Are Bādarāyaṇa and Vyāsa the same person?

As part of his aikaśāstrya agenda, Vedānta Deśika wanted to prove that Jaimini (the author of the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā Sūtra) was a pupil of Bādarāyaṇa (the author of the Uttara Mīmāṃsā, aka Vedānta, Sūtra). In order to prove that, he can use a verse from the Mahābhārata referring to Vyāsa:

The Lord, the best, the benefactor, taught the Vedas, of which the Mahābhārata is the fifth, to Sumantu, Jaimini, Bailva and Śuka, his own son and to Vaiśampāyana.
They (the students) recited separately [parts] of the Mahābhārata, which had been put together [by Vyāsa] (vedān adhyāpayām āsa mahābhāratapañcamān | sumantuṁ jaiminiṁ pailaṁ śukaṁ caiva svam ātmajam || prabhur variṣṭho varado vaiśaṁpāyanam eva ca | saṁhitās taiḥ pr̥thaktvena bhāratasya prakāśitāḥ || MBh 10.57.74–5)

What remains to be done, at this point, is to establish the identity of Vyāsa and Bādarāyaṇa. This is also a wide-spread idea, but Vedānta Deśika wants to establish through a motivation of this double name:

In the island mixed with (i.e., endowed with) Badarika (jujube) tress, out of Parāśara, Satyavatī (the mother of Vyāsa) begot a child, a destroyer of foes (parantapa), Bādarāyana, the imperishable.

dvīpe badarikāmiśre bādarāyaṇam acyutam |
parāśarāt satyavatī putraṃ lebhe parantapam ||

Unfortunately, however, I could not locate the source of the latter verse. Do you know it?

I am surprised to notice that I never discussed aikaśāstrya on this blog. You can, however, read about it in my forthcoming article on the volume I will edit with Philipp Maas, a preliminary version of which can be read here.

Can one establish the existence of an omniscient?

…or can one just say that his existence cannot be denied?

During his commentary on Maṇḍana Miśra’s Vidhiviveka (henceforth VV), 1.14–15, Vācaspati Miśra focuses on the possibility of the existence of omniscients. Why so? Because the VV is a Mīmāṃsaka text and the whole Mīmāṃsā enterprise depends on the idea that the Vedas are the only way to know about dharma. Thus, the existence of omniscient being, who would have direct access to dharma, would automatically invalidate the Mīmāṃsā epistemology. Consequently, the VV and its commentary need to stage from the beginning a debate between a Buddhist Pramāṇavādin (favouring omniscients) and a Mīmāṃsaka (denying them). During his commentary on VV 1.14, the last word is left to the Pramāṇavādin and Vācaspati seems to display some familiarity with Pramāṇavāda material, since he quotes from Dharmakīrti and discusses the existence of concrete omniscient beings (such as the Buddha), rather than the abstract possibility of yogipratyakṣa*. Part of the discussion is agreeable and well-structured:

  1. The omniscient one exists
  2. Because there are no means to deny his existence and because there are means to positively establish it
  3. Discussion of the former, featuring sense perception and then inference
  4. Discussion of the latter, featuring sense perception

The discussion of 3. is rich and interesting, with the Mīmāṃsaka arguing for the necessity of desire for communication (this is Kumārila’s position) and the Pramāṇavādin replying that the compassion which moves the Buddha to help others is not a desire (rāga). A more technical discussion about the impossibility to formalise a syllogism denying the omniscient is also present.

The odd point about the discussion, however, comes after it, at point 4, since Vācaspati does not seem indeed to give any positive motivation for the existence of an omniscient one (although he promises that he will discuss it again later —I do not yet know whether he keeps his promise). Accordingly, the discussion of 4. is also negative in nature:

Nor is it the case that there are no positive evidences. To elaborate, such an [absence] should be either absence of perceptual [evidence] or of [evidence] from all (other?) instruments of knowledge. In turn, the absence of perceptual [evidence] regards either itself or all [the rest]. Even if it regards itself, then it can be either characterised by the fact that [the absence of perception regards] something perceptible, or [the absence of perception] is not characterised (by either perceptibility or anything else). To begin with, the absence of perceptual evidence of itself as regarding something perceptible does not prove the absence of an omniscient. Because the [omniscience] has a remote (i.e., parokṣa) nature and, thus, cannot have its [perceptual] reality arise, as it is well known. And the absence of the whole sense-perception is not established, because the [absence of perceptual evidence] which is not [further] characterised is wrong. For, it is not the case that the entire perception of a normal (i.e, not omniscient) human being (arvāgdṛś-) is absent, for this is not established.

