On September the 1st, Kiyotaka Yoshimizu will read a paper at the Austrian Academy of Sciences, IKGA (Apostelgasse 23, 1030):
Kumārila’s Criticism of Buddhism as a Religious Movement in his Views on the Sources of dharma
On September the 2nd and the 3rd, Kiyotaka Yoshimizu will be at the Austrian Academy of Sciences (Apostelgasse, 23, 1030, ground floor) for a workshop on “Semantics or Pragmatics?”. The workshop wil regard Dignāga’s and Kumārila’s distinction of semantics from pragmatics (an innovation both shared, if compared to Nyāya) and their different solutions to the issue (with Dignāga priviledging semantics and Kumārila focusing on pragmatics).
More in detail,
2.9: apoha in Dignāga (showing his focus on semantics over pragmatics)
3.9: Kumārila’s understanding of the grahakaikatvanyāya as an evidence of his focus on pragmatics
Texts to be read: PS and PSV 41-44; PS and PSV 50a (2.9). TV on 3.1.(7).13-15 (3.9).
References: Kiyotaka Yoshimizu “The Theorem of the Singleness of a Goblet (graha-ekatva-nyāya) : A Mīmāṃsā Analysis of Meaning and Context”, Acta Asiatica 90, 2006.
Kiyotaka Yoshimizu “How to Refer to a Thing by a Word: Another Difference between Dignāga’s and Kumārila’s Theories of Denotation”, in Journal of Indian Philosophy, 39(4-5), 2011.
Is the plurality of subjects compatible with the idea of a Vedāntic kind of liberation (in which there seems to be no distinction among different souls)? And can there be an absolute brahman if there are still distinct subjects?
We all know that for Dignāga the meaning of a word is apoha ‘exclusion’. But how does one seize it and avoid the infinite regress of excluding non-cows because one has understood what “cow” means? Kataoka at the last IABS maintained (if I understood him correctly) that Dignāga did not directly face the problem of how could one seize the absence of non-cows. He also explained that the thesis he attributes to Hattori and Yoshimizu, which makes the apoha depend on the seizing of something positive (e.g., one seizes the exclusion of non-cows because one seizes the exclusion of dewlap, etc.) contradicts the negative nature of apoha, since it indirectly posits positive entities, such as dewlaps. But this leaves the question of how apoha can take place in the worldly experience open.
All nice things come to an end, and so did the IABS conference. Now, many among you will be heading to Heidelberg for the Dharmakīrti Conference. Although I will not be able to attend, I received from K. Yoshimizu his paper for it, with the assent to discuss it here.
There are various differences among the Bhāṭṭa and the Prābhākara schools of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, respectively founded by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Prabhākara Miśra, who possibly lived around the 7th c. AD, but one of the most striking and telling ones is that regarding the concept of apūrva.
How can one interpret a Vedic passage by saying that a certain meaning was not “intended” (vivakṣita), while still thinking that the Veda has no personal author?
The Mīmāṃsā cannot renounce the idea that the Veda has no personal author (apauruṣeyatva): its whole theory about the Veda’s validity depends on this principle. However, Kumārila needs also to explain in which sense one can decide whether an interpretation of the Veda is right or not on the basis of whether it is intended (vivakṣita). How can one speak of intention if there is no author?
The first Kumārila Conference will be held at the Department of Philosophy at the University of Toronto, Mississauga, from May 27th to June 1st, 2024. Venue: Maanjiwe nendamowinan building, Room 3230, UTM.
The conference will bring together experts who will lead two-hour reading sessions on key passages of Kumārila’s texts and provide participants with the necessary tools to understand the hidden gems of Kumārila’s philosophy. More in detail, these sessions will include the reading and commenting on selected passages on a given topic (e.g., adhikāra in Ṭupṭīkā 6.1) and a talk on the topic itself (e.g., mapping the intersection of adhikāra and sāmarthya) and then a discussion session. Besides, there will be opportunities for scholars and advanced students to present their research related to Kumārila in shorter sessions (60′ and 30′).
The conference will be coordinated by Elisa Freschi and Nilanjan Das and will see the participation of other experts in Sanskrit philosophy and philology. Confirmed participants (so far) include Dan Arnold, Tarinee Awasthi, Purushottama Bilimoria, Hugo David, Alessandro Graheli, Ham Hyoung Seok, Kei Kataoka, Malcolm Keating, Lawrence McCrea, Sudipta Munsi, John Nemec, Monika Nowakowska, Andrew Ollett, Parimal Patil, Akane Saito, Wintor Scott, Taisei Shida, Elliot Stern, Angela Vettikkal, Alex Watson and Kiyotaka Yoshimizu.
This will be an in-person only event, since we believe in the power of collective intelligence and collaboration and these are hardly replicable when some participants speak per Zoom and others are in the room. Please consider that we are happy to assist you with invitation letters etc. if you need them for visa purposes, just let us know!
I received the following ad from Prof. Kiyotaka Yoshimizu. You might remember that this position is presently Somdev Vasudev’s and used to be Diwakar Acharya’s and Werner Knobl’s.
Andrew Ollett has just posted some interesting comments on K. Yoshimizu recent workshop and on the impact of his theories from a linguistic point of view. Andrew especially elaborates on the topic-comment opposition and on the possibility to read along these lines the vidheya–upadeya opposition found in Kumarila.
If you missed the workshop, you can read about it also here.