers? And your questions?

Shail Mayaram, in the introduction of a book dedicated to Daya Krisna and Ramchandra Gandhi, Philosophy as Samvad and Svaraj adds some interesting information about the saṃvādas which have no written record:

A dialogue on bhakti attempted to universalize the phenomenon of devotion and encourage thinking about it philosophically. A dialogue on Śilpaśāstra was held in Amber, Jaipur and brought together traditional sthapatis and architects. I […] was fortunate to be present at the dialogue on Kāshmir [sic!] Śaivism (with a special session in an open ground in Gulmarg). […] Subsequently, two dialogues were held in Lucknow and Hydearabad.

Within the same volume, Mustafa Khawaja reproduces the letter of invitation sent by Daya Krishna to scholars of Islamic philosophy. Daya Krishna predominantely wrote in English, but he was well aware of the risk of neglecting other languages. Thus, the saṃvādas were open to scholars speaking in different languages (as attested also by the proceedings mentioned above) and Daya Krishna was very keen to listen also to marginal philosophical traditions (such as that of the Islamic theologians speaking Urdū). Also the invitation letter is written in two languages and is full of open questions to be debated.
Nonetheless, this openness did not always work. Mayaram writes:

I remember the meeting of the scholars’ group including Daya Krishna, Ram Chandra Dwivedi, Arindam Chakrabarti and Mukund Lath with Laxman Joo, then celebrated as one of the greatest living exponents of the school of philosophy that is popularly known as Kashmir Saivism [I would rather speak of the Pratyabhijñā school, EF]. Laxman Joo responded to their questions with complete silence. […] After their departure, he asked Bettina Bäumer, yeh nāstik kaun the [Who were those non-believers?]

This is an interesting point, because dialogue cannot be imposed on someone, its very “democratic” structure makes this impossible. Thus, what to do with those who do not want to speak? Or is dialogue among people not sharing the same presuppositions (e.g., the same religious praxis) impossible?

On Daya Krishna and his volume on bhakti, see this post and this one respectively. On English as the predominant language, some interesting comments can be read at this post and at the linked ones. I am grateful to Elise Coquereau for sending me a copy of Shail Mayaram’s article.

किम् मन्यन्ते तत्रभवन्तः, कः कः हेतुः युक्ततमः?

शब्दस्वरूप एतत् “पोस्ट्” अपि पठितव्यम्

he akhilavidyāmūrte! śubhās te pathānaḥ santu…

It was 2002, a very humid August, perhaps near 12.00 o’clock.

I was attending my class of Nyāyabodhinī, in the glorious Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika department sitting in the old (1791) Mukhyabhavana of the Sampurnanada Sanskrita University (Varanasi). In the middle of the lesson entered a tiny aged figure, with very bright eyes and shining face.

Then, a bit fatigued, he sat down and started speaking a fluent and elegant Sanskrit.

He explained to have attended for several years, in that very room where we were sitting, the classes of the illustrious paṇḍita Badrinath Shukla.

After a short discussion on few issues related to Siddhāntalaksaṇī Jagadīśī, with our Naiyāyika ācārya, I asked in a spontaneous way to that honourable man, who awakened in me a natural feeling of respect and sympathy: “ke ’trabhavantaḥ!” He replied “kamaleśvaro bhaṭṭācāryanāmadheyo ’ham”.

Immediately, I remembered that few years before, during my BA, I had read some articles on Nyāya signed with that very name. So I replied “asmākam deśeṣu bhavatāṃ nāma atīva prasiddham! praṇāmāmy aham!”.

This was my first meeting with Professor Kamaleswar Bhattacharya and that first feeling never changed, but, conversely, in the following years grew stronger and stronger.

I could never forget his worm and patient way of conversing with students, as well as his severe critic and condemn to aśāstrīya works.

After that first encounter I met Professor Bhattacharya several times in Paris, interrogating him on many śāstric issues, sometimes calling him by phone, or writing long mails asking for some śāstrīyasamādhānas on intricate issues.

Very soon I realised that Professor Bhattacharya was a real living monument of knowledge on several branches of śāstras. I became aware that I have had the privilege to meet a real padavākyapramāṇapravīṇasarvatantrasvatantra!

The affection he demonstrated to me, and I feel with all those who had the fortune to deal with him, is something that I shall forever keep in my heart.