(nāpi sādhakapramāṇābhāvaḥ. tathā hi sa pratyakṣābhavo vā sakalapramāṇābhavo vā syāt. pratyakṣābhāvo’pi cātmanaḥ sarveṣām vā yadātmanaḥ tadāpi dṛśyatāviśeṣaṇaḥ nirviśeṣaṇa vā. na tāvad ātmapratyakṣanivṛttir drśyatāviśeṣaṇā sarvajñābhāvasādhanī, tasya svabhāvaviprakarṣinas tattvānupapatteḥ prasiddhatvāt. nirviśeṣanāyāś ca vyabhicārāt samastapratyakṣanivṛtteś cāsiddhatvam. na khalv arvāgdṛśaḥ sakalapratyakṣanivṛtti asiddhatvāt, Stern p. 457.)

nirviśeṣaṇa possibly refers to sorts of perception which do not need a perceptible object, such as intellectual intuition (yogipratyakṣa).

Do you have any experience with a nirviśeṣaṇa ātmapratyakṣābhāva? And more in general, are there positive arguments for the existence of an omniscient?

*I am currently reading this text with Marco Ferrante and Cristina Pecchia. I owe this last comment to her, whereas I probably owe to Marco almost all the rest. I never write it in my articles, but just in case: All errors remain mine.

(cross-posted on the Indian Philosophy Blog)

Is there really a single author of the Yogasūtra and Yogabhāṣya?

The idea that the Yogasūtra (henceforth YS) and the Yogabhāṣya (henceforth YBh) are not two distinct texts has been discussed for the first way in a systematic way by Johannes Bronkhorst in 1985 (“Patañjali and the Yoga Sūtras”, Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik). Philipp Maas in his published PhD thesis (Maas 2006) examined it again and Philipp Maas in his contribution to Eli Franco’s Periodization and Historiography of Indian Philosophy (2013) dealt with it again in greater detail.

Where are the Yoga philosophers?

Today I read in Philipp Maas’s contribution to Periodization and Historiography of Indian Philosophy (edited by Eli Franco) an intriguing critique of Colebrook and of all the Indologists who, seemingly following him, thought that there was nothing philosophical in Yoga apart from its Sāṅkhya component and that what was typical of Yoga alone was not philosophical.

Who are the Vedāntins?

Who wrote the following quotes?

There is an Upaniṣadic sayiong that the Brahman is one only, without a second. But the existence of something different than the Brahman refutes this. To this we say: in the mention of “without a second” what does the compound intend? Is it a tatpuruṣa or a bahuvrīhi (attributive compound)? […]

Moreover, which consciousness modifies itself (vivṛt-) in the form of the deployment (prapañca)? To begin with, it is not the notion of [simple objects] like a pot, since the [deployment] is seen also when such notions are not present. And since it is not the case that one can say that if such a notion were not produced, or if it were destroyed, the whole world would not exist. And if one were to say it, [one’s assertion] would be invalidated by one’s sense-perception. […]

If X  appears without Y, even Y appears also without X. For instance, [a cloth] appearing even without a pot [and] a pot itself [appearing] without a cloth.

You have surely understood that we are within a Vedāntic framework (i.e.: using the Upaniṣads as one’s foundamental point of reference, evoking the brahman). What else?

Would you have understood that the framework is not-Advaitin? Probably so, given that the last verse mentioned refutes the sahopalambhaniyama (the rule according to which if two things are simultaneously grasped, like cognitions and external objects —which are only grasped through cognitions— they are not different). However, you might be surprised to know that the author is Yāmuna (in his Āgamaprāmāṇya).

In the light of that, what does the distinctive contribution of Śrī Rāmānuja consists in, apart from systematization and more accurate treatment of many detailed features?

You can read some more open questions on Rāmānuja by clicking on the category “Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta”.