Kumārila conference

The first Kumārila Conference will be held at the Department of Philosophy at the University of Toronto, Mississauga, from May 27th to June 1st, 2024. Venue: Maanjiwe nendamowinan building, Room 3230, UTM.

The conference will bring together experts who will lead two-hour reading sessions on key passages of Kumārila’s texts and provide participants with the necessary tools to understand the hidden gems of Kumārila’s philosophy. More in detail, these sessions will include the reading and commenting on selected passages on a given topic (e.g., adhikāra in Ṭupṭīkā 6.1) and a talk on the topic itself (e.g., mapping the intersection of adhikāra and sāmarthya) and then a discussion session. Besides, there will be opportunities for scholars and advanced students to present their research related to Kumārila in shorter sessions (60′ and 30′).

The conference will be coordinated by Elisa Freschi and Nilanjan Das and will see the participation of other experts in Sanskrit philosophy and philology. Confirmed participants (so far) include Dan Arnold, Tarinee Awasthi, Purushottama Bilimoria, Hugo David, Alessandro Graheli, Ham Hyoung Seok, Kei Kataoka, Malcolm Keating, Lawrence McCrea, Sudipta Munsi, John Nemec, Monika Nowakowska, Andrew Ollett, Parimal Patil, Akane Saito, Wintor Scott, Taisei Shida, Elliot Stern, Angela Vettikkal, Alex Watson and Kiyotaka Yoshimizu.

This will be an in-person only event, since we believe in the power of collective intelligence and collaboration and these are hardly replicable when some participants speak per Zoom and others are in the room. Please consider that we are happy to assist you with invitation letters etc. if you need them for visa purposes, just let us know!

Permissions in Dharmaśāstra

Vijñāneśvara’s Mitākṣarā commentary on Yājñvalkya 3 (on expiations), v. 35, explains that even in case of distress a non-Brāhmaṇa cannot take up the profession of a Brāhmaṇa and a Brāhmaṇa cannot take up that of a Śūdra. The commentary on v. 35 also explains that one will need to undergo an expiation ritual (prāyaścitta) because of having undertaken the occupation of another varṇa, once the difficult times are over (see Kumārila’s similar point in text a about expiable permissions). This suggests that

P(taking up the occupation of a kṣatriya or vaiśya varṇa)/being a Brāhmaṇa in distress (and so on for the further varṇas)

is to be understood as an exception to a previous prohibition:

F(perform the occupation of a kṣatriya, vaiśya and śūdra/Brāhmaṇa)

and not of a negative obligation.
It also seems to mean, as Timothy Lubin suggested (Nov 25), that there is no *F(self-harm)/T, since it may happen that taking up the occupation of a Brāhmaṇa would be the only way to avoid dying by starvation, but this still does not lead to a duty to undertake such an occupation.

Moreover, the picture gets more complicated.
In fact, vv. 37–39 explain that

P(taking up the profession of a vaiśya)/(being a Brāhmaṇa in distress)

has some counter-exceptions, namely prohibitions applying to it, e.g.

F(selling weapons)/being a Brāhmaṇa in distress who has taken up the occupation of a vaiśya

Thus, it is possible to have prohibitions within permissions (that are in turn exceptions of other prohibitions)

♦P(x/y) /\ F(z/x)

Then, there is a counter-counter exception, namely:

F(selling/Brāhmaṇa) /\ P(selling/Brāhmaṇa in distress) /\ F(selling sesame/Brāhmaṇa in distress) /\ P (selling sesame in exchange for grain/Brāhmaṇa who can’t perform rites for want of grain).

The commentary quotes Manu 10.91 explaining that if one were to sell sesame in exchange for something else, one would be harshly sanctioned (one will be born again as dog).
v. 41 and commentary explain that the previous permissions are clearly “better not” and that they come with some cost, whereas accepting gifts in case of distress is alright.
So (like in Kumārila, text a above), there are two levels of permissions:

F(selling/Brāhmaṇa)

