Positive and negative atheism

Michael Martin elaborates on positive atheism vs negative atheism and explains that the former is the positive belief that there are no god(s), whereas the latter is just the absence of belief in any god(s). He then adds:

These categories should not be allowed to mask the complexity and variety of positions that atheists can hold, for a given individual can take different atheistic positions with respect to different concepts of God. Thus, a person might maintain that there is good reason to suppose that anthropomorphic gods such as Zeus do not exist and therefore be a positive atheist with respect to Zeus and similar gods. However, he or she could, for example, be only a negative atheist with respect to Paul Tillich’s God. In addition, people can and often do hold different atheistic positions with respect to different conceptions of a theistic God. For example, someone could be a positive atheist with respect to Aquinas’ God and only a negative atheist with repsect to St. Teresa’s God. (Martin 2007, p. 2)

Martin does not discuss the case of a person convinced that there is, for instance, no Zeus while they believe in the Christian God, possibly because he considers this just a case of inner-antagonism among theists. The phenomenon might be, however, more interesting than that, since it might have rather to do with a belief in a completely different kind of god. This is particularly evident in the case of Indian atheists who might be positive atheists regarding Īśvara or devatās, but then believe in brahman or in a personal god.

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8 thoughts on “Positive and negative atheism

  1. At the risk of making caricatures, I would like to present some western atheists and their views. There are “provisional atheists” who consider atheism to be their present opinion while holding the right to change their minds if new convincing data is encountered. This is best stated by the former pastor Jerry De Witt.
    (1) Skepticism is my nature
    (2) Free thought is my methodology
    (3) Agnosticism is my conclusion
    (4) Atheism is my opinion
    There is the neuroscientist Sam Harris with his notion of both spirituality and atheism as penned in his book “Waking Up”. The late author Christopher Hitchens and the biologist Richard Dawkins, both staunch atheists, give ample room for numinous feelings particularly evoked by looking at the night sky and wondering about the vastness of the universe. Philosopher Dan Dennett thinks that religion is a natural phenomenon based on human instincts, while maintaining his view that religious beliefs are false. Finally, the philosopher A.C. Grayling believes in the “good” moral life without the need of belief in any sort of supernatural entity.
    My question to Dr. Frieschi: Does Purva Mimansa school of thought have anything in common with any of the modern western types of atheism?

    • Dear Salil,

      a senior colleague of mine once taught me to answer such questions always with a “no”, in the sense that there are always culturally relevant differences. The history and background of PM is far away from that of Dawkins etc. This being said, Kumārila would agree that
      1) blind belief is bad (this is his main reason to oppose Buddhism)
      2) rational investigation is the only acceptable methodology
      3) therefore, one concludes that the existence of devatās runs against rational investigation (their acceptance leads to contradictions)
      4) similarly, the acceptance of omniscient beings (like the Buddha) also leads to contradictions.

      This surely leads to a form of local atheism (denial of the existence of devatās and superhuman beings like the Buddha). However, I am not sure that Kumārila would have agreed with a global atheism. To be honest, I am also not sure that some contemporary atheists are global atheist either. Their arguments seem to be targeted only at the devatā or īśvara level (for these labels, see http://elisafreschi.com/2017/03/31/god-and-realism/).

  2. One thought about “negative atheism”. Atheists claim to hold their opinion based on empirical evidence. There are clearly more theists than atheists alive today. “Belief in god or gods” is a very real and observable phenomenon among humans alive today. An atheist cannot claim to be a “negative atheist” because this stance would be contrary to empirical evidence based on observation. One does not have to look far to find the presence of “belief in god or gods”. An atheist can only make a claim about the “non-existence of god or gods”, not about the “non-existence of belief in god of gods”.

    • Well, in many cases one might just be indifferent to the topic, isn’t it? One might focus on natural explanation and just not be interested in knowing whether God is part of the universe (they might exist, but they do not appear to be relevant, hence no reason to focus on them).

  3. Very much in such discussions is a question of, or quibble about, definitions. Here I would like to refer to my own little monograph, The Concept of Divinity in Jainism (Toronto, 1993. It was a special lecture that later was reprinted in whole in J. O’Connell (ed.), Jain Doctrine and Practice: Academic Perspectives. Toronto, 2000). A more conventional theist (for instance, a Christian) would say that Jainism is atheistic because no being is recognized that has what Christians consider the typical characteristics of ‘god’. Most Jainas strongly disagree, and the basis for this disagreement is that they give a radically different definition of what a deva is. Much of the Jaina critique of ‘Vedic’ brahminical systems of thought centres on their conviction that those brahmins have a wrong notion of what is a being that is worthy of worship.

    • Many thanks for that, Robert. I did not know (mea culpa!) your monograph and I will now order it. In general, I agree that our understanding on “atheism” depends on what we mean by “theism” and that the answer is not at all easy (not only) in a South Asian context. I discussed elsewhere my preliminary distinction between four possible understandings of “god”, namely deva/devatā, īśvara, brahman and bhagavat (see http://elisafreschi.com/2017/03/31/god-and-realism/).

    • Thanks again, Robert, for pointing out your study. I enjoyed it and it confirmed and strengthened with new evidences some of my intuitions:
      1. the general tendency among South Asian religions to incorporate another religion’s god(s) as superhuman beings who are not the Ultimate (shared pyramide, but different apex).
      2. the various meanings of “god” in South Asia, ranging from devatā to the nityasiddha to brahman, īśvara and bhagavat.
      3. the pervasive presence (possibly in all religions, surely in South Asia) of the cult of benevolent beings who can help one in one’s worldly preoccupations.
      4. the fact that trying to look “scientific” means implicitly assuming the superiority of the scientific paradigm!