In front of such a human as well scholarly loss it is not easy to say something sensible. I just remember we had scheduled an appointment for the next summer in Paris.

Unfortunately I shall not be again privileged to meet him anymore!

Let me close this note in a way, I hope, he may have appreciated –

saṃyogaś ca viyogaś ca vartate na ca te na me/

nāhaṃ na tvaṃ jagan nedaṃ sarvam atmaiva kevalam//

[A short note by me: Although I have not had the priviledge of studying with him like Gianni, I also could not help admiring Kamaleswara Bhattacharya’s scholarship, especially in the fields of Nāvya Nyāya and Vedānta, his vivid curiosity, his openness to new people, his ability to challenge French with his Nāvya Nyāya translations (he overtly told me once that he tried it exactly because he knew it would have been difficult and he wanted to see whether it would have at all been possible) …and his intense eyes. If you have memories of him that you want to share, please leave a comment below EF]

तत्रभवान् किं किं मन्यते ? रसेलमतं विना किं नैयायिकानां मीमांसकानां मिथः संवादः शक्यो वा न वा ? शक्ये च, कुत्र कुत्र रसेलमतमुपयोजनीयम् ?

जैनप्रत्यक्षजिज्ञासायाम्, श्रीमत्याः अान् क्लावेल् (Anne Clavel) प्रकरणम् एतस्मिन् पुस्तके पठितव्यम् ।

सांख्यानां प्रामाण्याप्रामाण्यौ उभौ स्वतः । नैयायिकानां वैशेषिकानां च प्रामाण्याप्रामाण्यौ उभौ परतः । बौद्धप्रमाणवादिनां प्रामाण्यं परतः, अप्रमाण्यं तु स्वतः । मीमांसकानां तु प्रामाण्यं स्वतः, अप्रमाण्यं च परतः । इति चत्वारः पक्षाः ।

तत्र, सांख्यास्तावत् प्रामाण्यस्य ज्ञाप्त्युत्पत्त्यर्थं न किञ्चिदेवाधिकमवश्यकमिति मन्यन्ते । परन्तु, सांख्याः सत्कार्यवादिनो ऽपि सन्ति । अत एव, केन प्रकारेण प्रमाणाप्रमाणौ भिद्येते ? प्रामाण्याप्रमाण्योः स्वतः सतोः, सत्कार्यवादानुसारेण च किंचिदधिकंपश्चादुत्पत्त्यसंभवे सति, प्रामाण्याप्रामाण्यौ उभौ सकृदुत्पद्याताम् !

नैयायिकास्तु प्रामाण्याप्रामाण्यौ उभौ परतः इति मन्यन्ते । सर्वस्य ज्ञानस्य कारणगुणाः अध्यवसेयाः । ईश्वरज्ञानं तु नित्यमकारणिकं च । तस्य च किं प्रामाण्यम्, अप्रामाण्यं वा ? प्रामाण्यमिति चेत्, नैयायिको ऽपि स्वतःप्रामाण्यं स्वीकरोति । अप्रामाण्यमिति चेन्न, स्ववचनविरोधात्, ईश्वरस्य सार्वज्ञत्वादनपेक्षत्वाच्च ।

बौद्धप्रमाणवादिनः प्रामाण्यम् परतः, अप्रामाण्यं स्वतः इति मन्यन्ते । अतः, सर्वं ज्ञानं स्वत एव अप्रमाणम्, व्यवहारस्यापरमार्थत्वात् । केवलं कारणगुणसद्भावे ज्ञानम् प्रमाणीभवति ।

मीमांसकास्तु− किं कारणगुणज्ञानं स्वतः प्रमाणमुत वा न ? स्वतः प्रमाणमिति चेत्, किमर्थम् तदेव स्वतः प्रमाणम्, प्रथमं ज्ञानं तु परतः ? अप्रमाणमिति चेत्, तद्विषये ऽपि “किं कारणस्य गुणाः सम्भवन्ति ?” इत्यध्यवसेयम् । तत्कारणगुणसद्भावज्ञानस्यापि स्वतः न प्रामाण्यात्, तद्विषये ऽपि कारणगुणाः अध्यवसेयाः − इत्यनवस्था ।

तत्रभवन्तः कं पक्षं स्वीकुर्वन्ति ?