P1(selling/Brāhmaṇa in distress) —>O(expiation/end of distress) \/ bad karman

P2(accepting gifts/Brāhmaṇa in distress)—>no bad karman

v. 43 (on stealing) follows at that point.
It reads as follows:

bubhukṣitas tryayaṃ sthitvā dhānyam abrāhmaṇād dharet |

pratigṛhya tad ākhyeyam abhiyuktena dharmataḥ ||

“If one has been hungry for three days, he might take some grains from someone who is not a Brāhmaṇa |

If he takes it and is accused, he must say it, according to duty (dharma) ||”

NB: F(stealing)/T is overrun by P(stealing)/not having eaten for three days, provided one is stealing only from a non-Brāhmaṇa (thus presupposing F(stealing from a Brāhmaṇa)/T). The Mitākṣarā commentary
further explains that one can only take enough for one meal and cannot take additional supplies, thus presupposing P(stealing a minimal amount to avoid starvation)/not having eaten for three days.
Now, if one goes on like that for a long time, one might eventually die of starvation (because one is stealing only enough for one meal and only once every three days). v. 44 suggests the solution (the king should take care of one), but this is not a solution one can count on in every case. Hence, v. 43 does not a rule out a situation in which, in order to avoid violating the prohibitions at stake (F(stealing)/T, weakened by P(stealing from a non-Brāhmaṇa/not having eaten for 3 days) and F(stealing from a Brāhmaṇa)/T)) one ends up actually dying.
This further strengthens the point that there is no O(avoid starvation) as the result of F(harm)/T.

The commentary introducing v. 43 states that P(stealing from a non-Brāhmaṇa/distress) only applies to people who have tried all of the above. I am not sure about how to formalise the temporality factor, perhaps something like:

F(selling/Brāhmaṇa)

P1(selling/Brāhmaṇa in distress) /\ distress—>
P1(stealing/Brāhmaṇa in distress)

NB: Kumārila had distinguished between P1 and P2, but by saying that P1 are “general permissions” and P2 specific ones, that is ones explicitly mentioned in text, whereas here P1 can be specifically mentioned and still involve some bad karman.

Appendix: Kumārila, TV ad 1.3.4, text a

[In one case, that of hardship] one does something even without permission, because there is no other way |

[in the other case, that of supererogatory permissions,] one does something else on the strength of a permission: the difference is major ||

And there is a difference between the specific [permission] and the permission (abhyanujñāna) in general (to adopt looser rules in times of hardship) |

[In fact,] the specific [permitted action] is completely free of flaws, the other action has a little (stoka) flaw ||

ekaṃ vināpy anujñānāt kriyate gatyasambhavāt | kriyate ‘nujñayā tv anyad viśeṣaś ca tayor mahāh ||

sāmānyenābhyanujñānād viśeṣaś ca viśiṣyate | viśeṣo ‘tyantanirdoṣaḥ stokadoṣetarakriyā ||

Is the Mitākṣarā just not following Kumārila when it says that even a specific permission can imply bad karman and the need of an expiation? Is Kumārila trying to systematize a complicated series of cases? Or am I missing something altogether?

Ought entails Can (and Prohibited entails Can) for Kumārila (and Śabara)

Within TV ad 1.3.4, (Mimamsadarsana 1929-34, pp. 192–193), Kumārila discusses a seeming deontic conflict and solves it by appealing to the different responsibilities (adhikāra) of the various addressees. He explains that the prescription to learn the Vedas for 48 years does not conflict (virodhābhāva) with the duty to get married and have children, because it addresses people who suffer of disabilities and who therefore cannot become householders. This is a further evidence of how O(x/a) implies that a is actually able to perform x. If a is unable to perform x, the obligation is not incumbent upon them (the background, ableist, assumption is that a blind or lame person cannot support a family.

Kumārila also discusses the prescription to learn the Veda by heart in order to get svarga (heaven/happiness) and explains it would clash against the ones prescribing complicated sacrifices for the same result, since no one would engage in them, if learning the Veda by heart were enough. Here, we see several principles at work:

1. No prescription can remain idle.
2. Translative (?) property of duties: If x implies z and O(x), then O(z). In fact, performing sacrifices \emph{presupposes} learning the Veda by heart, so that O(sacrifices)—>O(learning Veda by heart).

Because of 1., it is clear that the former prescription necessarily only applies to people who cannot perform the latter. Thus: If there are two seemingly contradictory obligations (both aiming at the same result), that is:

(i) O(x/in order to reach s) and
(ii) O (x3/in order to reach s),
then one needs to postulate for the former an additional condition that states something like “Unless you can perform (ii).

As for the converse, namely that prohibitions imply possibility, Śabara (ŚBh ad 1.2.18) explains that the seeming prohibition “The Fire is not to be kindled on the earth, nor in the sky, nor in heaven” cannot be taken as a prohibition, because fire cannot be kindled in the sky nor in heaven.

Prescriptions in Kumārila, Uṃveka, Maṇḍana

Maṇḍana’s thesis of iṣṭasādhanatā is an answer to the problem of how to identify the core of a prescription. What makes people undertake actions? Kumārila’s śabdabhāvanā (‘linguistic urge’) theory and Prabhākara’s kāryavāda (‘theory about duty [being the motivator]’) had already offered their answers.

Kumārila’s theory had two pillars:

  • 1. a theory of rational behaviour being always goal-oriented,
  • 2. a strong hermeneutic basis linked to the analysis of prescriptive language.

In the 2. analysis, exhortative verbal endings are analysed as entailing a verbal part (tiṅ) and an exhortative part (liṅ). The former express the action (bhāvanā), the latter express the injunction (vidhi/śabdabhāvanā). And any action needs three components, namely something to be brought about by the action (bhāvya), an instrument to bring it about (karaṇa) and a procedure (itikartavyatā), which is equated to the instrument’s instrument. bhāvanā, vidhi, bhāvya, karaṇa and itikartavyatā are all conveyed by the Vedic prescriptive sentence, but are they conveyed *qua* bhāvanā etc.? The answer is clearly affirmative for bhāvanā and vidhi, which are directly conveyed by tiṅ and liṅ respectively. By contrast, bhāvya, karaṇa and itikartavyatā might need the application of some further investigation on the part of the knower, who will need to apply hermeneutical rules (nyāya) to correctly interpret the sentence and link the bhāvya to the word mentioning the eligible person and the karaṇa to the meaning of the verbal root.

The first pillar (1) is taken up by Maṇḍana.
In fact, Maṇḍana expands on Kumārila’s intuition about human behaviour being always goal-oriented by offering a radical reductionist hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, being a motivator is nothing but communicating that the action to be undertaken is an instrument to some desired result. In this sense, prescribing X to people desiring Y is *nothing but* explaining that X is the means to achieve Y. The “nothing but” part of the definition is key to distinguish Maṇḍana’s position from Kumārila’s. Also for Kumārila a prescription presupposes that one understands that the prescribed action will lead to something independently desired.

Now, I am grateful to Sudipta Munsi, who recently made me read Uṃveka’s commentary on ŚV codanā 214, where Uṃveka rejects a view that seems a proto-version of Kumārila’s one, since it speaks of bhāvanā, of a desired bhāvya and of the meaning of the verbal root, but without mentioning the fact that this conveys the karaṇa. In this proto-Kumārila view, the prescriptive sentence impels (pravṛt-), but since one might doubt this impulsion, it implies (ākṣip-) a bhāvya in the form of something desirable and therefore orients the listener’s understanding to move past the meaning of the verbal root towards the identification of something really desirable. Uṃveka does not use the verb abhidhā- ‘directly denote’, but says that the prescriptive sentences conveys (avagam-) this meaning. The doubt (āśaṅkā) about the impulsion seems to be the reason for the implication (ākṣepa). Uṃveka does not frame this as a case of śrutārthāpatti (postulation of a linguistic element based on cogent evidence), because ākṣepa performs almost the same role (but without the postulation of an explicit linguistic unit, which remains implied).
Uṃveka contrasts to this view his own (vayaṃ tu brūmaḥ), according to which a prescriptive sentence first conveys an impulsion (preraṇā) and then (uttarakālam) conveys (pratī-) a desired goal. Here, there are important points that appear to be influenced by Maṇḍana (please remember that Uṃveka commented on Maṇḍana’s Bhāvanāviveka):

  • The mention of the destruction of accumulated bad karman as the desired result for fixed sacrifices
  • The connection between impulsion and the fact that the action impelled leads to a desirable goal

However, unlike in Maṇḍana, Uṃveka distinguishes impulsion (preraṇā) from the fact of being the instrument to a desired goal, whereas Maṇḍana’s main claim is that the two are completely identical. Uṃveka is possibly the first person mentioning the temporal sequence linking impulsion and the understanding (pratī-) of something as a desirable goal. Like in the discussion of the proto-Kumārila view, Uṃveka does not use the word abhidhā, but he says that the prescriptive content is conveyed (avagam-).

Pārthasārathi (another commentator of Kumārila) de facto embedded Maṇḍana’s view of iṣṭasādhanatā, i.e., the prescribed action is an instrument to a desired result, as part of Kumārila’s śabdabhāvanā theory, more precisely as its procedure (itikartavyatā).

This was just a quick summary. Specifications or corrections are welcome.

Preliminary thoughts on divine omnipresence

Within the paradigm of rational theology (in my jargon, God-as-Lord or Īśvara), can God have a form and a body?… Do They need one?

Possible arguments in favour of Their having a body: 

—Yes! They need it to exercise Their will on matter (and, as Kumārila explained, matter does not obey abstract will)

—Yes! They need it so that we can revere Them.

The second argument does not count (it’s part of the God-as-Thou level), but the first seems powerful enough. If God did not have a body, They would have no influence on the world. Do They need a body in order to be omnipresent? And which kind of body? Surely not a limited one (as a deity could have it), since this would limit Their action (They could act only where the body is). Instead, They need to be omnipresent.

Which kind of body could be omnipresent? What would this entail?

In fact, most rational theologians I am aware of speak of God as being omnipresent, in a non-material way, but still as being able to interact with matter at will (so Udayana). Thus, as typical of the God-as-Lord, God is more-than-human, but very close to humans.

However, time and again theologians came to a different solution to God’s body, one which brings them close to the third concept of God, the impersonal Absolute. These theologians think of God’s body as omnipresent and yet material, because it is all that exists.

This all brings me to a more general question: Can there be omnipresence without a (limited) body?

This seems to demand from us a category jump. Because we need to put together presence in space (usually connected with extended bodies) and absence of a body (if conceived as extended in a limited space). 

I can think of at least three solutions:

1. space does not exist for God and is just a category conscious beings superimpose on the word (e.g., Kant, I am not aware of this solution prior to Kant)

2. pantheist version (God is the world) (e.g., Spinoza, Bruno, Rāmānuja)

3. God has something akin to a subtle body, which is omni-pervasive (vibhū) (Nyāya) 

The third case is often said to be a characteristic shared by God and souls (Augustine, Nyāya).

Yet, the souls’ omnipresence seems to be very different from God’s one (possibly because of some additional limitations due to their embodiment, the original sin etc.) 

What else can we say about Their omnipresence? It needs to be complete in each instance. God cannot be present for, e.g., 1/1.000.000.000.000 in the tree in front of my window, since this would entail the risk of Them exercising only a small amount of power on the tree. Moreover, They would be “more” present in bigger objects and less present in small ones! Thus, God needs to be completely present in each atom though being at the same time distributively present in the whole sum of all atoms. This again, calls for a category jump and not just a more-than-human body, since even a subtle matter extending all over the space will not be at the same time completely present in each atom. 

Thoughts and comments are welcome. Please bear with me if I am late in reading comments after the term starts again, on Monday.

General and specific rules in Mīmāṃsā?

What happens when commands clash? A standard devise to deal with the topic is the idea of taking one as a general rule and the other as a specific one. In Sanskrit, these are called, respectively, utsarga and apavāda. Mīmāṃsā authors have, however, other devices.

For instance, Kumārila, discusses the prohibition to perform violence and its seeming conflict with the ritual prescription to perform ritual killing within a given sacrifice.
See his Commentary in verses (Ślokavārttika), chapter on Injunction (codanā), vv. 223—224:

तेन सामान्यतः प्राप्तो विधिना न निवारितः ||
फलांशोपनिपातिन्या हिंसायाः प्रतिेषेधकः |
“Therefore the prohibition to killing, obtained in general applied and not stopped by another injunction, prohibits the killing when it pertains to the fruit-portion |

Is this a case of a general rule overturned by a specific one (as claimed in Kei Kataoka 2012, Is Killing Bad?)?

If it were so, we would have the general prohibition to perform violence (F(violence)/T) being overruled by the more specific obligation to perform ritual killing in a specific setting:
F(violence)/T
O(violence)/sacrifice for Agni and Soma

However, this is not the solution adopted by Kumārila. Rather, Kumārila’s point is that the original prohibition to perform violence should be reconfigured as a prohibition regarding only violence as the result of the action, and not regarding instrumental violence.

That is, according to Kumārila, the Vedic prohibition to perform violence should not be read as
F(violence)/T
but as
F(violence as a result)/T
which does not conflict with (instrumental violence)

Comments, as usual, welcome!

Maṇḍana’s intellectual theory of motivation

Maṇḍana’s thesis is an answer to the problem of how to identify the core of a prescription. What makes people undertake actions? Kumārila’s śabdabhāvanā theory and Prabhākara’s kāryavāda had already offered their answers. Maṇḍana expands on Kumārila’s intuition about human behaviour being always goal-oriented by offering a radical reductionist hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, being a motivator is nothing but communicating that the action to be undertaken is an instrument to some coveted result. In this sense, prescribing X to people desiring Y is nothing but explaining that X is the means to achieve Y.

This cognitive interpretation of what motivates one to act could be accused of intellectualism. What about agents who, though understanding that X would be the appropriate course of action, do not undertake it, perhaps out of sloth?

A possible answer is that Maṇḍana’s theory describes the behaviour of ideal agents, who are able to evaluate rationally what is the best means to a coveted goal. Alternatively, one might suggest (as hinted at at the end of section 11.2) that even such irrational people would be impelled to act, even if they then do not physically undertake any act. The iṣṭasādhanatā is a motivator even for them, although they do not act correspondingly. One might think of the comparable case of someone who intensely desires an ice-cream and comes to know that great ice-creams are available in a given part of the city. They are ready to go there, but undergo an accident and are prevented from going. Although they do not practically act, the knowledge about the ice-cream shop did act as motivator for them.

Correspondingly, pravṛtti is used as a synonym of prayatna `effort’ and indicates the undertaking of an activity, not yet its realisation. Similarly, a person said to be pravṛtta is one who has already conceived the decision to undertake an action, although no movement can be seen yet.

A preliminary understanding of pratibhā

Within chapter 11 of his masterpiece, the Vidhiviveka `Discernment about prescription’, Maṇḍana identifies the core element which causes people to undertake actions. Maṇḍana expands on Kumārila’s intuition about human behaviour being always goal-oriented by offering a radical reductionist hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, being a motivator is nothing but communicating that the action to be undertaken is an instrument to some coveted result. In this sense, prescribing X to people desiring Y is nothing but explaining that X is the means to achieve Y.

At this point, Maṇḍana introduces some opponents, mainly one upholding pratibhā.

The term pratibhā is found in Bhartṛhari, whom Maṇḍana extensively quotes in chapter 11 of his Vidhiviveka. It is clear that Maṇḍana suggests the pratibhā as an alternative way of making sense of what motivates people to act. In this sense, pratibhā is a pravartaka `motivator’, something causing one to act. It is the key alternative to Maṇḍana’s own proposal that the knowledge that the enjoined action will lead to a desired result is what causes people to act. The pratibhā theory radically opposes this one.

In fact, Maṇḍana’s theory is primarily cognitive (you act with regard to X because you know something relevant about X), whereas the pratibhā theory is almost behaviourist (you act with regard to X because of the pratibhā inducing you to act).

The Prābhākara opponent within Maṇḍana will later appropriate this theory and join it with their own deontological understanding, according to which we act primarily because we are enjoined to do so, thus adding a deontological nuance which was absent in Bhartṛhari’s view of pratibhā.

But what is pratibhā before its Prābhākara reinterpretation? A key passage for the understanding of the pratibhā theory in Maṇḍana before its Prābhākara appropriation is the very sentence introducing it, at the beginning of section 11.3. There, the opponent suggests pratibhā as the thing causing one to undertake an action. An uttarapakṣin asks which kind of artha this is and the answer is at first sight surprising: It is no artha at all (na kaścit). What is it then? It is a cognitive event (prajñā) leading to action.

The point seems to be that there is no mental content, but only the urge towards acting. The pratibhā is a mental state without intentional content.

A further hint is found at the beginning of 11.5, where Maṇḍana responds to the paradox that the pratibhā cognition has no object, but it causes activity. This results, says Maṇḍana, in an undesirable consequence. In fact, if in the case of pratibhā the cognition of the connection between word and meaning plays no role, because the pratibhā has no intentional content, a person hearing a prescription should act independently of any cognition of the meaning.

But can we have purely agentive mental states? Can there be incitement to action without any content?

I am grateful to Hugo David for an inspiring talk on pratibhā back in 2018. This interpretation should, however, not be blamed on him. Similarly, I am always grateful to Elliot Stern for his edition of the Vidhiviveka and for the work we shared in the last 12 months.

Uddyotakara on absence as an instrument of knowledge: NS 2.2.1–12

What is the pre-Kumārila position of Nyāya authors on absence as an instrument of knowledge? There seem to have been several shifts, from inference to perception (and then again to inference in some cases after Kumārila).

At the end of an epistemological discussion in a Sanskrit text, it is standard to discuss the sources of knowledge (pramāṇa) you don’t accept. Long-term memory (smṛti) has most likely been already excluded at the beginning, while discussing the definition of pramāṇa, so that it is not mentioned among the specific candidates.

Within Mīmāṃsā, Kumārila excludes (at the end of the discussion on abhāva) sambhava (inclusion) and aitihya (tradition). Within Nyāya, Gautama excludes these two, as well as two sources accepted by Kumārila, i.e. arthāpatti (cogent evidence) and abhāva (absence).

The discussion starts in NS 2.2.1, where an opponent says: “There are not 4 sources of knowledge, because [also] tradition, inclusion, cogent evidence and absence as sources of knowledge”. The discussion then goes on for several pages. NS 2.2.2 says that aitihya is nothing but linguistic communication (śabda) and inclusion is inference (anumāna). This is what Kumārila also says. What is different is that Gautama says that also arthāpatti and abhāva are nothing but inference.

This is remarkable, because the classical position of Nyāya authors (e.g., Jayanta) about absence is that this is known through sense-perception (not inference!). Only after Kumārila’s objections and through Gaṅgeśa etc. they say that in some cases inference is indeed needed (e.g., when you infer now that a certain person was not in a place you visited earlier today).

NS 2.2.3ff focus on arthāpatti, which is now said to be inconclusive (anaikāntika). NS 2.2.7 focuses on abhāva, which is now said to be not a pramāṇa at all, because there is not a corresponding prameya. Please notice that early Nyāya does not accept abhāva as a separate category, whereas this will be later added as the seventh padārtha.

Uddyotakara explains: abhāva is not a source of knowledge, because there is no content for it. Uddyotakara also adds something which seems new, namely that there is indeed a pramāṇa at stake, but that this has as its content something existing (again, weird, given the status of abhāva as padārtha…).

NS 2.2.8 speaks again in favour of abhāva, insofar as it is used to cognise, among marked things, the ones which are not marked.
This seems to prove that abhāva is indeed a source of knowledge, as explained by Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara. NS 2.2.9 goes back to the problem that there is no prameya for such a pramāṇa.

Uddyotakara on NS 2.2.12 explains that there are only two types of absence (prior and posterior absence). This is relevant, because Kumārila had discussed absence as being four-fold (thus, Uddyotakara clearly did not know this classification, since he does not even take notice of it). Interestingly, Vācaspati, commenting on Uddyotakara, feels the need to add that the fact that he mentions two does not mean that he refutes the others.

What does this all tell us about early Nyāya until Uddyotakara and absence?

  • 1. that Uddyoataka only knows a 2-fold classification of abhāva as prameya.
  • 2. that an early position saw abhāva as part of anumāna (this seems to be also Uddyotakara’s position at the end of his commentary on NS 2.2.2).
  • 3. that abhāva is considered a useful epistemological category, e.g., to speak about things lacking a certain characteristic.

The above is based on the commentary on NS 2.2.1–12. I will come back to later passages of the NV.

Addendum: Jhā translates abhāva as “antithesis”. Don’t ask me why.